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SUMMARY 
 
his research proposes a new secure token profile for improving the existing Web 
Services security standards. It provides a new authentication mechanism. This 
additional level of security is important for the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), 
which is an architectural style that uses a set of principles and design rules to shape 
interacting applications and maintain interoperability. Currently, the market push is 
towards SOA, which provides several advantages, for instance: integration with 
heterogeneous systems, services reuse, standardization of data exchange, etc. Web 
Services is one of the technologies to implement SOA and it can be implemented using 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). 
A SOAP-based Web Service relies on XML for its message format and common 
application layer protocols for message negotiation and transmission. However, it is a 
security challenge when a message is transmitted over the network, especially on the 
Internet. The Organization for Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS) announced a set of Web Services Security standards that focus on two major 
areas. “Who” can use the Web Service and “What” are the permissions. However, the 
location or domain of the message sender is not authenticated. Therefore, a new secure 
token profile called: Participant Domain Name Token Profile (PDNT) is created to 
tackle this issue. 
The PDNT provides a new security feature, which the existing token profiles do not 
address. Location-based authentication is achieved if adopting the PDNT when using 
Web Services. In the performance evaluation, PDNT is demonstrated to be significantly 
faster than other secure token profiles. The processing overhead of using the PDNT with 
other secure token profiles is very small given the additional security provided. 
Therefore all the participants can acquire the benefits of increased security and 
performance at low cost.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
3-tier – Presentation tier, business logic tier and data tier. 
Axis2 – a free core engine for Web Services, which is running on Apache. 
Base64 Encoding – It uses radix-64 representation to represent binary data in an ASCII 
string format. 
BPEL – Business Process Execution Language is a standard to specify actions within 
business process with Web Services. 
CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. 
DCOM – It stands for Distributed Component Object Model. It is proposed by 
Microsoft and is used for communication among software components over network. 
Eclipse – a free, multi-language integrated development environment (IDE). 
ESB – It stands for Enterprise Service Bus. It is used to design and implement the 
interaction between different software applications. 
ICANN – It stands for Internet Corporation for Assigns Names and Numbers. 
IPSec – Internet Protocol Security is a protocol set for security Internet Protocol. 
ISP – It stands for Internet Service Provider which is a telecommunication company 
that provides Internet connection to users. 
JAR – Java Archive is a file that uses to collect a set of Java class files and associated 
metadata and resources. 
Java API – An Application Programming Interface is a set of functions, modules, or 
libraries, which are written by Java programming language. 
JSP – It stands for Java Server Pages which is used for creating dynamically generated 
Web Page using Java programming language. 
OASIS – A non-profit consortium named Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards. It produces many standards for security, Cloud 
computing, SOA, Web Services, etc. 
Ontology – A set of concepts or knowledge within a domain, which are described by a 
set of relationships and properties.  
PKI – It stands for Public Key Infrastructure. 
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REST – It stands for Representation State Transfer that is an architectural style and is 
used to implement Web Services with well-defined HTTP methods. 
RPC – It stands for Remote Procedure Call. It allows a computer program to invoke a 
routine or module in another computer program. 
SAAJ – SOAP with attachments API for Java. It is a java library used to pars and 
handle SOAP-based message. 
SOA – Service-Oriented Architecture is a design architecture pattern used in the 
software design phase. 
SOAP – It stands for Simple Object Access Protocol, which is a specification for 
exchanged structured information in XML format for implementation of Web Services. 
SSL – Secure Sockets Layer is a cryptographic protocol that provides secure 
communication over Internet. 
TCP –It stands for Transmission Control Protocol. It is a connection-oriented protocol 
and requires handshaking to establish end-to-end communication. It is one of the core 
members the Internet Protocol Suite. 
UDDI – Universal Description, Discovery and Integration. It is a self-description 
language for a Web Service to registry themselves on the Internet. 
UDP – It stands for User Datagram Protocol and is a message-based connectionless 
protocol. It is one of the core members the Internet Protocol Suite.  
W3C – It stands for World Wide Web Consortium. 
White list – a list of IP addresses that is allowed to bypass the PDNT processing rules. 
WSDL – Web Services Description Language is an interface description language 
written in XML format. A method of Web Services can be described and invoked by 
other Web Services. 
WSS – It stands for Web Services Security. It is secure mechanisms to protect SOAP-
based message. 
WSS4J – It stands for Web Services Security for Java. It is a Java implementation to 
support OASIS Web Services Security specifications. 
XML – It stands for Extensible Markup Language (XML) that defines a set of rules for 
encoding a document.  
XML Schema – a document uses to descript the structure of an XML document. 
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1.1 Background 
oftware architecture style is changing and is categorized in different areas 
because as the size of the software increases so does: the complexity of 
functional requirements, demand for inter-system communication, data 
exchange between systems and integration with heterogonous systems. Shaw & 
Clements (1996) requires that the architectural style is formalized into a set of design 
rules that identify the kinds of components and connectors that may be used to compose 
a system or systems, together with local or global constraints on the way the 
composition is done. Meier et al. (2009) indicated that the architectural styles can be 
organized by their key focus area which includes: communication, deployment, domain 
and structure. They also describe examples of architecture style, for instance, Object-
Oriented architecture style, Message bus architecture style, etc. However, a large and 
complex system is often a combination of different types of architecture styles, for 
instance in building a public facing Web application. The selection of architecture style 
is important because it will affect the software stability, expandability to support new 
requirements, difficulty of application deployment and maintenance of the system, 
especially for Internet-based or Web-based systems. 
 
With the development of science and technology, new software architecture styles are 
proposed, designed and adopted. The major evolution in networking moulds software 
applications into new architectures, both in software and hardware architecture. The 
invention of Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN), IP protocol 
(Postel J., 1981a), TCP protocol (Postel J., 1981b), Internet, etc. changed the software 
architecture from standalone application to layered application. Tim Berners-Lee who is 
the inventor of the World Wide Web (WWW) created the HTML, which is a computer 
language for presenting web pages and other information in a web browser. The success 
of the Internet and World Wide Web once again changed the software architecture from 
layered application to cloud computing or distributed computing. The existing 
distributed computing solutions such as CORBA, Java RMI imply tight coupling 
between various components in a system. The required high level of coordination and 
shared context among business systems from different organizations makes them 
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unreliable for open, low-overhead ubiquitous B2B e-business (Albreshne A. et al., 
2009).  
 
1.2 Evolution of Software Architecture Style 
The innovation of Remote Procedure Call (RPC) leads the software architecture style 
into a new generation and it can be applied into many architecture styles. The RPC 
enables a software application to call a software module, which runs on the same or 
different machines. The RPC was first described in 1976 in RFC 707 and was adopted 
by Xerox, Microsoft, etc. One of the examples of architecture styles is Client/Server 
architecture, which uses RPC technology and divides a system into two applications, 
one is a client that makes a request and the other is a server that handles the request, for 
instance, a database server will return a result set when a client application makes a 
request. The evolution of the Client/Server architecture style was migrated from 2-tier 
to a multi-tier architecture and even to cloud computing because it can provide flexible 
and reusable applications. 
 
The two-tier architecture is simple but comes at the cost of lack of scalability. The 
business logic in two-tier architecture can be placed in either the user interface 
(presentation layer) or database (data tier) and the user interfaces directly access the 
database. However, the most commonly adopted multi-tier architecture is the three-tier 
architecture (3-tier). Basically the 3-tier style can be split into three tiers or layers, (1) 
Presentation Tier, (2) Business Logic Tier and (3) Data Tier. In order to improve 
reusability and flexibility of a complex system, more tiers or layers are added, for 
instance, a new tier or layer is added to handle business workflow. The evolution of tier 
architecture is shown in Figure 1.1. Each tier is independent of each other and it can be 
upgraded or replaced individually without modifying other tiers. 
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Figure 1.1: The evolution of tier architecture 
 
Cloud computing and grid computing have become buzzwords after Web 2.0. Godfrey 
B. (2006) identifies that distributed computing works by splitting up the larger task into 
smaller chunks, which can be performed at the same time independently of each other. 
Grid computing is a distributed computing concept which is used for sharing and 
integrating computing resources, it evolved from heterogeneous systems. Grid 
computing aims to solve the common IT problem of dedicated and underutilized 
hardware resources. It is also used to divide a large task into many tasks that run in 
parallel on separate servers. The success of the Internet led to the concept of cloud 
computing (Boss G. et al., 2007). A cloud computing infrastructure can do large-scale 
processing and it is massively scalable. Due to the nature of the Internet, cloud 
computing can break down the physical barriers and link the hardware and software 
platforms in different global locations through the Internet. Thousands or millions of 
computers can create an enormous machine pool. A complex and time-consuming task 
running on a vast amount of computers can obtain an expected result within minutes 
instead of weeks or months. 
 
Many highly complex applications have moved to the World Wide Web (WWW) 
platform which has caused the Internet to grow dramatically. Therefore, a new 
architectural style was proposed and adopted in many Web-based systems; this is the 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). The degree to which source codes can be reused 
is very important and has changed software engineering as shown in Figure 1.2. 
Reusable modules and classes can reduce implementation time, testing time and has 
Two-tier  
Architecture 
Three-tier 
Architecture 
N-tier 
Architecture 
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eliminated application bugs. Service reuse is one of the main advantages of adopting 
SOA. The service not only includes the business logics, it also includes the business 
processes. Services can work together representing an implementation of a business 
process or a business flow.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: The Degree of source code reusability 
 
The SOA has emerged over the past years as one of the preferred approaches for system 
design, development, and integration (Davis, 2009). SOA is a design architecture 
pattern used in the software design phase. An SOA-based system is a kind of distributed 
system that splits and groups the business logics into a loosely coupled set of services, 
usually called Web Services. SOA is not a technology but it is an architecture style and 
it can be implemented in many different ways, such as CORBA or with other Remote 
Procedure Call (RPC) technologies. However, Web Services is widely used to 
implement an SOA-based system. Web Services is a message-based communication 
between service provider and service consumer.  Booth et al. (2004) identifies two 
major classes of Web services architecture as illustrated in the following: 
 REST-compliant Web services, in which the primary purpose of the service is to 
manipulate XML representations of Web resources using a uniform set of 
"stateless" operations; and 
 Arbitrary Web services, in which the service may expose an arbitrary set of 
operations. 
 
•Procedures 
•Functions Reuse 
•Abstract Class 
•Polymorphism 
•Inheritance 
Reuse Services Reuse 
 16  INTRODUCTION 
  
 CHAPTER 1  
1.3 Motivation 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is one of the methodologies to implement 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). The SOAP protocol relies on Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) for its message format. A structured message is used to exchange data 
between service consumer and service provider in Web Services architecture. Therefore, 
a secure Web Services system not only focuses on the security of the system itself (e.g. 
hardware and software), but also on the confidentiality and Integrity of the message 
exchange between participants throughout the Internet, which is an unsafe public 
network, which is two components of the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability) Triad in the information security field.  Parker D. (2002) also proposed an 
alternative model, which named six atomic elements of information which include 
confidentiality, possession, integrity, authenticity, availability and utility.  
 
The SOAP-based Web Services uses WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard which is 
approved and published by Advancing Open Standards for the Information Society 
(OASIS) to fulfill the security requirements in SOAP message exchanges among 
participants. Moreover, the WS-Security 1.1 also provides security extensions for the 
Web Services protocol stack to provide end-to-end message security. The following 
specification and profiles make up the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard. 
 WS-Security Core Specification 1.1 
 Username Token Profile 1.1 
 X.509 Token Profile 1.1. 
 SAML Token Profile 1.1 
 Kerberos Token Profile 1.1 
 Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile 1.1 
 
The WS-Security Core specification and five secure token profiles are based on 
different existing security mechanisms and open standards including PKI, X.509, 
Kerberos, or other algorithms. However, they are complex and produce a lot of 
overhead, especially the X.509-based encryption and signature. If many SOAP 
 17  INTRODUCTION 
  
 CHAPTER 1  
messages are exchanged between service consumer and service provider, the overhead 
will be increased significantly. Moreover, as more secure token profiles are added to a 
SOAP message, more overheads will be produced for parsing and handling SOAP 
messages. 
 
 “Who” can use the services, “What” is the authorization is tackled by the WS-Security 
1.1 OASIS standard. However the “Where” is not handled or supported. For instance, a 
user John is allowed to use or invoke a service and has been granted appropriate user 
rights. According to the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard, the user can use or invoke 
the services everywhere. It is a security hole if the services should only be provided for 
a particular enterprise or domain. Therefore, a new secure token profile is needed to 
solve this issue and integrated with WS-Security standard. 
 
1.4 Objectives 
Although there are several security standards currently available and adopted in a 
SOAP-based message, they will produce a lot of overhead if one or more secure token 
profiles are used in the SOAP message. In this research, the location of service 
consumer and provider is taken into consideration for message exchange, parsing and 
handling. The objectives include the following: 
 
(i) Research on the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard, present the details. 
(ii) Find out the limitations of WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard. 
(iii) Propose a new token profile to tackle the limitation found in Objective [ii]. 
(iv) Develop a parser and processor based on Objective [iii]. 
(v) Building a performance model to evaluate Objective [i] and Objective [iii]. 
(vi) Present the experimental results and analysis based on Objective [v]. 
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1.5 Innovations 
The WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard is complex and produces a lot of overhead, 
especially the XML encryption, XML signature and other PKI-based mechanisms. 
However, the location of the service consumer and provider is not verified. It is a 
security hole if a service should only be provided for a particular enterprise or domain. 
 
The newly designed secure token profile incorporates one of the most widely used 
Internet service information identity, the Domain Name Service (DNS). It can verify, 
control and monitor the location of the service consumer or message sender. The newly 
designed token can be used to reject invalid requests or responses, which come from 
unknown or fake domains before parsing and processing the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS 
secure token profiles. Therefore, the service provider or consumer can save processing 
resources and handle more valid Web Services requests or responses. 
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2.1 Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Web Services 
ervice-orientation is a design paradigm comprised of a specific set of design 
principles. The application of these principles to the design of solution logic 
results in a service oriented solution logic. The most fundamental unit of 
service-oriented solution logic is the service (Erl T., 2007). The architecture style 
defining an SOA describes a set of patterns and guidelines for creating loosely coupled, 
standards-based business-aligned. Service-Oriented Architecture is an IT strategy that 
organizes the discrete functions contained in enterprise applications into interoperable, 
standards-based services that can be combined and reused quickly to meet business 
needs [BEA, 2005].  Erl T. (2005) indicated that the common tangible benefits of SOA 
are: 
1. Improved integration 
2. Inherent reuse 
3. Leveraging the legacy investment 
4. Establishing standardized XML data representation 
5. Focused investment on communications infrastructure 
6. “Best-of-breed” alternatives 
 
Artus (2006) also mentioned that Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) offers a version 
of IT flexibility enabling business agility. More and more enterprises are realizing that 
SOA is a reality not a myth. The information systems landscape of most enterprises is 
heterogeneous in nature and comprises of a combination of legacy and modern systems 
(Kumari et al., 2008). A Gartner survey (Sholler, 2008) showed that more than 85 
percent of Fortune 1000 companies are engaged in a service-oriented initiative, and that 
the average SOA project has been in place for about 9 months. Another survey 
(TechTarget/Forrester Research, 2010) showed that 47.4% of respondents work in 
organizations where SOA projects are underway, and 30.9% have multiple SOA 
projects underway. In terms of project scope, this work is seen as “enterprise-level” in 
nature in 62.6% of the cases. Formal SOA offices or centers of excellence exist in 
13.6% of organizations, up from 9.0% in a comparable 2009 survey. However, Lewis et 
al., (2007) identified eleven common misconceptions about SOA including: 
S 
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1. SOA provides the complete architecture for a system 
2. Legacy systems can be easily integrated into an SOA environment 
3. SOA is all about standards and standards are all that is needed 
4. SOA is all about technology 
5. The use of standards guarantees interoperability among services in an SOA 
environment 
6. It is easy to develop applications based on services 
7. It is easy to develop services anybody can use 
8. It is easy to compose services dynamically at runtime 
9. Services can only be business services 
10. Testing applications that use services is no different than testing any other 
application 
11. SOA can be implemented quickly 
 
Maamar Z. et al., (2011) indicated that Service-oriented architecture (SOA) and its 
flagship implementation technology known as Web services have changed the way 
software engineers design and develop today’s enterprise applications. SOA is not a 
technology but it is an architecture style or architecture pattern. It is technology 
independent and can be implemented by different remote procedure call technologies, 
for instance, Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), Distributed 
Component Object Model (DCOM), etc. The implementation of SOA applications is 
made possible through the realization of Web Services (Lee et al., 2006). Mahmoud 
(2005) identified that Web Services are the preferred standards-based way to realize 
SOA. A Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) can be implemented by a collection of 
loosely coupling services, which can be invoked by each other to exchange information 
between participants. Web Services are widely adopted and used to implement the SOA 
because of the maturing set of standards. 
Web Services, at a basic level, can be considered a universal client/server architecture 
that allows disparate systems to communicate with each other without using proprietary 
client libraries (Judith M., 2009). Web Services systems enable a high level of 
decoupling as well as dynamic binding of services. Such systems are composed by 
services, which contain behavior and messages. Services are found by applications 
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using service discovery (Gottschalk K., 2000).  There are many Web Services 
definitions described in different books or Websites, Albreshne A. et al. (2009) gives 
the following overview: 
 A web service is any piece of software that makes itself available over the 
internet and uses a standardized XML messaging system. XML is used to 
encode all communications to a web service. For example, a client invokes a 
web service by sending an XML message, then waits for a corresponding XML 
response. Because all communication is in XML, web services are not tied to 
any one operating system or programming language--Java can talk with Perl; 
Windows applications can talk with UNIX applications. 
 Web Services are self-contained, modular, distributed, dynamic applications that 
can be described, published, located, or invoked over the network to create 
products, processes, and supply chains. These applications can be local, 
distributed, or Web based. Web services are built on top of open standards such 
as TCP/IP, HTTP, Java, HTML, and XML. 
 A web service is a collection of open protocols and standards used for 
exchanging data between applications or systems. Software applications written 
in various programming languages and running on various platforms can use 
web services to exchange data over computer networks like the Internet in a 
manner similar to inter-process communication on a single computer. This 
interoperability (e.g., between Java and Python, or Windows and Linux 
applications) is due to the use of open standards. 
 
Therefore, a Web Service is an XML-based platform-independent protocol. Moreover, 
it is also programming language independent, and can be implemented using different 
programming languages. The Web Services can be distributed in both Internet and 
Intranet and discovered through a simple mechanism. Nowadays, many commercial 
products build-in Web Services technology, for instance, Web Services in Exchange 
2013 or Exchange Web Service (EWS).  EWS is a SOAP-based web service API that 
you can use to communicate with Exchange. EWS uses HTTP POST requests to send 
commands and data to the service endpoint (MSDN, 2013).  Amazon also provides a 
Web Services (AWS) infrastructure to their customers. It delivers a scalable cloud 
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computing platform with high availability and dependability, offering the flexibility to 
enable customers to build a wide range of applications. Helping to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our customers’ systems and data is of the 
utmost importance to AWS, as is maintaining customer trust and confidence (Amazon, 
2013). Fusaro VA., et al., (2011) use AWS to deliver their biomedical cloud computing. 
 
2.2 SOA-Based System 
An SOA-based system is also a kind of distributed system and similar to the Internet-
based system. One of the major differences is the level of dependence on business 
logics in the design phase. A traditional Internet-based system decomposes the business 
logics into more tightly-coupled components but SOA splits it into loosely coupling 
components and the SOA relies on components and creation of services. The other 
difference is that the system architecture of a SOA-based system can be changed after 
deployment. Therefore, a new service can be added in the system without stopping the 
whole system. The potential benefits of SOA are services reuse, integration 
improvement, leveraging the legacy investment and best of breed integration. SOA is 
suitable to design a distributed, Internet-based, dynamic change, autonomous and non-
point to point system.  
 
The following sections show an example which is designed in SOA and implemented 
using Web Services. The example is “An SOA-based Disease Notification System” 
(Cheong C. P. et al., 2009). It proposes a Diseases Notification System which is 
designed using a SOA pattern. Disease notification is an import component of the 
disease control systems. A successful diseases notification system will deliver positive 
effects for human beings. The proposed system is designed and implemented by use of 
the Business Process Execution Language for the business process layer and Enterprise 
Service Bus for the connectivity layer. Therefore, it can cope with a dynamically 
changing environment or requirements. Moreover, the proposed system can reduce the 
notification process time and it can provide timely information on diseases notification. 
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2.2.1 An SOA-Based Diseases Notification System (SOADNS) 
Many computer-based systems or tools are used for monitoring of disease migration. 
Some provide record-based information and some provide visual data, examples are 
given by (Chang L. C. et al., 2005) and (Qian Z. et al., 2004). A location-based data 
visualization system can be of great benefit for disease monitoring and tracking. 
However, a successful disease control system is based on cumulative recording of the 
occurrence of spreading diseases. Diseases notification and tracking is a vital 
component in ensuring protection of public health. To prevent and control the spread of 
infectious disease around the world, health organizations must monitor trends over time 
not only in human diseases such as chickenpox, tuberculosis, plague, HIV, Severe 
Acute Respiratory (SARS) especially, the spreading disease: Influenza-A H1N1, etc. 
and even animal diseases such as bird flu H5N1 and H7N9. 
 
2.2.1.1 System Overview 
The SOA-based Diseases Notification System (SOADNS) utilizes medical standards to 
exchange or identify notifiable diseases, including: International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) and Health Level Seven (HL7). A doctor can use the ICD code to 
classify each disease. For instance, code “487” represents “Influenza” in ICD version 
9CM and code “J11” represents “Influenza, virus not identified” in ICD version 10. The 
SOADNS has two roles, one is service provider and the other is service consumer. For 
instance, it provides services to the disease declarer and consumes service provided 
from the local health authority. A service consumer can discover the service by the 
Universal Description and Discovery and Integration (UDDI) or service brokers. Earlier 
SOA-based systems can be implemented using different connection technologies such 
as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) or Common Object Request Broker 
(CORBA). However, the SOADNS uses Web services which will be implemented by 
the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Web Service Definition Language (WSDL), 
etc. to implement the system. Figure 2.1 shows the high level architecture of the 
SOADNS. A clinic or a private doctor can declare notifiable diseases by use of a Web 
interface provided by the local health authority. The Hospital acts as a service consumer 
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and submits the notifiable diseases by use of a standard SOA client application using a 
SOAP message format. The hospital can also act as a service provider to provide Web 
services to other service consumers. For instance, it can provide the details of patient 
records to the WHO if necessary. The SOADNS is designed as a standard application 
package. Therefore, it can be deployed to every participant and only requires minor 
changes in the business process layer. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: High level architecture diagram of SOADNS 
 
2.2.1.2 System Architecture 
The SOADNS is composed of five layers including: presentation layer, service layer, 
business process layer, connectivity layer and data layer. The presentation layer - the 
client side uses a Web browser to input data, such as patient records and diseases 
notification data. The service layer contains all the services provided from the proposed 
system. The service can encapsulate one or more business logics of the system and it 
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has an interface for the service consumer to interact with. Services are orchestrated into 
business processes in the business process layer. The Business Process Execution 
Language (BPEL) is used in this layer and it can specify which services should be 
invoked and the sequence in which they are invoked, which can ensure the 
business/work flow is in the correct order. Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) is used in the 
connectivity layer. It can move, transform and route the clinical data within the internal 
system and between the external systems in XML format. The data layer includes the 
database of diseases notification data, demographic data and it can be used through an 
adapter service defined in the connectivity layer, for instance, a database adapter service. 
 
A. Service Layer 
Service modeling is one of the vital processes to build a SOA-based System. The 
process decomposes the business logics into several generic processes or services. There 
are several core services in SOADNS including: CodeValidationService, 
NotificationService, TaskService and DatabaseAdapterService. The NotificationService 
is used for notifying guarders when a serious incident occurs via email, fax, pager or 
SMS. The ICD Code is validated by the CodeValidationService. It can handle the 
different versions of the disease codes. The TaskService is a human workflow task and 
it can interweave human interactions with connectivity to the SOADNS. The human 
task is linked to the Business Process Layer through a WSDL. In the SOADNS, the 
TaskService is used for the human re-approval and re-confirmed for the disease being 
monitored before notifying the emergency committee. DatabaseAdapterService 
provides a bridge between the database and the business process layer. All the services 
can interact with each other at the message level and are described in Web Service 
Orchestration language. 
 
B. Business Process Layer 
The Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) is used in this layer for specifying 
interactions with Web Services including the business logic and the execution order. 
The BPEL process of SOADNS is shown in Figure 2.2.  For instance, a doctor submits 
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a notifiable disease through a web browser. The doctor can input different versions of 
ICD code. Then, the BPEL process is invoked by a message from the application server 
or ESB. The BPEL process writes the notifiable disease record to the database. The 
BPEL process calls the CodeValidationService to valid the disease code. If the disease 
code is valid, it will check whether it is required to notify a monitor or a committee 
member by using NotifialeDiseaseDBAdapter. The committee or members of the WHO 
may receive an alert message under certain circumstances. Finally, an email will be sent 
back to a declarer for confirmation. If it is a confirmed case, the system will send an 
alert message through SMS or a pager to the emergency committee. Otherwise, if it is a 
suspected case, the system will only send an alert message via an email to a general 
officer for example. 
 
Figure 2.2: BPEL process of SOADNS 
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C. Connectivity Layer 
In a hospital environment, many different architecture systems, which include hardware 
and software, are used for different purposes. For instance, a Health or Hospital 
Information System is used for recording patient demographic and clinical information. 
The Lab or laboratory management system (LMS) is used in the laboratory for the 
management of the patient’s samples such as blood test samples. It requires an 
interfacing program between the LMS and laboratory equipment. Different systems 
produce outputs in different formats, such as text, XML, HL7, etc. Therefore, the 
Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) can be used to put everything together. The ESB is 
suitable for use in the hospital environment. It can collect the output coming from 
different platforms and in different formats. It means that the disease code not only 
comes from user input through a Web user interface, it can also be obtained from 
heterogeneous systems automatically. 
 
2.2.1.3 Advantages of SOADNS 
The SOADNS is designed in a SOA style. Therefore, it can obtain the advantages of 
SOA such as business logic reusability, loosely-coupled to other services, etc. The 
BPEL and ESB are also used to make the system complete. The system can be 
dynamically changed by modifying the BPEL process in the business process layer. 
Therefore, the system is easy to spread and to deploy. The ESB is used in the SOADNS. 
It can accommodate the data of existing medical systems, such as laboratory 
management system, X-Ray management system, etc. The SOADNS is composed of 
services, BPEL and ESB. Therefore, it increases flexibility, it is easy to change the 
system architecture and it scales from a point to point solution to a distributed solution. 
Moreover, the SOADNS can make diseases notification more effective and provide 
timely information. It uses BPEL as a standards-based way of orchestrating all services. 
The system architecture can be changed easily by modifying the business process layer 
through BPEL. Therefore, the SOADNS can be deployed by different participants 
without modifying the application source code. The ESB is used to collect notifiable 
diseases data in different formats from heterogeneous systems. The proposed system is 
a complete solution for diseases notification in and from different locations. 
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2.2.1.4 Security consideration of SOADNS 
One of the major security issues is who can submit a notifiable disease, for instance, a 
private doctor, a clinic or even a hospital. Usually, a user or a participant can be 
identified by a username with a password. Therefore, the SOADNS can adopt the 
Username Token Profile, which is one of the secure token profiles collected in the 
OASIS standard 1.1 to fulfill the user authentication requirement. However, “where” 
can submit a notifiable disease is not handled and not verified in existing secure token 
profiles. Therefore, a new secure token profile is a need to provide additional security 
for use by SOANDNS. 
 
2.3 Web Services Architecture 
Web services provide a standard means of interoperating between different software 
applications, running on a variety of platforms and/or frameworks. A Web service is a 
software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over 
a network. It has an interface described in a machine-processable format. Other systems 
interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP 
messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction 
with other Web-related standards (Booth et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 2.3: Web service architecture (Champion et al., 2002) 
 30 LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 CHAPTER 2  
The Web Services architecture basically consists of three roles, service requestor, 
service provider and service registry as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The relationship 
between these three roles is: a service provider defines and publishes a service 
description to a service requestor or service registry; the service requestor finds a 
desired service and retrieves the service description locally or from the service registry; 
the service requestor uses service description to bind with and invoke the service 
implementation from the service provider directly. 
 
2.4 Classes of Web Services 
Two major classes of Web services are defined by W3C. Representation State Transfer 
(REST)-compliant Web services and arbitrary Web services, the “Big” Web services 
technology. REST is neither a standard nor a protocol. It is an architectural style like the 
client/server architecture. The arbitrary or “Big” Web Services is a web service which is 
implemented by Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP).  
 
2.4.1 REST-compliant Web Services 
RESTful Web Services are an alternative to Remote Procedure Call technologies like 
SOAP and WS-* services (Schreier S., 2011). According to Fielding (2000), 
Representational State Transfer is intended to evoke an image of how a well-designed 
Web application behaves: Presented with a network of web pages (a virtual state-
machine), the user progresses through an application by selecting links (state 
transitions), resulting in the next page (representing the next state of the application) 
being transferred to the user and rendered for their use. REST defines a set of 
architectural principles by which you can design Web services that focus on a system's 
resources, including how resource states are addressed and transferred over HTTP by a 
wide range of clients written in different languages (Rodriguez, 2008). Hansen (2007) 
identified a set of constraints and architectural principles for the REST-style services as 
illustrated in the following: 
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 RESTful services are stateless. As Fielding (2000) writes in Section 5.1.3 of his 
thesis, “each request from client to server must contain all the information 
necessary to understand the request, and cannot take advantage of any stored 
context on the server.” 
 RESTful services have a uniform interface. This constraint is usually taken to 
mean that the only allowed operations are the HTTP operations: GET, POST, PUT, 
and DELETE. 
 REST-based architectures are built from resources (pieces of information) that are 
uniquely identified by URIs. For example, in a RESTful purchasing system, each 
purchase order has a unique URI. 
 REST components manipulate resources by exchanging representations of the 
resources. For example, a purchase order resource can be represented by an XML 
document. Within a RESTful purchasing system, a purchase order might be 
updated by posting an XML document containing the changed purchase order to its 
URI. 
 
One of the major characteristics of the RESTful Web Services is the explicit use of 
well-defined HTTP methods which are defined in RFC 2616. It maps the well-known 
HTTP methods to four basic functions which are “create”, “read”, “update” and “delete” 
(CRUD) operations as shown in Table 2.1. In a traditional Web application, it uses the 
HTTP GET method with “query string” or “hidden field” which is defined in standard 
HTML form to achieve the four basic functions (CRUD). However, this mechanism 
changes the original design of HTTP protocol and it is inconsistent with the HTTP GET 
method. An example of an Application Program Interface (API) between RESTful Web 
Services and traditional Web application is shown in Table 2.2.  
 
REST-based resource-oriented Architecture abstracts all the objects in the system as 
resources and gives them their own unique resource identifiers. It provides various 
resource services to the external environment through RESTful Web Services (Wang et 
al., 2009). The RESTful utilizes Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) to identify 
resources and uses uniform interface (HTTP methods) to manipulate information. It 
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uses a directory structure-like URI to make a service consumer easily understand where 
they can obtain the resources. Table 2.3 shows the examples of RESTful URI for 
acquiring particular resources. The REST-style architecture is like the client/server 
architecture, for instance, a client sends a request to a server and a result will be sent 
back to the client after the server processes the request. It is similar to a user browsing a 
web site on the Internet. For instance, a user browses a web site by sending an HTTP 
request to a web server. The web server parses and processes the HTTP request and 
returns a result depending on the HTTP method. 
 
Table 2.1: The mapping between RESTful operations and the HTTP method 
RESTful 
Operations 
HTTP method Description 
Create POST Submit data to be processed by the 
identified resources 
Read GET Request a specific representation of a 
resource 
Update PUT Update a resource with the supplied 
representation 
Delete DELETE Deletes the specified resource 
 
Table 2.2: The API of RESTful Web Services and traditional web application 
Operation RESTful API Traditional Web API 
Create POST /students HTTP/1.1 
Content-Type: application/xml 
…... 
<?xml version=”1.0”?> 
<student> 
GET /addStudent?name=Peter HTTP/1.1 
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 <name>Peter</name> 
</student> 
Read GET/students/Peter HTTP/1.1 
Accept: application/xml 
…… 
GET / getstudnet?name=Peter HTTP/1.1 
Update PUT /students/Peter HTTP/1.1 
Content-Type: application/xml 
…… 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<student> 
  <name>David</name> 
</student> 
GET 
/updatestudent?name=Peter&newname=David 
HTTP/1.1 
Delete DELETE/students/Peter HTTP/1.1 
Accept: application/xml 
…… 
GET /deleteStudent?name=Peter HTTP/1.1 
 
Table 2.3: Example of RESTful URI for acquiring particular resources 
URI Description 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/students Resources of students 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/students/1001 Resource of student ID 1001 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/schools Resources of schools 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/schools/Informatics Resource of school of Informatics 
 
Due to the simplicity and flexibility, REST is suitable for a constrained environment. 
Many Web clients and physical devices support HTTP protocol. It can easily cooperate 
and integrate with different devices if security is not a major issue. In recent years, some 
REST security protocols (Serme G., 2012), (Kosmajac D., 2012) have been proposed in 
academia.  However, they are not standard security protocols. SOAP-based Web 
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Services has a De factor Web Services security standard. Therefore, it will be adopted if 
security is a major concern. 
 
2.4.2 SOAP-based Web Services 
Simple Object Access Protocol is a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging 
structured information in a decentralized, distributed environment. It uses XML 
technologies to define an extensible messaging framework providing a message 
construct that can be exchanged over a variety of underlying protocols. The framework 
has been designed to be independent of any particular programming model and other 
implementation specific semantics (Gudgin M. et al., 2007). Al-Zoubi et al. (2009) 
identify that the SOAP-based Web Services are provided as Remote Procedure Calls 
(RPC) on top of the Web (HTTP). SOAP is a protocol specification for exchanging 
structured information in the implementation of Web Services in a computer network. It 
relies on eXtensible Markup Language (XML) for its message format, and usually relies 
on other Application Layer protocols for message negotiation and transmission 
(Atadjanov A.J., 2010). 
 
A method or a subroutine hosted in a local machine can be executed by a remote system 
through an Application Programming Interface (API). However, a traditional API is 
language-dependent and is only available for a particular programming language. A 
Web service is a kind of distributed system and it provides APIs which can be used by 
all systems on the Internet. Currently, SOAP is the most common way to implement 
Web Services and it is a core component of the Web Services architecture. The SOAP is 
a specification for exchanging structured messages between two computer systems via 
common communication protocols. The components of SOAP are shown in Figure 2.4. 
XML is used for exchanging information and HTTP, SMTP, etc are used for the 
communication between participants. 
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Figure 2.4: The components of SOAP 
 
A valid SOAP message is a well-formed XML document, which is defined in the XML 
1.0 specification. The SOAP message consists of a SOAP envelope, SOAP header and 
SOAP body as illustrated in Figure 2.5. The SOAP envelope element identifies the 
XML document as a SOAP message and indicates the start and the end of the SOAP 
message. The SOAP header is an optional element, which provides application-specific 
information for extending the functionality of a SOAP message. The SOAP body 
element contains the method name with corresponding parameters of the Web Services 
and the results after invoking the Web Services. It also contains a child element, a 
SOAP fault element, which is used to indicate error messages while processing the 
message. A SOAP message is encoded using XML and uses SOAP namespace and a 
SOAP encoding style as shown in Table 2.4. Mitra N. and Lafon Y. (2007) indicate how 
to invoke a SOAP RPC as shown in the following: 
1. The address of the target SOAP node.  
2. The procedure or method name.  
3. The identities and values of any arguments to be passed to the procedure or method 
together with any output parameters and return value.  
4. A clear separation of the arguments used to identify the Web resource, which is the 
actual target for the RPC, as compared with those that convey data or control 
information used for processing the call by the target resource.  
5. The message exchange pattern, such as HTTP POST and HTTP GET, which will 
be employed to convey the RPC, together with an identification of the so-called 
"Web Method"  
6. Optionally, data, which may be carried as a part of SOAP header blocks. 
XML message 
Communication 
Protocol SOAP 
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Figure 2.5: A pictorial representation of the SOAP message (Mitra N. et al., 2007) 
 
Table 2.4: Prefixes and namespaces used in this research 
Prefix Namespace Notes 
S11 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ A normative XML schema document 
for SOAP message version 1.1 
namespace 
S11:encodingStyle http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/ indicates the encoding rules used to 
serialize a SOAP message version 1.1 
S12 http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope A normative XML schema document 
for SOAP message version 1.2 
namespace 
S12:encodingStyle http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-encoding indicate the encoding rules used to 
serialize a SOAP message version 1.2 
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Usually, the SOAP uses HTTP as a communication protocol, named SOAP HTTP 
binding. A SOAP message is embedded in a HTTP request or HTTP response message 
that complies with the SOAP encoding rules. A HTTP POST method is used for the 
SOAP request message and uses HTTP Content-Type header to define MIME 
(Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions / Internet Media) type and character encoding. 
An example of a SOAP request and response message is shown in Figure 2.6 and Figure 
2.7. According to the RFC 3902, the Content-Type is defined by the MIME type of the 
body as illustrated in Table 2.5. The Content-Length header represents the number of 
bytes in the request and response body. In this example, a method “GetStudents” is sent 
to a Web server with a parameter “studnetId” and the student information who student 
id is A001 will be returned in XML format. The namespace and the schema of student 
information are defined in the “http://www.sussex.ac.uk/student” in this example. 
 
Table 2.5: The Content-Type used in SOAP request message 
MIME media type name Application 
MIME subtype  name soap+xml 
Required parameters None 
Optional parameters charset: specified in RFC 3023 
actions: used to specify the URI that 
identifies the intent of the message. 
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Figure 2.6: An example of SOAP request message using HTTP protocol 
 
 
  
POST /student HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.sussex.ac.uk 
Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8 
Content-Length: nnn 
 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<S12:Envelope xmlns:S12="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" 
 S12:encodingStyle="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-encoding"> 
 
 <S12:Body xmlns:ns="http://www.sussex.ac.hk/student"> 
  <ns:getStudents> 
   <ns:studentId>A001</ns:studentId> 
  </ns:getStudents> 
 </S12:Body> 
 
</S12:Envelope> 
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Figure 2.7: An example of SOAP Response message using HTTP protocol 
 
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is an XML format for describing 
network services as a set of endpoints operating on messages containing either 
document-oriented or procedure-oriented information (Christense E., et al., 2001). A 
SOAP client uses WSDL to locate Web Services and obtain a method description as 
illustrated in Figure 2.8. Therefore, the client can know how to access the services. It 
also indicates which transport protocol is used, for instance, the HTTP protocol. 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8 
Content-Length: nnn 
 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<S12:Envelope xmlns:S12="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope" 
 S12:encodingStyle="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-encoding"> 
 
 <S12:Body> 
  <getStudentsResponse xmlns:ns="http://www.sussex.ac.hk/student"> 
   <student>    
    <studentId>A001</studentId> 
    <firstName>Peter </firstName> 
    <lastName>Chan</lastName> 
    <gender>M</gender> 
    <email>peter.chan@sussex.ac.uk</email> 
   </student> 
  <getStudentsResponse> 
 </S12:Body> 
</S12:Envelope> 
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<definitions name="StudentService" 
 targetNamespace="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wsdl/StudentService.wsdl" 
 xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" 
 xmlns:S11="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
 xmlns:tns="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wsdl/StudentService.wsdl" 
 xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
 xmlns:s0="http://www.ssussex.ac.uk/student/student.xsd> 
  
 <message name="GetStudentRequest"> 
  <part name="studentId" type="xsd:string"/> 
 </message> 
 <message name="GetStudentResponse"> 
  <part name="student" type="s0:Student"/> 
 </message> 
 
 <portType name="Student_PortType"> 
  <operation name="getStudents"> 
   <input message="tns:GetStudentRequest"/> 
   <output message="tns:GetStudentResponse"/> 
  </operation> 
 </portType> 
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Figure 2.8: An example of Web Service Description Language 
 
The WSDL document includes seven parts including definitions, types, message, 
portType, binding and service elements, which are described in the following: 
 The <type> element is used to define built-in data types that are used by the Web 
Services.  The built-in data types are defined in an XML schema file. 
 <binding name="Student_Binding" type="tns:Student_PortType"> 
<s11:binding style="rpc" 
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
  <operation name="getStudent"> 
   <s11:operation soapAction="getStudent"/> 
  <input> 
  <s11:body 
   encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
   namespace="urn:examples:studentservice" 
   use="encoded"/> 
  </input> 
  <output> 
   <s11:body 
   encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
   namespace="urn:examples:studentservice" 
   use="encoded"/> 
  </output> 
  </operation> 
 </binding> 
 
 <service name="Studnet_Service"> 
  <documentation>WSDL File for StudentService</documentation> 
  <port binding="tns:Student_Binding" name="Student_Port"> 
   <s11:address 
              location="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/student/"> 
       </port> 
 </service> 
</definitions> 
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 The <message> element defines the data format of each individual transmission 
in the communication, in this example, one message represents the “getStudents” 
request and the other is the response message. Each message can contain one or 
more parts, which are the parameters of the message. 
 The <portType> element is the most important WSDL element. It describes the 
operations, which are provided by Web Services.  
 The <binding> element indicates which communication protocol is used. 
 The <Service> element defines the location of the Web Services. 
 
SOAP relies on XML for its message format. In order to pass through the firewall to 
support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over the Internet, usually Hyper 
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is adopted as 
the communication protocol. There are two different layers to secure the SOAP, 
message level security and transport level security. The transport level security uses 
layer 3 or layer 4 protocol to protect the data, such as IPSec, SSL, etc. However, it will 
break the layer 3 security protection if there is an intermediary SOAP node between two 
end points (Nordotten N. A., 2009 ). The message level security is working in layer 7, 
the application layer. Therefore, the message level security is a proper method to protect 
the message from end to end and the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard is adopted to 
protect SOAP messages. 
 
2.4.3 RESTful Web Services versus SOAP-based Web Services 
Fielding (2000) writes that “REST-based architectures communicate primarily through 
the transfer of representations of resources”. This is fundamentally different from the 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) approach that encapsulates the notion of invoking a 
procedure on the remote server. The RPC messages typically contain information about 
the procedure to be invoked or action to be taken, which is a similar mechanism to a 
SOAP-based message. The REST-style Web Services or RESTful Web services 
provider requires a more constrained architectural style, which provides a uniform set of 
interfaces or operations, including create, retrieve update and delete. However, the 
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SOAP-based Web Services provide arbitrary or application-specific interfaces, which 
are invoked by the service consumer. Unlike SOAP-based Web Services, the RESTful 
Web Services do not provide descriptions of the web service interface, such as Web 
Services Description Language (WSDL). It must have an out-of-band agreement 
between a service consumer and a service provider, for instance, sample code and API 
documentation. Moreover, the RESTful Web Services only support HTTP in the 
transport layer instead of other transport layer protocols, for example, FTP, SMTP, etc. 
However, both of the SOAP-based and RESTful Web Services use an XML document 
to exchange a message between service consumer and service provider. The major 
characteristics of RESTful Web Services and SOAP-based Web Services are shown in 
Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6: Comparison of RESTful Web Services and SOAP-based Web Services 
 RESTful Web Services SOAP-based Web Services 
URI Resource-based Method-based 
Message Format XML XML with SOAP 
Envelope 
Interface Definition None WSDL 
Method name Uniform method Arbitrary method 
Transport Protocol HTTP HTTP, SMTP, FTP, etc. 
Transport Level Security SSL SSL 
End-to-End Security None WS-Security 1.1 OASIS 
standards 
 
RESTful Web Services is an architectural style for building a distributed application. It 
is not a standard or a protocol. But the SOAP is a standard, a protocol and it has been 
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provided with a series of specifications.  Both types of Web Services can use HTTP-
based authentication plus Secure Sockets Layer or Transport Layer Security (SSL / TLS) 
to secure the communication between service consumer and service provider. However, 
SOAP works with extra secure protocols, the WS-* specifications, which support end-
to-end message security. But the RESTful Web Service does not have this option and 
does not provide any relative security standard. Therefore, this research will focus on 
the security issues of the Web Services, which is implemented using SOAP. 
 
2.5 Web Services Security Challenges 
According to the definitions of “44 U.S.C. § 3542”, Information security means 
protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide – 
A. Integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity;  
B. Confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
information; and  
C. Availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information. 
 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) are three major aspects of security. 
Security decisions must always be made with an understanding of the threats facing the 
system to be secured (Zhang, 2010). Singhal A. et al. (2007) identify the elements of 
security for Web Services as illustrated in Table 2.7. Schwarz J., et al. (2005) also 
identifies the traditional security threats and security challenges of Web Services as 
shown in the Table 2.8 and Table 2.9.  
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The security challenges between service provider and service consumer can be divided 
into two parts, one is in the communication / transport layer and the other is in the 
message layer security. Usually, the security issues in the communication layer can be 
solved by the Secure / Transport Socket Layer (SSL /TLS) if a SOAP message uses 
HTTP as a communication protocol. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) or other network 
layer security protocols can be used to tackle the security issues in the network layer 
(layer 3). However, this research only focuses on the message layer security of Web 
Services. 
 
Table 2.7: Element of security for Web Services (Singhal A., et al., 2007) 
Element Description 
Identification and Authentication Verifying the identity of a user, process, or 
device, often as a prerequisite to allowing 
access to resources in an information 
system. 
Authorization The permission to use a computer 
resource, granted, directly or indirectly, by 
an application or system owner. 
Integrity The property that data has not been altered 
in an unauthorized manner while in 
storage, during processing, or in transit. 
Non-repudiation Assurance that the sender of information is 
provided with proof of delivery and the 
recipient is provided with proof of the 
sender’s identity, so neither can later deny 
having processed the information. 
Confidentiality Preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure, 
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including means for protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary information 
Privacy Restricting access to subscriber or relying 
party information in accordance with 
Federal law and organization policy 
 
Table 2.8: Traditional security threats (Schwarz J., et al., 2005) 
ID Security Challenge Definition 
T-01 Message Alteration The message information is altered by inserting, 
removing or otherwise modifying information created 
by the originator of the information and mistaken by the 
receiver as being the originator’s intention. There is not 
necessarily a one to one correspondence between 
message information and the message bits due to 
canonicalization and related transformation 
mechanisms. 
T-02 Confidentiality Information within the message is viewable by 
unintended and unauthorized participants. (e.g. a credit 
card number is obtained). 
T-03 Falsified Messages Fake messages are constructed and sent to a receiver 
who believes them to have come from a party other than 
the sender. For example, Alice sends a message to Bob. 
Mal copies some (or all of) it and uses that in a message 
sent to Bob who believes this new action was initiated 
by Alice. This overlaps with T-01. The principle is that 
there is generally little value to saying a message has 
not been modified since it was sent unless we know 
who sent it. 
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T-04 Man in the Middle A party poses as the other participant to the real sender 
and receiver in order to fool both participants (e.g. the 
attacker is able to downgrade the level of cryptography 
used to secure the message). The term “Man in the 
Middle” is applied to a wide variety of attacks that have 
little in common except for their topology. Potential 
designs have to be closely examined on a case-by-case 
basis for susceptibility to anything a third party might 
do. 
T-05 Principal Spoofing A message is sent which appears to be from another 
principal (e.g. Alice sends a message which appears as 
though it is from Bob). This is a variation on T-03. 
T-06 Forged claims A message is sent in which the security claims are 
forged in an effort to gain access to otherwise 
unauthorized information (e.g. A security token is used 
which wasn't really issued by the specified authority). 
The methods of attack and prevention here are 
essentially the same as T-01. 
T-07 Replay of Message 
Parts 
A message is sent which includes portions of another 
message in an effort to gain access to otherwise 
unauthorized information or to cause the receiver to 
take some action(e.g. a security token from another 
message is added).Note that this is a variation on T-01. 
Like “Man in the Middle” this technique can be applied 
in a wide variety of situations. All designs must be 
carefully inspected from the perspective of what could 
an attacker do by replaying messages or parts of 
messages. 
T-08 Replay A whole message is resent by an attacker 
T-09 Denial of Service Amplifier Attack: attacker does a small amount of work 
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and forces system under attack to do a large amount of 
work. This is an important issue in design and perhaps 
merits profiling in some cases. 
 
Table 2.9: Security challenges of Web Services (Schwarz J., et al., 2005) 
Security Challenge Definition 
Peer Identification An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so that 
the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it from 
other entities. 
Peer Authentication The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the one 
claimed. 
Data Origin 
Identification 
An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so that 
the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it from 
other entities. 
Data Origin 
authentication 
The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed. 
Data Integrity The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost 
in an unauthorized or accidental manner (see [RFC 2828]). It 
includes transport data integrity and SOAP message integrity. 
Data Confidentiality The property that information is not made available or disclosed 
to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes [i.e. to any 
unauthorized system entity]. It includes transport data 
confidentiality and SOAP message confidentiality. 
Message 
Uniqueness 
The ability to insure that a specific message is not resubmitted 
for processing. 
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2.6 Web Services Security Technologies 
Security is fundamentally about protecting assets. Assets may be tangible items, such as 
operations or your customer database (Meier J.D. et al., 2008). Web application or Web 
Service is one of the assets of a corporation or enterprise. It will expose the internal, 
private and sensitive information to the public if a service is used or invoked by an 
unauthorized user. Yamaguchi Y. et al. (2007) identified that when services are 
composed together, it is important to consider not only the functional requirements but 
also the nonfunctional requirements. Especially for security, the security requirements 
for an application are commonly described in a policy like WS-SecurityPolicy. Web 
Services security is one of the critical areas for research both in industry as well as in 
academia. In recent years, many security solutions have been invented and implemented 
including non-standard Web Services security technologies and de facto Web Service 
security technologies.  
2.6.1 De facto Web Services security technologies 
OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) is a 
not-for-profit consortium that drives the development, convergence and adoption of 
open standards for the global information society. OASIS announced a set of Web 
Services Security Standards named WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard, which were 
approved by the Web Service Security (WSS) technical committee in November 28th 
2006. The WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard consists of one specification and six token 
profiles, including: 
 WS-Security Core Specification 1.1 
 Username Token Profile 1.1 
 X.509 Token Profile 1.1 
 SAML Token Profile 1.1 
 Kerberos Token Profile 1.1 
 Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile 1.1 
 SOAP with Attachments (SWA) Profile 1.1. 
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The WS-Security Core Specification 1.1 utilizes two open W3C- approved standards, 
XML Encryption and XML Signature to provide message integrity and confidentiality.  
Because the core specification is designed to be extensible, other existing security 
mechanisms can be applied and work with the core specification, for instance, the X.509, 
SAML, Kerberos, Rights Expression Language. Therefore, five security-related token 
profiles are proposed and approved by the Web Services Security Technical Committee 
and can improve the security of Web Services.  
 
2.6.1.1 WS-Security Core Specification 1.1 
The WS-Security Core Specification is also named “Web Services Security: SOAP 
Message Security 1.1”, which is written by Lawrence K. et al. (2006) and has been 
published by OASIS. The specification utilizes the W3C-approved XML encryption and 
XML signature standard to provide SOAP message integrity and confidentially. 
Moreover, the specification is designed to be extensible. It defined a mechanism for 
associating different types of security tokens with message content. Therefore, a range 
of security protocols or user defined security protocols can work with a SOAP message 
using this specification instead of fixed or limited security protocols. Figure 2.9 shows 
the conceptual representation of the WS-Security Core specification. The specification 
is an extension of the SOAP specification for building secure Web services and 
provides three main features: 
1. Define how to send a security token as part of a SOAP message. 
2. Provide message integrity feature. 
3. Provide message confidentiality. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.9, a security header <wsse:Security> has been added into the 
SOAP message header <soap:Header>  to define  a security framework and includes 
extensibility mechanisms.  The security header block defines different tags to contain 
security-related information for the intended recipient. A recipient will parse the 
message security information and obtain the details of the processing rules based on the 
WS-Security core specification. 
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Figure 2.9: The conceptual representation of WS-Security core specification 
According to the WS-Security Core Specification, an XML Encryption security element 
<xenc:EncryptionData>, which is based on the XML encryption standard is added into 
<wsse:Security> security token block. The encryption element block carries the 
required information for encryption processing. An example of SOAP message 
encryption is shown in Figure 2.10. In this example, a public key which is specified in 
the “<ds:KeyInfo>” element is used to encrypt the data. 
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Figure 2.10: Example of SOAP message encryption  
The <xenc:DataReference> element indicates which message part will be encrypted, the 
message body is encrypted in this example. A common symmetric key shared by the 
service provider and the service receiver is used for encrypting the message content. It 
can also use a one-time symmetric key, which is carried in the <xenc:CipherValue> 
element of the message. The one-time symmetric key is encrypted by a recipient public 
key. Therefore, the recipient can decrypt the message using the private key.  
 
<S11:Header> 
<wsse:Security> 
<xenc:EncryptedKey> 
   <xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
   <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
     <ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
      <ds:X509IssuerName>CN=Webster</ds:X509IssuerName> 
      <ds:X509SerialNumber>1325057813</ds:X509SerialNumber> 
     </ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
   <xenc:CipherData> 
    <xenc:CipherValue> 
Gu0KEwiNTGI40UcjTnS6g/4/lsuwhVU5+gaCjOFsihQ4lViD/P7cPkzGBnhEHg
+oM8SB9AkXyuSnQ0PIMET9gai94kA62Mhm/8f/xaxShNtoGBCZ0Dixc5DGIAMm
z32wzHC1zbDUDnpQSp6hIP+IOM/SXSQavLZtMaDhxXYTaUtSJxyVHFGNUMfFAm
WI3H7x26/UIC3zNe0EDUkBPwcWvet5+vMvUnzNFxZyYXsU+yRE+D/+p8qtd3Ax
xzi5ou+qfQvlIL02d9PqCPt7fvyxqjZtuBN2XheCokUewMVqIG7UmaFfwAsEDG
thcEIyNGtX8726x3DYxFoKKY1R27f+fw== 
    </xenc:CipherValue> 
   </xenc:CipherData> 
   <xenc:ReferenceList> 
    <xenc:DataReference URI="#MsgBody"/> 
   </xenc:ReferenceList> 
  </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header> 
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The WS-Security Core Specification allows the creation of a digital signature for the 
SOAP message body.  A signature is produced by the message creator and is used to 
verify message origin and integrity. A message recipient uses the signature to determine 
whether the message is altered during transmission. An example of a SOAP message 
signature is shown in Figure 2.11. This specification also allows for multiple signatures 
and signature formats to be attached to a message. A <ds:Signature> element, which is 
added to the existing content of the <wsse:Security> header block is used to carry 
signature-related information. For instance, within the <ds:Signature> element block, 
the <ds:DigestMethod> element is used to identify the digest algorithm to be applied to 
the signed object, RSA encryption and SH1 message digest algorithm is used in the 
example. The encrypted message digest with base64 encoded value is shown within the 
<ds:DigestValue> element block. The key information, which is used to encrypt the 
encoded message digest is shown within <ds:KeyInfo> element block. 
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Figure 2.11: Example of SOAP message signature  
 
<wsse:Security> 
 <ds:Signature  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
  <ds:SignedInfo> 
   <ds:CanonicalizationMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-
20010315#WithComments" /> 
   <ds:SignatureMethod 
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
   <ds:Reference URI="#MsgBody"> 
    <ds:DigestMethod 
     Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
    <ds:DigestValue> 
     EVZpDUsThfZQeKXpgijgyLO5PbU= 
    </ds:DigestValue> 
   </ds:Reference> 
  </ds:SignedInfo> 
  <ds:SignatureValue> 
RCCAJjax942pxXOlCfazRgeNjVAZT8fRbcIICEyRwAeNljKNB4RvoT0u+g96oD
MTtACq5xxcf8cu85cP6+l5yrRizbTDQhhkBfNwkw7VDv/1eqszVkxPd96phNcm
TZ8rB2xXaJYgrkWoH0NkBqA5NvCrmH1ETpTtnOudDXTOLBo= 
  </ds:SignatureValue> 
  <ds:KeyInfo> 
   <ds:KeyValue> 
    <ds:RSAKeyValue> 
     <ds:Modulus> 
0Xrzq2zclIckhZQwbHiRqZQf3c4T3YsmWOj7jl9NyUCIrXR
3Hit1Q0kf3zCSzeo56MjEy2b8aw+GqGU+cK2r03NHygfOIB
cjGTioCExlPGuWbKMLIeBMzh5V3o2lsGM89sK8S07egngc4
cRcVN12vnj55i1KbXPeST90E3DoX+k=  
     </ds:Modulus> 
     <ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent> 
    </ds:RSAKeyValue> 
   </ds:KeyValue> 
  </ds:KeyInfo> 
 </ds:Signature> 
</wsse:Security> 
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2.6.1.2 Web Service Security: Username Token Profile 1.1 
The Username Token profile is used with the Web Services Security (WSS) 
specification and describes how to use Username Token. It describes how a web service 
consumer can supply a username and a password to a service provider for the consumer 
authentication. A <wsse:UsernameToken> token is used to carry user relative 
information including username, password, etc. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Example of username token use in a SOAP message 
 
An example of Username Token used with the WSS specification is shown in Figure 
2.12. It illustrates using a password digest with a nonce and a create timestamp. The 
digest value of password uses SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) message-digest 
<S11:Header> 
 <wsse:Security> 
  <wsse:UsernameToken> 
   <wsse:Username>John</wsse:Username> 
<wsse:Password Type="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-username-token-
profile-1.0#PasswordDigest"> 
 NtaIDHV2y+beT9ED5IUUck9dvqE= 
</wsse:Password> 
<wsse:Nonce EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-
1.0#Base64Binary"> 
 zgniDw== 
</wsse:Nonce> 
   <wsu:Created> 
    2012-02-10T16:45:27+0800 
   </wsu:Created> 
  </wsse:UsernameToken> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header>  
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algorithm for cryptographic hash function. In order to prevent replay attacks, the 
following equation is used to produce the password digest. 
 
Password_Digest =Base64 (SHA-1 (nonce + created + password))  
  (2.1) 
Where:  
 Base64: An encoding scheme that represents binary data in an ASCII string 
format by translating it into a radix-64 representation. 
 SHA-1: Secure Hash Algorithm 1 for message digest. 
 Nonce: A random value that the sender creates to include in each Username 
Token that it sends. 
 Created: A timestamp is used to indicate the create time. 
 Password: A password that is provided by the service provider. 
 
2.6.1.3 Web Service Security: X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1 
X.509 is an ITU-T (Telecommunication Standardization Sector of International 
Telecommunication Union) standard for Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks. 
The X.509 certificate token profile describes how to use the X.509 authentication 
framework with the Web Services Security Specification 1.1. The binding information 
of a Public-key to an entity and a set of attributes are stored in the X.509 certificate as 
shown in Figure 2.13.  
 
CertificateContent ::= Sequence { 
Version Version Default v1, 
serialNumber Certificate SerialNumber, 
signature AlgorithmIdentifier {{SupportedAlgorithms}}, 
issuer Name, 
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validity Validity, 
subject Name, 
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, 
issuerUniqueIdentifier IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
subjectUniqueIdentifier IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
extensions Extensions OPTIONAL 
} 
Figure 2.13: An Example of X.509 Certificate (ITU-T X.509, 2008) 
 
A <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element that specifies the X.509 subject key identifier of the 
signing certificate if using references to Subject Key Identifier. A user can be 
authenticated, the identity of a message sender from a trusted source, named a 
Certification Authority (CA). A CA is an entity, which issues digital certificates to the 
ownership of a public key. It allows participants to verify or certify the other user’s 
public key. CA is one of the components in Public-key infrastructure. A public key is 
bound with respective user identity, which must be unique with each CA domain. A 
user certificate can be trusted because the user certificate is signed by a well-known CA. 
Based on the hierarchy of CA, chain of trust, which is an ordered list of certificates is 
used to validate and verify the certificate issuer. The hierarchy of the CA has a tree 
structure and the top-most is a root certificate, which is a self-signed certificate. 
Therefore, a certificate receiver can verify a sender’s certificate and all intermediate 
certificates. 
 
The X.509 Certificate Token Profile describes the syntax and processing rules for the 
use of the X.509 authentication framework with Web Services Security: SOAP Message 
Security specification (Nadalin A. et al., 2006c). It describes how to store and carry the 
sender’s X.509 certificate within a SOAP message and which elements are to be used to 
retrieve key information. The key information can be used for the SOAP message 
encryption and message signature. According to the X.509 Token Profile, three token 
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references are supported by WSS: SOAP Message Security including: (Nadalin A. et al., 
2006c) 
 Reference to a subject Key Identifier - The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
element contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element that specifies the token data 
by means of a X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier reference. A subject key identifier 
may only be used to reference an X.509v3 certificate.” 
 Reference to a Binary Security Token - The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
element contains a wsse:Reference> element that references a local 
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element or a remote data source that contains the 
token data itself. 
 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number - The 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a <ds:X509Data> element 
that contains a <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element that uniquely identifies an end 
entity certificate by its X.509 Issuer and Serial Number. 
 
An example of a SOAP message, which uses a Binary Security Token to contain the 
binary X.509 security token data is shown in Figure 2.14.  It contains a 
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element and a certificate is presented within this element 
in binary format. The scope of the signature is defined by a <ds:Reference> element 
within the <ds:SignedInfo> element. 
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Figure 2.14: Example of SOAP message with an embedded certificate using BinarySecurityToken 
 
2.6.1.4 Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), developed by the Security Services 
Technical Committee of OASIS, is an XML-based framework for communicating user 
<S11:Header> 
 <wsse:Security> 
  <wsse:BinarySecurityToken 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-
200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"  
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-
wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509" wsu:Id="x509cert00">   
  </wsse:BinarySecurityToken> 
  <ds:Signature  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
   <ds:SignedInfo> 
    …… 
   </ds:SignedInfo> 
   <ds:SignatureValue> 
RCCAJjax942pxXOlCfazRgeNjVAZT8fRbcIICEyRwAeNljKNB4Rvo
T0u+g96oDMTtACq5xxcf8cu85cP6+l5yrRizbTDQhhkBfNwkw7VDv
/1eqszVkxPd96phNcmTZ8rB2xXaJYgrkWoH0NkBqA5NvCrmH1ETpT
tnOudDXTOLBo= 
   </ds:SignatureValue> 
   <ds:KeyInfo> 
    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
     <wsse:Reference URI="#x509cert00"  
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-
token-profile-1.0#X509"/> 
    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header> 
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authentication, entitlement, and attribute information. The SAML is an XML-based 
framework for exchanging security information. This security information is expressed 
in the form of assertions about subjects, where a subject is an entity that has an identity 
in some security domain (Maler E., et al., 2003). There are three kinds of statement or 
functions defined in the SAML, including Authentication, Attribute and Authorization 
Decision. The authentication, attribute and authorization decision statements can be 
used to authenticate a subject at a particular time. What attributes are associated with a 
particular subject. What authorizations are granted or denied to specify subject and to 
specify resource. The major feature of SAML is to provide a Single Sign-on (SSO) 
solution, which is used among Web Applications. 
 
The SAML Token Profile defines the use of Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) assertions as security tokens, which are added into the <wsse:Security> header 
block. The SAML assertions are used with XML signature to bind the subjects and 
statements of the assertions to a SOAP message. With the XML signature, the assertion 
statement integrity can be verified. Moreover, the issuer of the assertion statement can 
be authenticated. An example of SAML is shown in Figure 2.15 (Monzillo R., 2006). A 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element is used to indicate, which security token 
profile is used, the SAML V1.1 is used in this example. <saml:Assertion> element 
contains assertion statements and can be interpreted as follows: 
 
Assertion A was issued at Time T by issuer R subject to Conditions C 
 
The value of the issuer attribute is the unique identifier of the SAML authority. A 
<saml:NameIdentifier> element refers to a subject and defines the user id format in the 
“nameidformat” property. In this example, it uses X.509 subject as a Nameidentifier. 
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Figure 2.15: Example of SOAP message with SAML 
 
2.6.1.5 Web Services Security: Kerberos Token Profile 1.1 
Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principles, (e.g., a workstation 
user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network (Neuman C. et al., 2005). 
Kerberos is a computer network authentication protocol and was originally developed 
for MIT’s Project Athena in the 1980s. It is designed in a client-server model and uses 
<S12:Header> 
 <wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="..."> 
  <saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="..." 
   AssertionID="_a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc" 
   IssueInstant="2003-04-17T00:46:02Z" 
   Issuer=”www.opensaml.org” 
   MajorVersion="1" 
   MinorVersion="1"> 
   
   <saml:AuthenticationStatement> 
    <saml:Subject> 
     <saml:NameIdentifier 
      NameQualifier="www.example.com" 
      Format=“urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameidformat: 
      X509SubjectName”> 
       uid=joe,ou=people,ou=saml-demo,o=baltimore.com 
     </saml:NameIdentifier> 
     <saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
      <saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
       urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer 
      </saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
     </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
    </saml:Subject> 
   </saml:AuthenticationStatement> 
  </saml:Assertion> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S12:Header> 
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secret-key cryptography to provide mutual authentication between client and server. 
Kerberos was developed in 1983, released as open source in 1987 and became an IETF 
standard in 1993. Nowadays, many operating systems are embedded with Kerberos 
implementation including Apple Macintosh, Microsoft Windows and UNIX operating 
systems. The most up to date Kerberos is version 5 and was published in RFC4120 in 
2005. Based on the Kerberos authentication process, a client can use the shared secret, 
which is stored in the Authentication Server (AS) or Key Distribution Center (KDC) to 
obtain the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and session key from the AS. The TGT and the 
session key will be used for further communication with the Ticket Granting Server 
(TGS). 
 
The Kerberos Token Profile describes how to use Kerberos (Kerb) tickets (specifically 
the AP-REQ packet) with the WSS: SOAP Message Security [WSS] specification, an 
example is shown in Figure 2.16 (Nadalin A., et al., 2006d). The 
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element with “http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasiswss-
kerberos-token-profile-1.1# Kerberosv5_AP_REQ”,  which is defined in ValueType 
attribute is used to specify the adoption of Kerberos protocol in SOAP message. A 
symmetric encryption algorithm is used if the Kerberos ticket is referenced as an 
encryption key. 
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Figure 2.16: Example of SOAP message with Kerberos 
 
2.6.2 Non-standard Web Services security technologies 
Although the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard has been published to protect a SOAP 
message between two end-points, there is still significant research into Web Services 
security. Authentication and authorization are the mechanisms to determine who you are 
and what you are authorized to do. Both mechanisms are adopted in many information 
systems and the difference between old and new technology is the implementation. The 
authentication process may be as simple as a providing a username and password to an 
authenticating system, or as complicated as using PKI authentication or a Kerberos 
authentication system. Research reported by Genge B. et al., 2009, proposes a new 
secure token to extend the WS-security for implementing existing secure protocols such 
as ISO9798, Kerberos, etc. Other research, such as Damiani E. et al., 2002, designs and 
<S12:Header> 
 <wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="..."> 
  <wsse:BinarySecurityToken EncodingType="http://docs. 
   oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security- 
1.0#Base64Binary" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-
wss225 
   kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ" wsu:Id="MyToken"> 
   boIBxDCCAcCgAwIBBaEDAgEOogcD... 
  </wsse:BinarySecurityToken> 
  ... 
  <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
   <wsse:Reference URI="#MyToken" 
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-
token232 
    profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ"> 
   </wsse:Reference> 
  </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
  ... 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S12:Header> 
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implements an Authorization Filter to provide authentication and authorization features 
between a client and a SOAP gateway for all the SOAP requests. It also describes new 
tokens or tags to provide the security features for instance, “userid”, “passwordhash”, 
“role”, etc. However, it is not a new security mechanism to protect a SOAP message. 
Authorization is the next process after authentication to determine which web services 
and methods can be invoked by an authenticating user or a participant. Group-based 
access control and role-based access control (Sandhu R.S., et al., 1996) are mostly used 
to control the level of access rights within a system. Other similar models include task-
based access (Oh S. and Park S., 2003) and provision-based access control (Kudo M., 
2004). These models are static and require a pre-defined access level for each 
participant. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was explained why the Service-Orinted Articture (SOA) is such an 
important architecture style and an example of an SOA-based system was discussed. 
The research presented the relationship between SOA and Web Servcices. Two classes 
of Web Services were discussed in this chapter, which are REST-compliant Web 
Services and SOAP-based Web Services. REST-compliant Web Services is a resource-
based uniform interface Web Service and SOAP-based Web Services is a method-based 
application-specific interface Web Service. This chapter also covered the major security 
challenges of Web Services and the currently de facto and non-standards Web services 
security technologies. 
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3.1 Introduction 
he goal of domain names is to provide a mechanism for naming resources in 
such a way that the names are usable in different hosts, networks, protocol 
families, internets and administrative organizations (Mockapetris P., 1987). 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical distributed naming system like a tree 
structure for network devices, which connect to the Internet or internal network. Each 
node in the domain naming tree has one or more zone files, which are used to store 
resource records and is managed by a domain name server.  The DNS is implemented in 
client-server model and maintained by a distributed database system. A DNS client 
issues a DNS query to a DNS server or DNS resolver using User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP). The DNS resolver listens on port number 53 to handle the DNS query and 
returns a Resource Record (RR) to the client. The resource record is the fundamental 
element in the DNS and each record has its own type. The common format of resource 
record is specified in RFC 1035 and the types of DNS record are shown in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Examples of DNS record types 
Type Type Number RFC Description 
A 1 RFC 1035 Address Record 
LOC 29 RFC 1876 Location Record 
MX 15 RFC 1035 Mail Exchange Record 
NS 2 RFC 1035 Name Server Record 
PRT 12 RFC 1035 Pointer Record 
SRV 33 RFC 2782 Service Locator 
TXT 16 RFC 1035 Text Record 
  
The domain name is used to uniquely identify Internet resources such as a Web site, and 
email system, etc. Domain name is human readable and it can be translated to the 
numerical identifiers, the Internet Protocol (IP) address by the DNS. The IP address is 
used by a machine and it can be used to locate an Internet service in the worldwide web. 
For instance, the website of the University of Sussex, http://www.sussex.au.uk is 
mapped to an IP address of 139.184.32.51. A user inputs an URL to a HTTP user agent, 
T 
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which is a Web browser usually for browsing a website. A corresponding IP address 
will be translated by one of the DNS records stored in the DNS server, which is 
specified or configured in the user computer. A public DNS database is maintained by 
domain name registrars who are accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a nonprofit organization and was founded in 
1998 to oversee Internet-related tasks including Internet Protocol address spaces 
assignment, top-level domain name space management, etc. ICANN also publishes the 
complete list of top-level domain registries and domain name registrars. Usually, the 
local Internet Service Provider (ISP) is the domain name registry and manages the 
domain name database and the relationship with the domain name applicants. An 
applicant can also apply for resource records, which are hosted in a local ISP. The rules 
and regulations of applying domain name and resource records are defined by each local 
ISP. The valid resource records are forwarded to other DNS systems and are used in 
worldwide DNS clients. 
 
A Web Services consumer, which is an application or software module sends a service 
request or invokes a service method using HTTP protocol, an example is shown in 
Figure 3.1. The HTTP request contains not only the requested information but also the 
necessary information, which is used for responding back to the requester, for instance, 
the requester’s IP address and port number, “192.168.1.1” and “8888” in this example. 
Therefore, the requester IP address cannot be faked as the requester wants the result to 
be sent back. The mapping between the IP address and domain name is stored in the 
DNS, which is hosted by the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Usually, the ISP is a 
trusted local telecommunication company. Therefore, the DNS records hosted by the 
ISP are trusted and reliable. The Participant Domain Token Profile uses one of the DNS 
resource records, the service resource record to validate the location or domain of 
participants. The details of the service resource record are described in the next section.  
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Figure 3.1: An example SOAP message using HTTP 
 
3.2 Service Resource Record 
The mapping between IP address and Domain name or other resource records, for 
instance MX record are stored in the zone file or database of the Domain Name System 
(DNS). There are many types of record resources stored in the DNS. Each type of 
resource record is defined Request for Comments (RFC) and has a particular function. 
For instance, the “A Record”, the type code is “1”, which is used to return a 32-bit IPv4 
address by giving a hostname. A Service resource record (SRV RR record) which is 
defined in RFC 2782 (Gulbrabdsen A., et al., 2000) is one of the DNS resource records 
and its type code is 33. The SRV RR allows administrators to use several servers for a 
single domain, to move services from host to host with little fuss, and to designate some 
hosts as primary servers for a service and others as backups. It is used to define the 
location of the servers for specified services. For instance, Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) uses the SRV record which is stored in the DNS to find or point to a SIP server, 
which is listening on TCP port 5060 for SIP services. According to the RFC 2782, the 
format of the SRV record is: 
 
Content-Type: application/soap+xml;charset=UTF-8 
Content-Length: 44501 
Host: 192.168.1.1:8888 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
User-Agent: Apache-HttpClient/4.1.2 (java 1.5) 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> 
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/1999/XMLSchema-instance" > 
 <S11:Body>   
  …… 
 </S11:Body> 
</S11:Envelope> 
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_Service._Proto.Name TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target 
  (3.1) 
 
Where:  
 _Service: is service symbolic name. The name is a unique name, which is legal 
for SRV lookup in the DNS database. 
 _Proto: is the symbolic name of the desired protocol. _TCP and _UDP are the 
most useful values for this field. 
 Name: is the domain this RR refers to. 
 TTL: is standard DNS time to live. 
 Class: is standard DNS class field. 
 SRV: Service record. 
 Priority: is the priority of this target host. A client must attempt to contact the 
target host with the lowest-numbered priority it can reach. 
 Weight: is a server selection mechanism. The weight field specifies a relative 
weight for entries with the same priority. Larger weights SHOULD be given a 
proportionately higher probability of being selected. The range of this number is 
between 0 and 65535. 
 Port: is the port on this target host of this service. The port number range is 
between 0 and 65535.  
 Target: is the domain name of the target host. There must be one or more 
address records (A Record) for this name. 
 
The SRV record works with “A Record” because the target field defined in the SRV 
record is pointing to an address record. Therefore, the corresponding hostname record 
must be defined in the DNS. The proposed token profile utilizes the SRV record and 
makes a little change to the meaning of the target field to be a self-defined host instead 
of the remote host. Although the definition of the target field of RFC 2782 has a minor 
change, it will not affect the existing usage because of different service names. The 
proposed token profile can be implemented by using the following SRV record defined 
in the DNS server. 
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_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 300 IN SRV 1 1 8080 soap.sussex.ac.uk
  (3.2) 
 
Where: 
 _pdn  : service name for proposed token. 
 _tcp : using TCP protocol. 
 .sussex.ac.uk : domain of owner. 
 300 : time to live, 300 seconds. 
 IN : Internet class. 
 SRV : Service record. 
 1 : (0-65535). Lowest is high priority. 
 1 : weight. 
 8080 : port number of target host of desire service. 
 soap.sussex.ac.uk : the name of the host that will provide this service. 
However, it has changed the definition to message sender. 
 
In this example, _pdn is used as a service name and uses TCP (_tcp) as the 
communication protocol. The domain owner is “.sussex.ac.uk” and “time to live” is 300 
seconds, which is the caching time in the DNS. Internet class (IN) and Service record 
(SRV) must be used in this example. The priority and the weight are both set to 1 to 
define that it has a high priority and lower weights. The port number is defined in port 
8080 and all the requests must come from the corresponding IP address of 
soap.sussex.ac.uk. 
 
3.3 Classification of WS-Security Token Profiles 
There are two layers of security challenges in adopting Web Services: the transport 
layer security and message layer security. The transport layer security issue is addressed 
by transport layer protocol. The most widely used transport protocol for Web Services is 
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HTTP and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), this is one of the mechanisms 
to satisfy transport layer security requirements. With HTTPS, a user agent or browser 
adds an encryption layer of SSL/TLS to protect traffic. The objective of HTTPS is to 
create a secure channel over an insecure channel, which can prevent the eavesdroppers 
and man-in-middle attacks. However, the primary concern of this research is the 
message layer security challenge. 
 
The message layer security challenge can be addressed by WS-Security standards if 
SOAP is adopted to implement a Web Service. The WS-Security standards consist of 
one core specification and five secure token profiles. The processing model for WS-
Security with all five token profiles is no different from other security tokens defined in 
the WS-Security core specification. The message processor or handler must do the 
token validation and follow the processing rules, which are defined in related protocol 
specifications, not in each token profile. All OASIS WSS token profiles involve 
cryptology, encryption, signature mechanisms or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to 
provide authentication and authorization features. The five secure token profiles focus 
on two major areas. Who can use the Web Services and what are the permissions. The 
classification of five WSS token profiles is shown in Table 3.2.  Integrity is provided to 
a SOAP-based Web Service using XML signature. Confidentiality is also provided 
using XML encryption.  Message uniqueness is provided by Username token profile 
and other security issues are tackled by the other four secure token profiles. However, 
the location or domain of Web Services participants is not handled and not verified in 
existing secure token profiles. XML security standards also do not rely on location. 
Therefore, a new secure token profile is proposed in this thesis to provide additional 
security for use by Web Services. 
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Table 3.2: WS-Security token profiles classification 
Area Secure Token Profile 
Web Service Authentication (Who) Username Token Profile 
X.509 Certificate Profile 
Kerberos Token Profile 
Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) Token Profile 
Web Service Authorization (What) Rights Expression Language Token 
Profile 
Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) Token Profile 
 
 
3.4 Proposed Participant Domain Name Token 
The Participant Domain Name Token Profile (PDNT) is used with WSS: SOAP 
Message Security specification (WSS). It describes how a participant supplies a Domain 
Name token as a means of identifying the participant by domain name to authenticate 
the participant location.  In order to use PDNT in a SOAP message, the namespaces 
which show in Table 3.3 are used and a new element block 
<pdn:ParticipantDominNameToken> is introduced and added into the <wsse:Security> 
block. The corresponding schema file of PDNT is shown in Figure 3.2. Within the 
<pdn:ParticipantDominNameToken> element block, a <pdn:DomainName> element is 
specified. An example of the use of PDNT is shown in Figure 3.3. It contains a 
participant or a message sender domain name with the required format and it will be 
translated to the IP address through the SRV resource record, which is stored in DNS. 
The details of how to use the proposed token are illustrated in the next section.  
 
  
 73 PDNT 
  
 CHAPTER 3  
Table 3.3: Namespaces are used in PDNT 
Prefix Namespace 
S11 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ 
S12 http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope 
wsse http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-
secext-1.0.xsd 
wsu http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wsswssecurity-utility-
1.0.xsd 
pdn http://schema.sussex.au.uk/participant-domain-name-token-profile.xsd 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A schema file of Participant Domain Name Token 
<xsd:schema targetNamespace="http://schma.sussex.au.uk/participant-domain-name-
token-profile.xsd" xmlns="http://schema.sussex.au.uk/participant-domain-name-token-
profile.xsd" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">   
 <xsd:complexType name="ParticipantDomainNameTokenType"> 
  <xsd:annotation> 
   <xsd:documentation> 
    This type represents a participant domain name token 
   </xsd:documentation>  
  </xsd:annotation> 
  <xsd:complexContent> 
   <xsd:sequence> 
    <xsd:element name="DomainName"  
      type="xsd:string" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" /> 
    <xsd:any processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />  
   </xsd:sequence> 
  </xsd:complexContent> 
 </xsd:complexType> 
 <xsd:element name="ParticipantDomainNameToken"  
      type="wsse:ParticipantDomainNameTokenType"> 
  <xsd:annotation> 
   <xsd:documentation> 
    This element defines the pdn:ParticipantDomainNameToken element 
   </xsd:documentation>  
  </xsd:annotation> 
 </xsd:element> 
  </xsd:schema> 
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Figure 3.3: An example SOAP Message using Participant Domain Name Token 
 
In the above example, a service name with protocol type can be found within the 
<pdn:DomainName> element block, which is _pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk. The Web Services 
participants use the following rule or format to obtain the corresponding SRV resource 
records. If the result is not saved in local DNS cache before, a DNS client will query a 
DNS server to obtain the result and keep it in the local DNS cache to improve the 
performance next time. 
 
QNAME = _pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk, QCLASS=IN, QTYPE=SRV (3.3) 
 
Based on SRV resource records, a service provider can validate a message sent by a 
service consumer or vice versa. However, the message receiver must ask the message 
sender to register the SRV resource records with the local ISP when the Participant 
Domain Name token is implemented. The high availability can be supported by the 
SRV resource records if multiple SRV records are defined in the DNS zone file as 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="..." xmlns:wsse="..." 
Xmlns:pdn=="http://schma.sussex.au.uk/participant-domain-name-token-profile.xsd"> 
 
 <soap:Header> 
  ... 
  <wsse:Security> 
   <pdn:ParticipantDomainNameToken> 
    <pdn:DomainName> 
     _pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 
    </pdn:DomainName> 
   </pdn:ParticipantDomainNameToken> 
  </pdn:Security> 
  ... 
 </soap:Header> 
 ... 
</soap:Envelope> 
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shown in Figure 3.4. The value of priority and weight fields are used to provide a 
combination of load balancing and backup service.  The first two records of the example 
share a priority of 10. Therefore, the weight field is used by a client to determine which 
server will be used. The value of the target field of the first record is 
webservice1.sussex.ac.uk. It is pointing to an address record (A record) and is mapped 
to a corresponding IP address. If more than one IP addresses are mapped to a single 
address record, round robin DNS feature can be used, which is a load distribution 
technique. 
 
Figure 3.4: Multiple SRV records used to provide load balancing and high availability 
 
3.5 Processing Rules of Participant Domain Name Token 
The Participant Domain Name Token (PDNT) works with DNS records, which are 
stored in the DNS server. Figure 3.5 shows the processing flow of the PDNT as 
illustrated in the following.  
 
1. A service consumer sends an HTTP request, which contains a SOAP message 
for the service provider.  
2. The service provider receives the HTTP request and parses the SOAP message. 
A participant domain name can be obtained from the 
<pdn:ParticipantDomainName> element block. The service provider sends a 
SRV resource record query with the domain name to a local DNS server.  
3. If the corresponding resource record cannot be found in the local ISP, then the 
local ISP will do the recursive query worldwide. A host name defined in the 
target field is returned and a second DNS query is executed to lookup the IP 
_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 300 IN SRV 10 10 8080 webservice1.sussex.ac.uk 
_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 300 IN SRV 10 20 8080 webservice2.sussex.ac.uk 
_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 300 IN SRV 20 20 8080 webservice3.sussex.ac.uk 
_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk 300 IN SRV 20 30 8080 webservice4.sussex.ac.uk 
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address. A corresponding IP address can be resolved by the local ISP and is 
returned to the service provider.  
4. The location of a service consumer or message sender can be authenticated if the 
following equation is valid. The results will be returned to the service consumer 
if PDNT and other secure token profiles are validated. 
 [IP Address]RemoteAddress = [IP Address]SA (3.4) 
Where: 
 RemoteAddress can be obtained from a container. The container is a 
Web Service container or traditional Web server container, in JavaServer 
Pages (JSP) language, it can obtain the message sender IP address by 
executing request.getRemoteAddr(). 
 SA is a two-step procedure. First, it looks up a SRV resource record by 
giving a standard SRV query string. Second, based on the SRV record, it 
can obtain a canonical hostname and acquires an IP address by querying 
an address record in DNS. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The processing flow of the Participant Domain Name Token Profile 
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To eliminate the overhead for processing an unknown or a fake request, the PDNT is 
processed before other secure token profiles or other security standards such as X.509 
Token Profile, Kerberos Token Profile, etc. In order to support high availability, load 
balancing and services backup, the DNS server may return more than one SRV resource 
record. The token processor uses priority and weight fields to determine the precedence 
for use of the record’s data. One of the objectives of PDNT is to reject a fake request as 
fast as possible, which will reduce the processing resources required to handle illegal 
requests.  
 
In order to handle a SOAP message which does not use or implement the proposed 
token, a permitted domain list feature is included in the system. In other words, a 
permitted domain list is a kind of whitelist, which is used to bypass the processing rule 
of PDNT. The whitelist can use the IP address or an address record (A Record), which 
is stored in the DNS server to control who is allowed to use the Web Services. If the IP 
address is adopted, it will use it to compare the remote IP address directly. Otherwise, 
the IP resolve step is processed before the comparison. The whitelist will be stored in a 
secure location such as in a private database or a file in a private folder. 
 
The location-based validation process utilizes one of the existing well-known Internet 
infrastructures, the Domain Name System. Therefore, it can be trusted and is reliable. In 
order to parse and verify the proposed token before any other security specifications, 
arbitrary data encryption cannot be applied to the Participant Domain Name Token 
profile. It means that the PDNT should be shown in plain text or Base64 encoded. 
Although the domain name information is sent in plain text, it is not private or sensitive 
information. The PDNT also must be processed before other secure token profiles 
because it uses less processing time to validate a message. Depending on the security 
requirements of the Web Services participants, the PDNT can be used in standalone or 
with other existing secure token profiles. The performance evaluation of token profiles 
is illustrated in the next chapter. 
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3.6 Security Enhancements 
Singhal A. et al. (2007) identify that because a Web Service relies on some of the same 
underlying HTTP and Web-based architecture as common Web applications, it is 
susceptible to similar threats and vulnerabilities.  The fundamentals of security concepts 
are the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, the C-I-A Triad. Based on the 
research of Web application security issues, Table 3.4 details the foundations of the 
security element of Web Services and it can be tackled by WS-Security 1.1 OASIS 
standard as shown in Figure 3.6. Although the basic security elements are solved by 
secure token profiles, they have a limitation in authentication as illustrated in the next 
section.  
 
Table 3.4: Fundamental of security element of Web Services 
Security Element Description 
Authentication The identity of a Web Services consumer and provider. Who 
invokes the Web Services? Who returns the result after 
invoking a Web Service? 
Authorization The permissions of Web Services operations for a specific 
Web Services consumer. What can the Web Services 
consumer do in a Web Service? 
Confidentially The data or information exchange between Web Services 
consumer and provider remains private and confidential. It 
cannot be viewed by unauthorized users or eavesdroppers 
who monitor the flow of traffic across a network. Moreover 
the intermediary Web Services node cannot also view the 
information. 
Integrity Web Services Information can be modified or altered by 
accident or deliberation. Integrity is the guarantee that the 
data is protected and does not get modified by unauthorized 
users. 
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Figure 3.6: The Web application security issues tackled by the corresponding WS-Security token profiles  
 
The Participant Domain Name Token Profile (PDNT) is used to enhance the Web 
Service authentication security methodology as shown in Figure 3.7. Although the 
Username token profile, X.509 token profile and Kerberos token profile can also handle 
the authentication issue; there is a limitation about the authentication of the location of 
the service consumer and provider. The PDNT can remove this weak point of Web 
Services authentication. The use of the PDNT has no new message-level threats beyond 
identified for the PDNT itself. Replay attacks or man-in-the-middle attacks are not 
threats for the PDNT. One potential threat is the DNS spoofing in ISP DNS. However, 
this not only applies to PDNT but also to the Web Services architecture. Moreover, the 
permitted domain list feature of PDNT can prevent an unauthorized domain to invoke 
Web Services. Other security issues such as message modification and eavesdropping 
can be addressed by using the integrity and confidentially mechanisms, which are 
described in other secure token profiles.  
 
A trusted third party is utilized to validate the location of a message sender. This is the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), which is the owner of the DNS and is a trusted third 
party in the processing flow of PDNT.  The ISP is an entity or company which 
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facilitates interactions between two parties who both trust the third party. Most ISPs are 
telecommunication companies, which is also a trusted third party. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: The enhancement of Web Services authentication security 
 
3.7 Security Scenarios 
There are a total of five secure token profiles for Web Services Security (WSS) 
Standards after implementing the Participant Domain Token Profile. The following 
scenarios present the security mechanisms and associated countermeasures that are 
addressed by the different secure token profiles. The peer authentication security 
scenario is shown in Table 3.5. It can be tackled using three secure profiles. The 
message Integrity security scenario is shown in Table 3.6. SOAP message security 
utilizes XML signature to prevent message alteration. Message confidentiality uses 
XML encryption to prevent disclosing the content of a message as shown in Table 3.7. 
The proposed token profile is used to solve location authentication, which is described 
in Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.5: Security Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 SOAP Message Peer Authentication 
Explanation A Web Service message sender and receiver must be able to authenticate 
each of other. 
Threats Man-in-middle, Sender Spoofing 
Solutions 1. HTTPS X.509 sender authentication 
2. Username Token Profile 
3. X.509 Certificate Token Profile 
 
Table 3.6: Security Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 SOAP Message Integrity 
Explanation A Message Receiver must be able to detect alternation or modification for 
the content sent from another SOAP node. 
Threats Message alteration, Falsified Messages 
Solutions 1. SOAP Message Security – XML Signature 
2. Transport layer integrity 
 
Table 3.7: Security Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 SOAP Message Confidentiality 
Explanation A Message Receiver must be able to exclusively access confidential 
content sent from another SOAP node. 
Threats Confidentiality 
Solutions 1. SOAP Message Security – XML Encryption 
2. Transport layer confidentiality 
 
Table 3.8: Security Scenario 4 
Scenario 4 SOAP Message Peer Location Authentication 
Explanation A Web Service message sender and receiver must be able to authenticate 
the location each of other. 
Threats Location Spoofing 
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Solutions 1. Participant Domain Name Token Profile 
 
3.8 Security Considerations 
There are some security considerations after implementing Participant Domain Name 
Token (PDNT) profile. It does not mean that the PDNT has security holes or issues. 
This section discusses the potential attacks and shows the suggestions for reducing 
security risks.  
 
The PDNT elements defined in a SOAP message are shown in plain text or Base64 
encoded. It means that it will expose the sender’s domain name. However, the sender’s 
domain name is self-defined information and it is stored in a Domain Name System 
(DNS) as one of the resource records. Most of the resource records can be queried by a 
client and it is public information used by Internet users. Therefore, the PDNT uses 
plain text within an element that does not expose any private or security information to 
the public. 
 
One of the major roles of PDNT is to use the remote client IP address to compare with 
an IP address which is retrieved from DNS. However, IP address spoofing may be 
encountered. IP address spoofing means that the Internet Protocol (IP) packet is created 
with a forged source IP address. The purpose of IP spoofing is to conceal the identity of 
the sender or to impersonate another computer system. Usually, routers use the 
destination IP address to forward packets through the Internet but ignore the source IP 
address. The source IP address is only used by the destination client when it responds 
back to the source machine. Forging the source IP address causes the responses to be 
misdirected to another machine or discarded by intermediate network devices. A SOAP 
message sending from a forged IP address machine to a Web Service provider will pass 
the PDNT rules. If the sender modifies the source IP address of all the packets to a 
permitted IP, it will not expose any sensitive data because the response message cannot 
send back to a forged IP machine. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the PDNT, its theory and its applications. It explains how the 
PDNT can be used for rejecting an invalid SOAP request, which came from an 
unknown domain or enterprise. 
This chapter classified the defence area of each WS-Security token profile and WS-
Security core specification. The research found that the existing Web Service Security 
standard focuses on two areas, which are user-based authentication and authorization. 
However, the location of the participant or message sender is not verified. Therefore, a 
new secure token profile has been designed and proposed, which is the Participant 
Domain Name Token Profile (PDNT). This chapter presented the PDNT architecture, 
syntax of the token and the processing rules. The PDNT provides a new security 
enhancement for SOAP based Web Services, which is location-based authentication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
  
 CHAPTER 4  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
- PERFORMANCE  
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 85 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
  
 CHAPTER 4  
4.1 Introduction 
ecurity is one of the successful factors for the use of Web Services on the 
Internet. Many Web Services security standards are designed and proposed, 
such as OASIS Web Services Security. It provides end-to-end message security 
properties including integrity, confidentiality and authentication. However, performance 
is another vital factor for evaluating a security standard. The processing time is a key 
indicator for measuring the performance of a new or existing security specification. As 
more security mechanisms are adopted, additional performance overheads will be added 
to process the Web Services using CPU processing time, large messages will consume 
channel bandwidth. In the evaluation, a set of WS-security specifications have been 
implemented and the Participant Domain Name Token Profile has also been designed 
and developed. A client-server model is used to evaluate each of the security standards 
to quantify the effect of the proposed new token.  
 
4.2 Performance Modeling 
In order to compare the performance of the Participant Domain Name Token Profile and 
the five secure token profiles, which are: Usename Token Profile, X.509 Token Profile, 
SAML Token Profile, Kerberos Token Profile and Rights Expression Language (REL) 
Token Profile - performance measurements are defined. Juric M.B. et al., (1999) 
defined a set of performance assessment frameworks for distributed object architecture. 
The most commonly used performance metrics are response time (R) and throughput 
(X). This research uses response time or latency time, which is the round-trip time of a 
message between a sender and a receiver, as a performance metric. The round-trip time 
does not include a registry lookup such as UDDI or other Web Service retrieval 
mechanisms. The metric can be used to evaluate the proposed token profile and 
compare it with other secure token profiles. The latency is defined by the following: 
 
 Latency = T [Network Layer] + T [Application Layer] (4.1) 
 
S 
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Where: 
 T [Network Layer]: is the total transfer time of a message between sender and receiver 
over the network. It consists of many factors. For instance, the number of 
network devices involved, total delay time in each router or switch, which 
network protocol is used, the quality of network infrastructure, the distance 
between sender and receiver, etc. 
 T [Application Layer]: The total processing time spent in the application level, which 
includes message encoding / decoding, message parsing, security token profiles 
handling time, total time spent in business logic, database processing time, etc. 
 
However, the total time spent in the network layer is difficult to evaluate over the 
Internet because it depends on the quality of network transmission and the network 
devices capacity. Therefore, this thesis only focuses on the time spent in the application 
layer which is defined as: 
 
 T [Application Layer] = T [parsing] + T [security token profile handling] + T [business logic] + T [database] (4.2) 
 
Where: 
 
 T[parsing]: Total time spent in parsing an input stream into an XML document and 
converting it to a W3C Document Object Model (DOM), which allows a 
program to access and manipulate the content of the document. 
 T[security token profile handling]: Total time spent in handling different secure token 
profiles and corresponding mechanisms. For instance, XML Encryption, XML 
Signature, etc. 
 T[business logic]: represents the time spent in business logic. 
 T[database]: Total time spent in Data Manipulation Language (DML). Most Web 
Services applications work with a database to query database tables in order to 
get the result back and return it to requesters. 
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The proposed token profile is used by a message receiver to authenticate the location of 
a sender. Other secure token profiles are also used to validate a SOAP message by 
different mechanisms. In order to compare the performance between proposed token 
and other existing token profiles, the T[logic] and T[database] factors can be ignored in 
the performance evaluation. It means that only parsing time and security token profile 
handling time are taken into account. 
 
Rayns C. et al. (2007) indicates that the CPU consumed by the parsing process is 
affected by both the overall size of the message, and also by the number of XML 
elements within the message. Therefore, the latency is not only one evaluation factor 
but also the additional message size for adopting secure token profiles. For instance, to 
apply the Username token profile in a Web Service, <wsse:Username>, 
<wsse:Password>, <wsse:Nonce> and relative elements are used and added into the 
<wsse:Security> element block in the SOAP message. <xenc:EncyptedKey>, 
<xenc:EncryptionMethod> and relative elements are used if a SOAP message if it 
requires encryption. The encrypted data is placed within the <xenc:CipherValue>  
element block. The SOAP message size depends on which secure toke profiles are 
adopted. A smaller message size gains a performance advantage, such as the reduction 
of transfer time and parsing time. 
 
In the performance evaluation, all the measurements are made with identical equipment 
and environment. In order to eliminate the network and other configuration issues, Web 
Service consumer and provider are running on an Intel Core2 Duo E8500 computer, 
using Windows XP Professional with SP3, with 4GB RAM, and restarted before each 
test case to ensure the same starting conditions. Both the Web Services consumer and 
Web Services provider are developed using the Java programming language. The Java 2 
Platform Enterprise Edition version 1.6.0_21-b07 and SOAP with Attachments API for 
JAVA (SAAJ) are used for the development and testing environment. A DNS server is 
installed and running on the same computer. DNS local cache is also enabled to 
improve the performance of the DNS resolution process, which is used by the 
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Participant Domain Name Token. All the source codes for the performance evaluation 
are presented in Appendix B. 
 
4.3 Experimental Results and Analysis 
The latency or response time performance metric is used to compare the proposed token 
profile with three other WS-Security tokens, which include Username token profile, 
XML Encryption and XML Signature. All test cases are tested with different message 
sizes. Furthermore, when adopting the proposed token, its performance is compared 
with three other WSS tokens. A millisecond timescale is used to compute latency for 
each round-trip time between message sender and receiver. 
 
4.3.1 Evaluation Method and Assumptions 
A pure HTTP server has been developed using the Java language and Apache HTTP 
client JAR is used to develop an HTTP client, which is used to send a SOAP message to 
the HTTP server. Five java classes have also been developed as shown in the following: 
 SOAPEncyrption.java 
 SOAPDecryption.java 
 SOAPSignature.java 
 UserNameToken.java  
 PaticipantDomainNameTokenHander.java 
All classes are plugged into the pure HTTP server to handle SOAP messages with 
different types of WSS. RSA 2048-bit is used for the asymmetric key algorithm and 
AES 128-bit is used for the symmetric key algorithm, SHA is used to create a message 
digest, which is used in the XML encryption, decryption, signature, and password digest. 
Latency can be evaluated from the total time spent by the HTTP client when it sends a 
SOAP request with secure token profiles to an HTTP server, which sends the 
information back to the HTTP client. In order to evaluate the performance for different 
sizes of SOAP messages, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 employee records are included in the 
message respectively.  An example of an employee record is shown in Figure 4.1. Each 
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SOAP message contains the proposed token and one of the WSS tokens. It means that 
the message size is identical during the performance comparison between the proposed 
token and one of the WSS tokens. Each test case is repeated 100 times to obtain the 
average latency. The average latency time is used for comparison between the proposed 
token and WSS tokens. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: An example of an employee record 
 
4.3.2 Test cases design 
According to the WS-Security 1.1 OASIS standard, there are five secure token profiles 
and one core specification. They depend on existing security standards and some of 
them are using a similar mechanism and algorithm. Therefore, not all the secure token 
profiles are evaluated. For instance, the X.509 token profile uses a digital signature to 
verify an X.509 certificate. It is the same as the XML signature token, which is used in 
<employee> 
  <firstName>David</firstName> 
  <lastName>Ho</lastName> 
  <gender>M</gender> 
  <nationality>British</nationality> 
  <dateOfBirth>1958-07-01</dateOfBirth> 
  <phone>12-543325-8</phone> 
  <maritalStatus>Married</maritalStatus> 
  <address>No. 7 A Road</address> 
  <city>Hong Kong</city> 
  <country>China</country> 
  <email>david.ho@myService.org</email> 
  <empNo>101</empNo> 
  <title>Manager</title> 
  <department>Accounting</department> 
  <hireDate>2005-01-05</hireDate> 
</employee> 
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the WS-Security core specification. Therefore, after consolidation, four test cases have 
been selected, designed and evaluated as shown in the following: 
 
Test Case 1: Proposed Token vs. Username Token 
Test Case 2: Proposed Token vs. XML Encryption Token 
Test Case 3: Proposed Token vs. XML Signature Token 
Test Case 4: Proposed Token vs. XML Encryption with Signature Token 
 
Each test case has been divided into three sub-test cases, which contain (a) the proposed 
token only; (b) one of the above WS-Security tokens; (c) proposed token with one of the 
above WS-Security tokens. Each sub-test case is processed a hundred times to acquire 
the average response time for each sub-test case of each record size. 
 
4.3.3 Message size of each secure token  
The size of a SOAP message depends on which secure tokens are used. Different secure 
token profiles have different element blocks, types, attributes and syntax. For instance, 
less than 10 elements consist of Username token profile. It is the least number of 
elements compared to other WS-Security secure token profiles. Therefore, the message 
size of a SOAP message header using the Username token profile is less than using 
other WS-Security token profiles. A large SOAP message size will increase the 
streaming time, network transfer time and parsing time for the message sender and 
receiver. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the message size and the percentage size 
increase for each secure token profile. They are the minimum elements requirement for 
use of each token profile. It means that only compulsory elements are used in each test 
case and optional elements are not considered. 
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Table 4.1: Message size of each secure token profile in bytes 
Number of Employees 
Records 
100 200 300 400 500 
Non-WSS 44,511 88,511 132,511 176,511 220,511 
PDNT 44,676 88,676 132,676 176,676 220,676 
Username Token 45,054 89,054 133,054 177,054 221,054 
PDNT + Username Token 45,204 89,204 133,204 177,204 221,204 
Signature Token 45,515 89,515 133,515 177,515 221,515 
PDNT + Signature Token 45,665 89,665 133,665 177,665 221,665 
Encryption Token 61,946 122,152 182,364 242,576 302,784 
PDNT + Encryption Token 62,096 122,302 182,514 242,276 302,934 
Encryption + Signature Token 62,935 123,141 183,353 243,565 303,773 
PDNT + Encryption + 
Signature Token 
63,085 123,291 183,503 243,715 303,923 
 
Table 4.2: Percentage increase of message size between Non-WSS and each secure token profile 
Number of Employees 
Records 
100 200 300 400 500 
PDNT 0.37% 0.19% 0.12% 0.09% 0.07% 
Username Token 1.22% 0.61% 0.41% 0.31% 0.25% 
PDNT + Username Token 1.56% 0.78% 0.52% 0.39% 0.31% 
Signature Token 2.26% 1.13% 0.76% 0.57% 0.46% 
PDNT + Signature Token 2.59% 1.30% 0.87% 0.65% 0.52% 
Encryption Token 39.17% 38.01% 37.62% 37.43% 37.31% 
PDNT + Encryption Token 39.51% 38.18% 37.73% 37.51% 37.38% 
Encryption + Signature Token 41.39% 39.13% 38.37% 37.99% 37.76% 
PDNT + Encryption + 
Signature Token 
41.73% 39.29% 38.48% 38.07% 37.83% 
 
Based on the results in Table 4.2, the message size of the Participant Domain Name 
Token (PDNT) profile is the minimum and the Encryption Token Profile is the 
maximum amongst WS-Security secure token profiles. Using WS-Security Token 
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Profiles, the size of a SOAP message is increased by 1.22% ~ 39.17% when the 
message contains 100 employee records. However, it only increases by 0.37% if 
adopting PDNT only. The message size overhead for using PDNT with each WS-
Security Token Profile is only increased by 0.34%. It is a major advantage of adopting 
the PDNT because the message size is much less than adopting other WS-Security 
token profiles and the overhead adds only a very small increase in message size. With 
PDNT, the more employee records that are included in a SOAP message, the smaller the 
relative percentage increase of message size and the overhead is decreased compared to 
other WS-security token profiles. 
 
4.3.4 Results of Test Case 1  
In test case 1, a simple SOAP message, which contains both PDNT and Username token 
are used for all sub-test cases. Using an identical message header can eliminate the 
streaming time, network transfer time and parsing time issues because of the different 
message header size issue. Therefore, identical message size can focus on the 
processing time of token elements of each sub-test case. The message header of test 
case 1 is shown in Figure 4.2. Each sub-test case only processes the specified tokens, for 
instance, the first sub-test only processes the <pdn:ParticipantDominName>  element 
block and other relative elements, other WS-Security token profile elements within 
<wss:Security> will be ignored. 
 
 93 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
  
 CHAPTER 4  
 
Figure 4.2: SOAP message header for test case 1 
 
Table 4.3 lists the results of the comparison between the proposed token and the 
Username token. A message receiver only uses 7.53 milliseconds to process the 
Participant Domain Name Token (PDNT), which is less than the message receiver, 
which uses 8.48 milliseconds to process the Username tokens when the message 
contains 100 employee records. It shows that PDNT is 12.74% faster to reject a Web 
Services request if it comes from an invalid location or domain. The third sub test case 
is to evaluate the performance when both tokens are required to be processed. When a 
message passes the PDNT validation, it also requires processing of other tokens, the 
Username tokens in this case. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3 show that there is a 0.37% 
processing overhead to process both tokens, this is a very small increase given the 
additional security provided. 
 
 <S11:Header> 
  <wsse:Security> 
   <pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
    <pdn:DomainName>_pdn_tcp.ac.uk</pdn:DomainName> 
   </pdn:ParticipantDominName>   
   <wsse:UsernameToken> 
    <wsse:Username>John</wsse:Username> 
    <wsse:Password Type="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-username-token-profile-
1.0#PasswordDigest"> 
     NtaIDHV2y+beT9ED5IUUck9dvqE= 
    </wsse:Password> 
    <wsse:Nonce EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-
1.0#Base64Binary"> 
     zgniDw== 
    </wsse:Nonce> 
    <wsu:Created>2012-02-10T16:45:27+0800</wsu:Created> 
   </wsse:UsernameToken> 
  </wsse:Security> 
 </S11:Header> 
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Table 4.3: Latency in milliseconds for test case 1 
No. of Employee Records 100 200 300 400 500 
PDNT 7.53 14.94 24.09 32.84 41.02 
Username Token 8.48 15.93 24.64 33.28 41.05 
PDNT + Username Token 8.52 16.23 25.24 34.75 43.34 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Latency in milliseconds for test case 1 
 
4.3.5 Results of Test Case 2  
In test case 2, this research assumes that the decryption mechanism defined in the XML 
encryption standard is used to validate a SOAP message if there are no other 
authentication methods adopted. The message header of test case 2 is shown in Figure 
4.4. As in test case 1, only the secure tokens, which are specified by each sub-test case 
will be processed. The first sub-test case will handle the PDNT secure tokens. The 
second sub-test case will process the encryption tokens. The third sub-test case will 
handle both PDNT and encryption tokens. As shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5, 
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significant performance gains can be realized by using the proposed token. The 
processing time of adopting PDNT is more than 10 times faster than the decryption 
process when a hundred employee records are contained in a SOAP message. A 
message receiver can reject a message, which is sent from an unauthorized location as 
fast as the XML decryption processing can be completed. Processing time is increased 
by only 0.49% to process both tokens when a SOAP message contains 100 employee 
records. Therefore, the overhead is not significant if both tokens are processed. 
 
Figure 4.4: SOAP message header for test case 2 
<S11:Header> 
 <wsse:Security> 
  <pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
   <pdn:DomainName>_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk</pdn:DomainName> 
  </pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
  <xenc:EncryptedKey> 
   <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-
1_5"/> 
    <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
     <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
      <ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
       <ds:X509IssuerName>CN=Webster</ds:X509IssuerName> 
       <ds:X509SerialNumber>1325057813</ds:X509SerialNumber> 
      </ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
     </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
    </ds:KeyInfo> 
    <xenc:CipherData> 
     <xenc:CipherValue> 
DpCR5OuxNJ9dupgjxHoTfO700LbwrtuQ83WVvSUOH4ZATyvKaAutUjW43cD22C
QD/qFFU8exrj51hsQQC5NOYKVNuMq1sUCHn26+h0XgmJD8gecz6dClZxA02kjE
SCDwYXMMuUCD46mDjGT6Qnf7M2kufaW8vnVJdOZsBF+lQWeGjCVfkmwQatj9UO
szLIAfZQ/vti/N4+DUVELqfCamsZz0lvrkvcVFqJVrYV2/i2OMkPxqz8dc7LqF
KC+r1XDfl+XVjzXsLmb7knpmhLi6jYO86n91g4Hgo4WMs/jYB6xdHMbHvqY7l2
U/xiAk45eV2dwhlxrqib1R0nbLj5SIrg== 
     </xenc:CipherValue> 
    </xenc:CipherData> 
   <xenc:ReferenceList> 
    <xenc:DataReference URI="#MsgBody"/> 
   </xenc:ReferenceList> 
  </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header> 
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Table 4.4: Latency in milliseconds for test case 2 
No. of Employee Records 100 200 300 400 500 
PDNT 4.76 11.04 15.79 21.65 32.99 
XML Encryption Token 
(Decryption Process) 
71.00 86.34 103.63 121.78 138.71 
PDNT + Encryption Token 
(Decryption Process) 
71.35 87.22 105.51 122.04 139.67 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Latency in milliseconds for test case 2 
 
4.3.6 Results of Test Case 3 
An XML signature is used to ensure SOAP message integrity and the message is sent 
from a known sender. A SOAP message header for test case 3 is shown in Figure 4.6. 
Both PDNT and signature tokens are included in the message. Three sub-test cases will 
be evaluated including the processing time of the PDNT, signature token and PDNT 
with signature token. Table 4.5 and Figure 4.7 show the performance results of adopting 
the PDNT, signature token, and PDNT with signature tokens. According to the results 
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of test case 3, it is 37.71% ~ 62.35% faster on average if adopting PDNT compared to 
the signature token. The overhead of adopting both tokens is 0.40% ~ 0.43% on average. 
Therefore, adopting the proposed token has a performance advantage as it can refuse an 
invalid SOAP message faster. 
 
Figure 4.6: SOAP message header for test case 3 
<S11:Header> 
 <wsse:Security> 
  <pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
   <pdn:DomainName>_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk</pdn:DomainName> 
  </pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
  <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
   <ds:SignedInfo> 
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-
xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/> 
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-
sha1"/> 
    <ds:Reference URI="#MsgBody"> 
     <ds:DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
     <ds:DigestValue>yU/ypTa0GSC0kjjf23jgkSxxYf0=</ds:DigestValue> 
    </ds:Reference> 
   </ds:SignedInfo> 
   <ds:SignatureValue> 
IlhHY/0hHFjaRbEMNpBL6urRDUhhboVv9XGb3AcYYLJyel0bNvpdPfBZNLMq7HyNtxEmrfJ
fghj1IWYAmrsOB7J9bZFSa1UkZpaCgpnhyC4e5dlCtZTK/CJTSkfuQ1RXSQrxHjfh1o9+SO
fpToTFMMaHRnY+/lAMRCOwhj725Xo= 
   </ds:SignatureValue> 
   <ds:KeyInfo> 
    <ds:KeyValue> 
     <ds:RSAKeyValue> 
       <ds:Modulus> 
miAhwTQHAyCYts1dP4WdEQFvg83cUFoiymuPPXksyYcU+/1X03Zlac7A4d
P/4U6+IRL2+J8cRvMbdy+X1kI/vEYDw1yI4T4snB7XOGxbDi0D80FYUD6a
/99e3nr098aT4sVF8eJfD6KUYzFiMP48CAmS59UaSv6AiK/9Le1/7I0= 
       </ds:Modulus> 
      <ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent> 
     </ds:RSAKeyValue> 
    </ds:KeyValue> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
  </ds:Signature> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header> 
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Table 4.5: Latency in milliseconds for test case 3 
No. of Employee Records 100 200 300 400 500 
PDNT 8.22 15.10 24.00 28.69 32.92 
XML Signature Token  11.32 20.55 31.61 45.08 53.45 
PDNT + Signature Token  11.37 20.80 31.80 45.49 53.67 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Latency in milliseconds for test case 3 
 
4.3.7 Results of Test Case 4 
Some Web Services applications require more security mechanisms to protect the 
information between sender and receiver. Therefore, more than one secure token profile 
is adopted in a SOAP message.  Figure 4.8 shows the message header of test case 4. In 
test case 4, PDNT, XML encryption and XML signature tokens are used in a single 
SOAP message. The first sub-test case will only handle the PDNT token. The second 
sub-test case processes both encryption and signature tokens. The last sub-test case 
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processes all three secure tokens, the PDNT, encryption and signature tokens. The result 
of test case 4 is shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.9. It shows that the PDNT is faster 
from 356.30% to 1417.62%, on average if only adopting PDNT compared to the 
encryption with signature token. The overhead of adopting all three tokens is from 
0.11% to 0.78% on average. Therefore, less than 1% overhead can gain an additional 
security feature if using the PDNT.  
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<S11:Header> 
 <wsse:Security> 
  <pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
   <pdn:DomainName>_pdn_tcp.sussex.ac.uk</pdn:DomainName> 
  </pdn:ParticipantDominName> 
  <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
   <ds:SignedInfo> 
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-
xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/> 
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-
sha1"/> 
    <ds:Reference URI="#MsgBody"> 
     <ds:DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
     <ds:DigestValue>yU/ypTa0GSC0kjjf23jgkSxxYf0=</ds:DigestValue> 
    </ds:Reference> 
   </ds:SignedInfo> 
   <ds:SignatureValue> 
XQ85p6k/Q8xAdA6+bLUiGeSGe4DPe7WGAgfRmdD6QDpGIDIUS/z+4Fn2jSCxeiCq1wJn
Jjii/R8Hdhe2bWFQNQ7qlPoniuRTHL0TzTUkFBRQw7o+CHvATPokNWs0JmlheiMxdjKI
kfXts6wLLN5s4faJDmQXFK1bkPETQt1CQ7o= 
   </ds:SignatureValue> 
   <ds:KeyInfo> 
    <ds:KeyValue> 
     <ds:RSAKeyValue> 
      <ds:Modulus> 
xsZaGU62rvUPpYcCx4B2c0Z03K3CNQnEgfM7jA7zngvD3GkmkqeqR587vp7pD
F62migJ0+D2letCfyq5H3RYkNVukaVkbpSSQFzesJu+WyCg227O2LeudT58ie
v/7H24wJxcfr5oe3PltL0/rnHZ4nz/c5jXH4HmH/CpzBqd1f0= 
      </ds:Modulus> 
      <ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent> 
     </ds:RSAKeyValue> 
    </ds:KeyValue> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
  </ds:Signature> 
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Figure 4.8: SOAP message header for test case 4 
 
Table 4.6: Latency in milliseconds for test case 4 
No. of Employee Records 100 200 300 400 500 
PDNT 4.88 9.14 15.33 22.33 32.11 
XML Encryption + 
Signature Token  
74.10 92.16 113.62 128.25 146.50 
PDNT + Encryption + 
Signature Token  
74.56 92.50 114.51 130.84 146.66 
 
  <xenc:EncryptedKey> 
   <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-
1_5"/> 
   <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
     <ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
      <ds:X509IssuerName>CN=Webster</ds:X509IssuerName> 
      <ds:X509SerialNumber>1325057813</ds:X509SerialNumber> 
     </ds:X509IssuerSerial> 
    </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
   </ds:KeyInfo> 
   <xenc:CipherData> 
    <xenc:CipherValue> 
JvKOLNz6qa52Wt2eq/9ECBIb2sjndjm1UzaY9wWBh8jdRPd0zn3rNk3DTNKxpqn+K
Q0qf5mmKMx+SLI7qyE+19Qa7bvsfGxaGnOTGIoYnxduEg02ypHFGtt1pHF3g9L+zu
20TBXj7aPB5EowCsUz1xjRI9PKKdpjGkCqQvLUeTalCOSAUp0hcpYqLklVZdnipOC
rng+CVuuoJ63/7SniC1RmzzWlX4LBBYucY4gPWiE/WURlb92sz1oHuTgr2BmFGDzY
RqOZcid80NV6OE1o5a5zcwsdibVgjjZogO5Wedv+vXjoDY+4gGAsCnlLWSzTkTof/
ARMzIjfRidyrrxjRA== 
    </xenc:CipherValue> 
   </xenc:CipherData> 
   <xenc:ReferenceList> 
    <xenc:DataReference URI="#MsgBody"/> 
   </xenc:ReferenceList> 
  </xenc:EncryptedKey> 
 </wsse:Security> 
</S11:Header> 
</S11:Header> 
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Figure 4.9: Latency in milliseconds for test case 4 
 
4.3.8 Results Analysis 
The latency of each test case includes the time for the message transfer between the two 
end-points, XML parsing; secure token parsing; secure token processing and DNS 
lookup for PDNT. However, the DNS lookup is not a time consuming process because 
it always uses local server DNS cache after first time querying. The message transfer 
time between client and server is also not a major consideration in this testing 
environment because the client and server process is running on the same computer. 
According to the results of four test cases, all results, which only adopt the PDNT token 
are significantly faster than other secure token profiles. Moreover, the overhead of 
adopting PDNT tokens with other secure token profiles is minor. Therefore, the PDNT 
has a performance advantage. 
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4.4 Advantages of Participant Domain Name Token 
Three advantages accrue from the proposed Participant Domain Name Token (PDNT). 
First, it provides one more security feature, which the WSS token profiles do not 
include. The PDNT works with DNS to provide location or domain validation of a 
SOAP message. Second, the PDNT has a performance advantage when compared with 
WS-Security token profiles. The overheads of XML signature, XML encryption and the 
five secure token profiles are significant. Therefore, using the proposed token, a service 
provider can reject an unknown domain or faked SOAP request as soon as possible. The 
proposed token is parsed and processed before the WS-Security core specification and 
other secure token profiles are processed. Therefore, it can save server resources such as 
CPU time, memory, energy, etc and handle more valid SOAP requests. Based on the 
evaluation of the four test cases, it generates less than 1% overhead to adopt PDNT, this 
is not a significant cost. Third, a permitted domain list feature is also provided. It acts 
like a white list or approved list to control “Where” can invoke the Web Services 
method. The PDNT is simple and easy to implement compared with other Web Service 
security specifications and token profiles. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a performance model for measuring the PDNT and WS-
Security token profiles because the performance is another vital factor to increase the 
spread of a new security standard. Four test cases were seleted and designed in this 
chapter. Each test case has been devided into three sub-test cases to give a detailed 
comparsion. The total parsing time and the total token handling time are adopted as 
performance metrics. According to the experimental results of the four test cases, the 
research found that the PDNT is significantly faster than WS-Security token profiles. 
Moreover, the processing overhead for adopting the PDNT with the WS-Security token 
profiles is minor. Therefore, the PDNT gains significant performance advantages. 
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5.1 Introduction 
he Web Services protocol stack is a set of protocols which are used to define; 
discover and implement the Web Services as illustrated in Figure 5.1.  The 
core protocol stack consists of five layers. The first layer is the transport layer, 
which is responsible for transporting messages between applications, the service 
consumer and service provider. The second layer is responsible for encoding a request 
or responding to messages in a common XML format. The third layer is responsible for 
describing the public interface to specific Web Services; centralizing services into a 
common registry and providing publishing and finds functionality, for instance, what 
methods can be invoked. It also encodes a request and request message to SOAP format. 
The fourth layer is responsible for the enhancement of the SOAP message, including the 
message security, message reliability, etc. The top layer is responsible for the services 
orchestration. It uses Business Process Execution Language (BPEL), which is an 
orchestration language for the Web Services interactions. Using the BPEL, the business 
processes can be defined in XML-based language and exchange messages not only for 
the internal system but also with the outside system. 
 
To implement a Web Service, many technologies are involved. XML is a core 
technology to encode the information. Web Services are a mix of XML and HTTP 
protocol that can convert a message into a Web application. It uses XML to encode 
methods, parameters and other information exchanges between service consumer and 
service provider. SOAP, UDDI and WSDL are XML-based protocols and independent 
of the OS platform and programming languages. The metadata of Web Services is 
defined by the WSDL and listed and discovered by UDDI. WS-* standards are the 
enhancements of Web Services including security, reliability, policy, atomic transaction, 
coordination, etc. 
 
T 
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 Figure 5.1: The Web Services protocol stack 
 
5.2 Building Web Services Platform 
There are two major platforms or frameworks to implement the Web Services, one is 
J2EE (Java Platform, Enterprise Edition) and the other is Microsoft .NET. J2EE 
provides APIs and runtime environment for developing and running enterprise software, 
including network, Web Services, etc. J2EE extends the J2SE (Java Platform Standard 
Edition), which provides APIs for interacting with file systems, network, graphic 
interfaces, etc. The .NET Framework is a software framework developed by Microsoft 
which runs on Microsoft Windows. It provides many libraries for developers to handle 
the user interface, database access, cryptography, Web Services, etc. Although both 
platforms support Web Services, the J2EE is platform gives independence. Therefore, 
J2EE is adopted as the development platform for this research. 
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5.2.1 Web Container 
A Web Server, which is used to host static Web pages is replaced by a Web container or 
modules-based Web server. Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) and Apache 
HTTP server are the most commonly used Web servers. In “Java World”, a Web 
container or Servlet container is an application running on the Web server to handle or 
process Java Servlet and Java Server Pages. The container is an independent 
environment and designed to run Java coding on a Web server. Apache Tomcat is one 
of the most popular Non-commercial Web containers and Oracle WebLogic is a 
commercial Web container. Modules based Web server is another solution to add 
website functionality such as: Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS). IIS has many 
modules to form an application pool to provide different functionalities. Therefore, to 
support Web Services, a Web container or modules based Web server must be used. 
Web container or Servlet container is used because Java is the programming language 
used in this research. Apache Tomcat is also used for the development and testing 
environment. It is an open source software implementation of the Java Servlet and 
JavaServer Pages technologies. Tomcat is an application server and runs behind the 
HTTP server. It means that all the requests are handled by the HTTP server and passed 
to Tomcat when they come across the intended Servlet container. 
 
5.2.2 Java Web Services API 
Java API for XML Web Services (JAX-WS) is a technology for building Web Services 
as shown in Figure 5.2. JAX-WS allows developers to write message-oriented as well as 
RPC-oriented Web Services. It uses XML-based protocol, SOAP is used to build a Web 
service, it hides the complexity of the SOAP for the application developer. With JAX-
WS, an application developer does not need to parse and form a SOAP message. 
However, in order to add a new security token profile on top of SOAP message, the 
SOAP with Attachments API for Java (SAAJ) is used. The SAAJ goes on behind the 
scenes in JAX-WS handlers and JAXR implementations. The advantages of using 
SAAJ are shown in the following: 
 Application developer can use the SAAJ API to write a SOAP message directly 
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 The SAAJ API allows a developer to make a method call by doing XML 
messaging. 
 Send and receive a SOAP message over the Internet using SAAJ. 
 It conforms to the SOAP 1.1 and SOAP 1.2 specifications. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Communication between a JAX-WS Web Service and a Client (Oracle, 2010) 
 
The SAAJ 1.3 specification is implemented in the javax.xml.soap package and provides 
all the necessary APIs for creating, populating and sending request-response SOAP 
messages. Figure 5.3 illustrates the structure of a SOAP message with no attachments 
and an example for creating a SOAP message using SAAJ is shown in Figure 5.4. The 
SAAJ is based on the SOAP standards and provides APIs for the developer to create an 
XML message that conforms to the SOAP 1.1 or 1.2 specifications. 
 
SAAJ is an API-based SOAP toolkit and can be used to create, read or modify SOAP 
messages. The APIs include classes and interfaces that parse and handle SOAP 
elements including SOAP envelope, header, body, and fault. SOAPMessage class is a 
root class SOAP message. Based on the SOAP specification, there are three major 
elements within a SOAP message including envelope element, header element and body 
element. SOAPEnvelope, SOAPHeader and SOAPBody are the three interfaces defined 
in SAAJ to represent the corresponding element.  
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Figure 5.3: SOAPMessage object with no attachments (Oracle, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 5.4: An example of creating a SOAP message using SOAP with Attachments API for Java (SAAJ) 
 
5.3 Web Services Implementation Approaches 
There are two approaches that are used to implement a Web Service from scratch as 
illustrated in Figure 5.5. The first approach is termed “bottom-up” and the other is 
public static SOAPMessage getSOAPMessage(InputStream in) 
 try{ 
  MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
  MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
  mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
  SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, in); 
  soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
  soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
  soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
  soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
 }catch(Exception e){ 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
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termed “top-down”. In the bottom-up approach the source codes or Java methods are 
implemented before writing the service description, the Web Services Description 
Language (WSDL). The “top-down” approach starts with writing a contract or WSDL 
and implements all necessary Java methods based on the Web Services description. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Top-down and button-up implementation approaches to Web Services 
 
The bottom-up approach provides a quick and easy way to implement a Web Service 
from existing coding. However when the Web Service is implemented from a 
developers point of view, it may not address the needs of the consumers. The top-down 
approach can address the consumer needs from the outset. It requires that the service 
provider discusses the service contract with the consumer before any application coding 
begins. It is designed from a business point of view. However, it may have 
interoperability issues, for instance: data types, encoding and binding issues between 
systems. The bottom-up strategy avoids the extra cost, effort, and time required to 
deliver services via a top-down approach, it ends up imposing an increased governance 
burden as bottom-up delivered services tend to have shorter lifespans and require more 
frequent maintenance, refactoring, and versioning. The top-down strategy demands 
more of an initial investment because it introduces an up-front analysis stage focused on 
the creation of the service inventory blueprint. Service candidates are individually 
defined as part of this blueprint so as to ensure that subsequent service designs will be 
highly normalized, standardized, and aligned Erl T (2005). Therefore, there are no best 
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approaches to implement a Web Service.  It depends on the enterprise architecture, 
existing systems architecture and the business requirements. 
5.4 Implementation of Web Services in Bottom-up Approach 
Eclipse IDE, which is a software development environment, Java, Axis2 plug-in and 
Tomcat are used to implement an example of a Web Service using the Bottom-up 
approach. A student Web Service is designed and developed for this demonstration as 
shown in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7.  
 
  
 
Figure 5.6: Student Web Service 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Service logic of student Web Service 
 
Using the approach, the java source codes have been implemented before writing the 
Web Services description. The example of the student Web Service is used to retrieve 
student information by passing an argument of a student ID. Data Access Object (DAO) 
is adopted to map a database object to a persistence object. One of the advantages of 
package uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method; 
import uk.ac.sussex.dao.StudentDao; 
import uk.ac.sussex.entity.Student; 
 
public class StudentService { 
 public Student getStudnet(long studentId){ 
  StudentDao studentDao=new StudentDao();   
  Student student=studentDao.getStudentById(studentId); 
  return student;   
 } 
} 
 
Student Web 
Service Student ID Student 
information 
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DAO is that it can provide data operations without exposing the details of the database, 
for instance, the database structure, primary key or foreign key defined in the tables, the 
one-to-many or many-to-one relationships between tables.  The Eclipse IDE platform 
can generate a Web Service and a client without writing any source code.  A screenshot 
of generating the student Web Service and the client using Eclipse is shown in Figure 
5.8 and Figure 5.9. All the source codes of the student Web Service are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Generate a student Web Service using Eclipse 
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Figure 5.9: Generate a student Web Service client using Eclipse 
 
Using the Eclipse Web Services feature, all the required XML files and Web Service 
Description Language (WSDL) have been generated, such as StudentService.wsdl. 
Moreover, the student Web Service can be tested by a testing client that is also 
generated by Eclipse as shown in Figure 5.9. A testing client can be a Web application 
or a standalone application. In order to show the SOAP messages between sender and 
receiver when invoking the student Web Service, the Eclipse Web Services Explore is 
used as shown in Figure 5.10. It can monitor both directions of SOAP messages 
including a Web Service request and response messages. In Figure 5.11, there is a 
SOAP envelope with a simple body element to invoke the student Web Service by 
calling the method name “getStudent” with an argument “studentId” and the value is set 
to 1. The Tomcat Web container uses the Axis2 plug-ins to parse, process and construct 
a SOAP response message as shown in Figure 5.12. This response message is simple 
and uses the request tag “getStudent” plus “Return” label to return the result. 
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Figure 5.10: Using Eclipse Web Services Explore to test the student Web Service 
 
 
Figure 5.11: A SOAP request message for invoking the student Web Service 
 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:q0="http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
  <soapenv:Body> 
    <q0:getStudnet> 
      <q0:studentId>1</q0:studentId> 
    </q0:getStudnet> 
  </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
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Figure 5.12: A SOAP response message after invoking the student Web Service 
 
In this section, the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and Java 
Platform are adopted to demonstrate how to create a student Web Service and a stand-
alone Web Service application. The communication traffic or the SOAP request and 
response messages can also be monitored by using the Eclipse Web Serves Explorer. 
However, these are not the only tool to implement Web Services. Microsoft .Net, IBM 
developerWorks, WebLogic, etc. can also be used to develop and deploy the Web 
Services. 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
standalone="no"?> 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<ns:getStudnetResponse xmlns:ns="http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk"> 
<ns:return xmlns:ax21="http://entity.sussex.ac.uk/xsd" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:type="ax21:Student"> 
<ax21:dateOfBirth xsi:nil="true"/> 
<ax21:email>perter.gade@sussex.ac.uk</ax21:email> 
<ax21:firstName>Peter</ax21:firstName> 
<ax21:gender>M</ax21:gender> 
<ax21:lastName>Gade</ax21:lastName> 
<ax21:nationality>Genermy</ax21:nationality> 
<ax21:phone>12345678</ax21:phone> 
<ax21:studentId>1</ax21:studentId> 
</ns:return> 
</ns:getStudnetResponse> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
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5.5 Web Services Security Libraries 
Security is one of the major requirements for many types of computer systems, 
especially for exchange of data over the Internet. Traditional information systems have 
moved from the client-server model to Web Services.  The implementation of Web 
Services has been designed and developed, for instance, Apache Axis, Apache Axis2, 
JAX-WS (Java API for XML Web Services), Microsoft .NET Framework, etc. Apache 
Axis2 is a Web Services / SOAP / WSDL engine. It can send, receive and parse a SOAP 
message. There are two layers of Web Services security. The first one is a transitional 
Web security mechanism, which is done in the transport layer using SSL or TSL to 
protect the communication path between sender and receiver. It is the point-to-point 
protection. The second one is implemented in the message layer which applies to XML 
documents that are sent as SOAP messages, it provides message confidentiality, 
prevention of message alteration, etc. It is the end-to-end protection. To support secure 
Web Services applications at the message level, the WS-Security standards or 
specification are adopted. The WS-Security API for implementing the WS-Security core 
specification and secure token profiles have been developed.  There is a famous toolkit 
which is used to implement the WS-Security specification, which is Apache WSS4J. 
The Apache WSS4J project is one of the Java implementations of the primary security 
standards for Web Services and it supports the following WS-Security standards: 
 SOAP Message Security 1.1 
 Username Token Profile 1.1 
 X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1 
 SAML Token Profile 1.1 
 Kerberos Token Profile 1.1 
 Basic Security Profile 1.1 
 
Apache WSS4J is part of the Apache Web Services project and it provides a set of APIs 
to implement WS-Security functionality of a SOAP message. The WSS4J is an 
implementation of the OASIS Web Services Security specifications, which is a Java 
library that can be used to sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt a SOAP message. This 
library is independent and can use the WSS4J’s APIs directly in a standalone manner. 
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All the related classes and interfaces can be found in the org.apache.ws.security package. 
It can be used as a library to sign and verify parts of, or the entire SOAP message and it 
also interoperable with Java API for XML-based RPC (JAX-RPC) and Microsoft .NET-
based servers and clients. Using the WSS4J APIs, a Web Service can add WS-Security 
functionality to enable the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. 
 
However, the Apache WSS4J package is not adopted in this research because the 
performance evaluation among the secure token profiles and proposed token needs to be 
compared in a fair situation. The processing time or resources for parsing and 
processing the secure token profiles will be evaluated in the pure version. Therefore, the 
implementation of the secure token profiles is rewritten and the Participant Domain 
Name Token is designed and programmed. 
 
5.6 Implementation of Participant Domain Name Token 
Web Services uses SOAP messages to represent remote procedure calls between client 
and server. Therefore, a SOAP message parser is needed. The SOAP message parser is 
software that reads a SOAP message and obtains the information from the message, 
which will be manipulated in a program, for instance, an XML parser converts an XML 
document into an XML DOM object, which can be manipulated in a Java program. 
SOAP with Attachments API for Java (SAAJ) is used for mainly for the SOAP 
messaging that goes on behind the scenes in JAX-RPC and JAXR implementations. The 
SAAJ is adopted in the performance evaluation because it can read and write SOAP 
messaging directly rather than use JAX-RPC.  The SAAJ API conforms to the Simple 
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1 specification and is implemented in the 
java.xml.soap package. The SAAJ-related classes are located in the java.xml.soap 
package and this package has all the APIs necessary for sending requests and 
responding to a SOAP message. The Participant Domain Name Token profile is 
implemented in Java language and uses “java.xml.soap.*” Java Achieve (JAR) to parse 
a SOAP message. Other libraries such as “org.xbill.DNS.*” are used for SRV and 
address resource record resolution. All the source codes of the PDNT implementation 
are presented in Appendix B. 
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5.6.1 The java.xml.soap Package 
A SOAP message can be generated and sent manually but the SOAP with the 
attachments API for Java (SAAJ) automates many of the required steps. The package 
javax.xml.soap is a Java API for parsing, creating and building a SOAP message and it 
extends their counterparts in the org.w3c.dom package. This package is defined in the 
SOAP with attachments API for the Java (SAAJ) 1.3 specification. According to the 
JavaTM Platform, Standard Edition 6 API specification, these package facilities the 
following: 
 create a point-to-point connection to a specified endpoint  
 create a SOAP message  
 create an XML fragment  
 add content to the header of a SOAP message  
 add content to the body of a SOAP message  
 create attachment parts and add content to them  
 access/add/modify parts of a SOAP message  
 create/add/modify SOAP fault information  
 extract content from a SOAP message  
 send a SOAP request-response message 
 
The java.xml.soap package extends DOM API to manipulate a SOAP message and 
builds up a SAAJ tree. It is possible to use DOM APIs to add ordinary DOM nodes to a 
SAAJ tree. However, the SAAJ APIs are still required to return SAAJ types when 
examining and manipulating the tree. The interface of SAAJ is used for SOAP 
messaging that provides a way to send XML documents in SOAP format over Internet 
from a Java programming model. The class and interface hierarchy of package 
java.xml.soap are shown in Figure 5.13 and 5.14. A Web Service application can send a 
SOAP message directly using an object of SOAPConnection. A SOAP message object 
can be created by using the MessageFactory object. The message object which is 
created by MessageFactory contains the basic parts of a SOAP message including 
SOAPEnvelop, SOAPHeader, SOAPBody, etc. Therefore, a Web Services application 
can manipulate, send the SOAP message by use of these objects. 
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Figure 5.13: Class hierarchy of package java.xml.soap 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Interface hierarchy of package java.xml.soap 
To create and send a SOAP message using SAAJ, five steps are required including: 
 Creating a SOAP connection 
 Creating a SOAP message 
 java.lang.Object 
o javax.xml.soap.AttachmentPart 
 javax.xml.transform.dom.DOMResult (implements 
javax.xml.transform.Result)  
 javax.xml.soap.SAAJResult 
o javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory 
o javax.xml.soap.MimeHeader 
o javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders 
o javax.xml.soap.SAAJMetaFactory 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnection 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnectionFactory 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPElementFactory 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPFactory 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart (implements org.w3c.dom.Document, 
javax.xml.soap.Node)  
o java.lang.Throwable (implements java.io.Serializable)  
 java.lang.Exception 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPException 
 
 javax.xml.soap.Name 
 org.w3c.dom.Node 
o org.w3c.dom.CharacterData 
 org.w3c.dom.Text 
 javax.xml.soap.Text (also extends 
javax.xml.soap.Node)  
o org.w3c.dom.Element 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement (also extends 
javax.xml.soap.Node)  
 javax.xml.soap.DetailEntry 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPBodyElement 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPFault 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPFaultElement 
o javax.xml.soap.Detail 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeaderElement 
o javax.xml.soap.Node 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement (also extends 
org.w3c.dom.Element)  
 javax.xml.soap.DetailEntry 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPBodyElement 
o javax.xml.soap.SOAPFault 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPFaultElement 
o javax.xml.soap.Detail 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader 
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeaderElement 
 javax.xml.soap.Text (also extends org.w3c.dom.Text)  
 javax.xml.soap.SOAPConstants 
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 Populating the message 
 Sending the message 
 Retrieving the reply 
 
An example of using SAAJ is shown in Figure 5.15. The object of SOAPConnection is 
used to make a one-way trip from one endpoint to another endpoint and uses HTTP Post 
as a transport mechanism. After creating a SOAPConnection object, a SOAP message 
object can be created by invoking createMessage() method, which is defined in a 
MessageFactory class. The SOAP message object has four elements, which are 
SOAPPart object, SOAPEnvelope object, SOAPBody object and SOAPHeader object. 
The four objects can be retrieved from a SOAPMessage object by use of the 
corresponding getter, such as using getBody() method to obtain a SOAPBody object. 
An empty SOAPBody object will be generated when a new SOAP message object is 
created. To manipulate or hold the content of a SOAPbody object, a 
SOAPBodyElement object and Name object are used. The method createName() and 
addBodyElement() of Name object and SOAPBodyElement objects are used to populate 
a SOAP message. After creating and populating a SOAP message, the message can be 
sent using a SOAPConnection object by invoking the call() method with an argument of 
a URL object. The call blocks until it receives a response message. A response message 
will be sent back from another endpoint, the response must be a SOAPMessage object. 
Therefore, the response message content can be accessed using the same methods as 
those for giving content to a message.  The SOAPObody object can be acquired through 
the SOAPMessage, SOAPPart or SOAPEnvelope Objects. 
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Figure 5.15: An Example of creating and sending a SOAP message using SAAJ 
 
5.6.2 The org.xbill.DNS Package 
The proposed token profile uses a service record to authenticate a message sender. The 
service record is one of the DNS records and can be retrieved by a DNS query. The 
org.xbill.DNS or “dnsjava” package supports all record types defined in RFC 1035, 
public static void main(String args[]) { 
 try {     
    //Create a SOAPConnection    
  SOAPConnectionFactory factory = SOAPConnectionFactory.newInstance(); 
  SOAPConnection connection = factory.createConnection();   
  //Create a SOAPMessage 
  SOAPMessageFactory messageFactory = MessageFactory.newInstance(); 
  SOAPMessage message = messageFactory.createMessage(); 
  SOAPPart  soapPart = messge.getSOAPPart(); 
  SOAPEnvelope envelope = soapPart.getEnvelope(); 
  SOAPHeader header = envelope.getHeader(); 
  SOAPBody body = envelope.getBody();  
  header.detachNode(); 
  //Populate a SOAPMessage 
Name bodyName = envelope.createName("GetStudentInfo","m", 
"http://webservice.sussex.ac.uk"); 
  SOAPBodyElement bodyElement = body.addBodyElement(bodyName); 
  Name name = envelope.createName("symbol"); 
  SOAPElement symbol = bodyElement.addChildElement(name); 
  symbol.addTextNode("studentID"); 
  //Sending a SOAPMessage 
  URL endpoint = new URL("http://webservice.sussex.ac.uk"); 
  SOAMessage response= connection.call(message, endpoint); 
  // Close the SOAPConnection 
  connection.close(); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   System.out.println(e.getMessage()); 
  } 
  } 
} 
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RFC 3596, RFC 2782, etc and is implemented in the Java programming language. 
There are many applications using this package. Examples are shown in the following: 
 CustomDNS – a customize DNS server written in Java 
 CRSMail – a Java based E-Mail server 
 Rabbit4 – a Web proxy server 
 Eagle DNS – an authoritative DNS server 
 
To implement the Participant Domain Name Token Profile, the org.xbill.DNS APIs are 
used to retrieve the Service Record (SRV), which is stored in a DNS server. For 
instance, a Web Service handler parses a SOAP message to construct a DOM tree and 
obtains a participant domain name element, < pdn:ParticipantDominName > from the 
tree. Then, the org.bill.DNS library will be invoked to acquire the relative Service 
Record and Address Record. Figure 5.16 shows an example of a Java method using the 
dnsjava package. 
 
 
Figure 5.16: A Java method uses org.bill.DNS to retrieve a list of Service Records 
 
 public List<String> getSrvRecord(String lookupService){ 
   List<String> hostList=new ArrayList<String>(); 
   Record [] records = new Lookup(lookupService, Type.SRV).run(); 
   if (records!=null){ 
    for (int i = 0; i < records.length; i++) { 
     SRVRecord srvRecord=(SRVRecord) records[i]; 
     hostList.add(srvRecord.getTarget().toString()); 
    } 
   } 
   return hostList;  
 } 
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5.6.3 The Participant Domain Name Package 
 A new java class to handle the proposed token named 
“ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler” has been designed and developed. A Java 
class constructor and a validation method of the proposed token are shown in Figure 
5.17 and an example of usage is shown in Figure 5.18. An instance, which is created 
from the class of the ParticipantDomainNameToken (PDNT) has been tested on 
different sizes of SOAP messages and it can work with other secure token profiles. All 
the related classes and libraries are packed into a JAR file, which can be used and 
plugged into different Web Services containers.  
 
To instance the PDNT class, a SOAPMessage object is an argument or parameter for 
creating the PDNT object. The PDNT will access the content of a SOAP message and 
validate the domain name by calling the validate() method. The PDNT object accesses 
the content of a SOAPMessage by using the SAAJ package. The TextContent of the 
“pdn:ParticipantDomainName” and “pdn:DomainName” elements are obtained by 
calling getElementsbyTagName method. The service record can be found within the 
pdn:DomainName element. It is used to find out the corresponding address record and 
compares it the IP address that the Web container shows. 
 
The ParticipantDoaminNameToken (PDNT) is designed and developed in a standalone 
Java package. It means that it can be plugged into different J2EE Web containers or 
other Java libraries to implement or adopt the proposed token profile. All the related 
java class files, associated metadata and resources are aggregated into one Java Archive 
(JAR) file. The JAR file allows Java runtime to efficiently deploy a set of classes and 
their associated resources. 
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Figure 5.17: The class constructor and a validation method of Participant Domain Name Token 
 
 
Figure 5.18: A sample program using Participant Domain Name Token 
public ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler(SOAPMessage message){ 
 try{ 
  soapMessage=message; 
  this.soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();  
  this.soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();          
  this.soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
  this.soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
  if (soapHeader==null){   
   soapHeader= 
   MessageUtil.createSecureHeader(soapEnvelope);   } 
 }catch(Exception e){ 
  e.printStackTrace(); 
 } 
} 
 
public boolean validate(String senderIP){ 
 String lookupService=getLookupService(); 
 List <String> ipList=DNSClient.getAddressRecord(lookupService); 
 for (int i=0;i<ipList.size();i++){ 
  if (ipList.get(i).equals(senderIP)) 
   return true; 
 } 
 return false; 
} 
 
 
public static void main(String[] args) { 
 MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
 MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
 mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml;charset=UTF-8"); 
 SOAPMessagesoapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, 
 MessageUtil.readFileToInputStream("soapMessage.xml")); 
 ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler tokenHandler=new 
 ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler(soapMessage); 
 tokenHandler.validate(senderIP); 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the detailed implemention methodologies to develop the PDNT. 
Because of the security issues with existing Web Service security standards, PDNT is 
proposed and it has performance advantages that have been demonstrated by the 
performance evaluation. The research uses Java as the major programming language to 
implement the PDNT. Moreover, the Attachments API for Java (SAAJ) package or 
toolkit is used for parsing a SOAP message. In order to work with DNS resource 
records, the “dnsjava” package is also adopted. This package supports all record types 
of the DNS resource record and it is implemented in the Java programming language. 
All the classes to handle and process the PDNT were designed and developed. 
Moreover, they were collected as a standalone Java package and aggregated into one 
Java Archive (JAR) file. Therefore, it can be plugged into J2EE Web containers or 
become a Java library for other systems use. 
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6.1 General Discussion 
n Organization must adapt to the changes in both external and internal 
environments both to survive and gain the best return on investment. These 
changes will affect the direction of business strategy, partnerships, mergers 
and acquisitions. The IT architecture and systems must also evolve to fulfill the new 
business environment and requirements, for instance, integration across enterprise 
boundaries, system collaboration between partners, customers and suppliers. Therefore, 
the IT architectures and systems must be designed to be flexible to reflect these changes. 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an IT architectural style and composed of 
loosely coupled invokable software modules or services. Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) has gained widespread acceptance in different sectors. It allows reuse and 
integration of existing IT assets, for instance: business logic reused and heterogeneous 
systems integration. The concept of the SOA can be used in other frameworks, for 
instance, Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) and Enterprise Application Integration (EAI). 
The ESB is a messaging backbone to do the data conversion, format transformation, 
routing, accept and deliver messages. The EAI is a framework to integrate a set of 
applications within or across the enterprises. These frameworks can be developed or 
implemented by a set of services and then they also become the Service-Oriented 
Architecture. 
 
The SOA is a preferred design and architecture style for integration of ubiquitous 
computing resources. Traditionally designed ICT systems use an application style, 
which is designed as a tightly coupled system; this is less effective and suffers from the 
dependencies of each component. The invention of Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
makes each component system independent and permits a loosely coupled system. The 
SOA can be adopted in a large complex system which includes many independent 
components. For instance, online shopping applications are composed of different 
functionalities like credit card authorization, currency conversion, best price searching, 
etc. These components can be designed and implemented into several independent 
services. The services can then be used in a single application or other applications. 
A 
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Services reuse is one of the advantages of adopting SOA. Moreover, adopting the SOA 
can gain benefits in enterprise application integration, service reuse, leveraging the 
legacy investment and best of breed integration. Therefore, SOA is suitable to design a 
distributed, Internet-based, dynamic change, autonomous and non-point to point system. 
 
The SOA can be implemented by a set of independent software units or services, with 
interfaces that can be invoked to perform required tasks. It can be implemented by 
SOAP-based Web Services, RESTful Web Services, Remote Procedure Call (RPC), 
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture (CORBA) etc.  However, Web Services are the most popular technology to 
implement the SOA. A Web service is a kind of distributed system that provides APIs, 
which can be used by all systems on the Internet. Unlike a traditional Application 
Programming Interface (API), Web Services API is language-independent and can be 
invoked by different languages on different platforms. There are two major classes of 
Web Services: REST-compliant Web Services and SOAP-based Web Services. Both 
have their advantages and disadvantages. The RESTful is simple and flexible but the 
SOAP is a standard protocol, which includes more extensions and security mechanisms. 
 
REST-compliant Web Service is also called RESTful Web Services. It is not a standard 
and the message consists of XML and HTML. RESTful Web Services are a resource-
oriented architecture and uses Unique Resource Identifier (URI) to represent each object 
in the system. RESTful focuses on interfacing with resources and changing their state. It 
uses a directory structure-like URIs to show where a service consumer can acquire the 
resources.  Unlike other Web Services architecture, it works on resources directly rather 
than invokes a function to work on resources. RESTful Web Services are stateless; the 
state is maintained by being transferred from a client to a server and back to the client. It 
uses a uniform set of stateless operations to parse and process a Web Service request. A 
RESTful Web API is a Web API that utilizes HTTP and REST principles. All interfaces 
are limited to the four HTTP commands. It makes explicit use of the HTTP methods, 
which include GET, POST, PUT and DELETE to implement read, create, update and 
delete functions (CRUD).  RESTful Web Services do not use RPC to send a message 
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Unlike RESTful, the SOAP-based Web Service not only supports HTTP protocol but 
also SMTP, FTP and other communication protocols. Although RESTful Web Services 
are simple and flexible compared with SOAP-based Web Services or stateful Web 
Services, it does not provide any security mechanism to protect a message. In order to 
protect the message content, HTTPS is used to secure the transmission of the message 
over the network if the RESTful style is adopted. However, it does not provide end-to-
end protection.  SOAP-based Web Services is highly extensible and it can cooperate 
with many existing standards and protocols. WS-Security is a set of security standards 
for SOAP-based Web Services which offers message confidentiality and message 
integrity. It also provides user authentication, authorization and other security 
mechanisms. Moreover, the state of a SOAP-based Web Service is maintained on the 
server side. It means that state information is not kept on the client side even when the 
session is still alive. Therefore, Simple Object Access Protocol is the most common way 
to implement Web Services if security is a major concern. The SOAP is a specification 
for exchanging structured messages between two end points via common 
communication protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The major 
security challenges between two end points are in the transport layer and message layer. 
The transport level security uses layer 3 and layer 4 protocols to protect data, using 
IPSec, SSL, etc. The message layer security is a proper method to protect the message 
format from end-to-end and it operates on layer 7. The SOAP-based Web Services has 
many in-built security mechanisms and extensions running on layer 7.  It is a suitable 
choice if the security is a major concern for the SOA-based system. 
 
An example of a SOA-based system, which requires higher security is presented in this 
research, named “An SOA-based Disease Notification System”. Disease notification is 
one of the critical components for prevention and controlling the spread of infectious 
disease within society and around the world. The proposed system uses medical 
standards, for instance, International Classification Code (ICD) to exchange a notifiable 
disease through the Internet. Three layers are used in the proposed system including the 
service layer, business process layer and connectivity layer. In the service layer, a 
service is a fundamental component of the Web Services.  The business logics are 
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decomposed into several generic services. All the services can interact with each other 
at the message level in the business process layer and the execution order can be 
specified and the business logic of inter-services programmed using the Business 
Process Execution Language (BPEL). A precise and reliable laboratory test result can 
indicate whether it is a notifiable disease. In a heterogeneous laboratory environment, a 
laboratory test result is generated by an analyzer or a medical instrument. The results 
that are printed out from the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) or 
input to a health information system (HIS) manually for further investigation. However, 
there are many different types of medical instruments in a hospital environment and 
each of them produces medical results in different formats. In order expedite speed of 
response issues; the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) is used in the connectivity layer to 
integrate everything together. The ESB does not only interface to all clinical 
instruments, but also interfaces to LIMS and HIS. Therefore, the precise and reliable 
laboratory test results can be delivered to the HIS on time, which is important during the 
outbreak of disease. 
 
A service provider deploys a Web Service for a service consumer to submit notifiable 
diseases, for instance, a notifiable disease will be sent to a local health authority directly 
when a hospital invokes a Web Service of local health authority or Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC). The hospital can also act as a service provider to provide a Web Service 
for a clinic to submit a notifiable disease to them. All the notifiable diseases can also be 
sent to the World Health Organization (WHO) from different health authorities via a 
Web Service, which is provided by the WHO. Existing WS-Security standards can 
control who can submit a notifiable disease. However, it cannot handle where can 
submit a notifiable disease. Location authentication is important for disease notification, 
for instance, it does not allow submission of a SARS case outside of a hospital. 
Additional authentication mechanisms can ensure case authenticity. 
 
Security is important for the use of Web Services. However, performance is another 
critical factor for evaluating a new security standard. Performance measurements have 
been completed in this research to compare the existing secure token profiles, the WS-
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Security with the proposed token profile. Response time or latency time is adopted as a 
performance metric to evaluate the round-trip time of a message between sender and 
receiver. The latency time is affected by two factors, which are the total time spent in 
the network layer and application layer. However, the total time spent in the network 
layer is not considered because it is difficult to evaluate over the Internet. The total time 
spent in the application layer is also affected by many factors including message size, 
number of XML elements, parsing time, token handling time, total time spent in 
business logic and database manipulation, etc. In this performance evaluation, all the 
measurements are made with identical equipment and environment. The proposed token 
requires a DNS lookup to acquire an SRV record for the domain validation. However it 
is not a time consuming process because a local DNS cache is used after first time 
querying. Therefore, the network issue and DNS lookup time can be ignored and only 
latency time spent in the application layer is considered. A millisecond timescale is used 
to compute latency for each round-trip time between message sender and receiver.  Both 
the Web Service provider and consumer are written in the Java programming language. 
A pure HTTP server and HTTP client with necessary java library are used for the 
performance evaluation.  
 
Different sizes of SOAP messages were used for each test case and average latency time 
is adopted for comparison between the proposed token and WS-Security tokens. The 
size of a SOAP message depends on which secure tokens are used. According to the 
message size evaluation of each secure token profile in this research, the message size 
of the proposed token profile is the minimum and the encryption token profile is the 
maximum, which is increased by 37%. Four test cases were selected and are tested with 
different message sizes, which include the proposed token vs. (1) Username token; (2) 
XML encryption token; (3) XML signature token; (4) XML encryption with signature 
token. In each test case, the proposed token profile was used by a message receiver to 
authenticate the location of a sender. WS-Security token profiles were used to validate a 
SOAP message by different mechanisms. Each test case has been divided into three sub-
test cases, which was processed a hundred times to obtain the average latency for each 
sub-test case of each record size.  
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In the test case 1, the latency of processing Participant Domain Name Token (PDNT) is 
12.74 % faster than username token profile when a message contains 100 employee 
records. It is also 6.67%, 2.27%, 1.36% and 0.07% faster if adopted for 200, 300, 400 
and 500 employee records respectively. The encryption token profile uses the most 
processing time when compared with the other WS-Security secure token profiles. The 
results are shown in test case 2. It is 238.13 % ~ 843.5% faster than the encryption 
token profile when the proposed token is adopted. In test case 3, the latency of 
processing PDNT is 30.3% ~ 50.39% faster than signature token profile. Finally, the 
encryption token with signature token are selected to compare with the proposed token 
for the performance evaluation and the results are shown in test case 4. It shows that the 
PDNT is 257.12% ~ 884.62% faster than these two token profiles. Therefore, all test 
case results show that the processing time for adopting the proposed token profile is 
faster than the other secure token profiles. The four test cases also evaluate the overhead 
to process the proposed token with each WS-Security token profile. In test case 1, if 
both the proposed token and username token are used and processed, the processing 
time is increased by 0.37%. It means that by adopting an additional token, the proposed 
token there is a very small increase and it provides additional security. In test case 1, 2 
and 3, it shows that the processing time is increased by less than 1% to process the 
proposed token with encryption token, proposed token with signature token, proposed 
token with encryption and signature token. Therefore, the overhead is not significant 
and the system gains an additional security feature if using PDNT. 
 
The security of an IT system has become one of the most important components of the 
system, especially for Internet-based systems. In an organization, the primary security 
device is a firewall and a SOAP message is designed to move across firewalls by using 
HTTP protocol. However, most firewalls are a layer 3 security device and cannot 
provide end-to-end message authentication, authorization, confidentiality and integrity. 
In order to protect the content or data in a message, more than one security feature is 
used in a single SOAP message. However, the more security mechanisms that are 
adopted the greater will be the total processing time.  In order to gain a performance 
advantage the proposed token   eliminates the overhead for processing an unknown or a 
fake request, the PDNT is processed before other WS-Security secure tokens, such as 
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username token, encryption token, signature token, and etc. Therefore, it can refuse a 
fake request as fast as possible and does not need to process other secure tokens if it is 
an illegal request, which will saves the processing resources to handle more requests.  
 
In this research, message layer security has been taken into account in order to fulfill 
three major aspects of security, integrity, confidentiality and availability. The SOAP 
relies on XML for its message format and a SOAP message can be protected in the 
message layer. We found existing message layer security mechanisms, which are 
defined and collected in the OASIS standard 1.1. It does not only provide message 
integrity and message confidentiality but also other secure token profiles including: 
 Username Token Profile 
 X.509 Token Profile 
 SAML Token Profile 
 Kerberos Token Profile 
 Rights Expression Language Token Profile 
 
Each token profile has defined a standard set of Web Services Security extensions to 
profile particular security features. We found that the five secure token profiles focus on 
two areas. Who can use the Web Services and what are the permissions. However, we 
found that the location of a Web Service invoker is not handled and not verified in 
existing secure token profiles. Other researchers also focus on the dynamic policy 
assignment based on other techniques, for instance, data mining and ontology. The 
location of service invoker is also ignored. Therefore, a location based verification is 
needed to control “where” can use the Web Services. 
 
  
  
 134 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 CHAPTER 6  
6.2 Conclusions 
Existing standards on WS-Security and performance evaluation of the proposed token 
have been presented in this thesis. The features, purposes and limitations of the OASIS 
standard 1.1 have also been discussed. The research have found and achieved the 
following: 
1. Services-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is one of the preferred approaches for 
system design and system integration, since integrated computing has become 
ubiquitous. 
2. Some SOA-based systems require higher security, for instance, the disease 
notification system. 
3. RESTful Web Services and SOAP-based Web Services are the widely used 
technologies to implement Web Services. 
4. Web Services is one of the technologies to implement SOA and Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) is widely used to implement Web Services if security 
is a major concern.  
5. SOAP-based Web Services is an XML-based platform-independent protocol. It 
is used for data exchange, method discovery and invocation between Web 
Services applications. 
6. WS-Security 1.1 OASIS is a security standard and specification to provide 
message confidentiality, message integrity, user authentication, authorization 
and other security mechanisms for SOAP-based Web Services. 
7. The SOAP-based message can be protected in both the transport and message 
layer protocol. Transport layer protection can be achieved by standard network 
security protocol, for instance SSL, IPSec.  The message layer is a proper 
method to protect the message from one end to the other end. WS-Security 1.1 
OASIS is an existing standard to protect a SOAP-based message, which 
provides “who can use the services” and “what are the permissions” mechanisms.  
8. There are no location-based mechanisms for the location authentication using 
existing standards and research. 
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A location-based authentication mechanism is proposed in this research, named 
Participant Domain Name Token (PDNT). “Where can use the services” is handled by 
the new proposed token and it is implemented in the Java language. Location 
authentication is important for a SOA-based system which is required to monitor and 
control “where” can invoke the Web Services. The Disease Notification System is an 
example of a system which requires control of “where” can submit a notifiable disease 
to ensure case authenticity. To adopt PDNT, the following libraries are required: 
1. Java.xml.soap.* are used to parse a SOAP message. 
2. Org.xbill.DNS.* are used for SRV and address resource record resolution. 
 
All the relative classes are packed into a Java Achieve (JAR) file. A web container or a 
Web Services system can plug this jar file into existing system architecture with minor 
modification. Performance is another advantage to be gained by adopting the PDNT. 
Based on the experimental results, which are presented in this thesis, the PDNT gains 
significant performance advantage over other secure token profiles and the overhead for 
adopting PDNT is minor. Therefore, all the participants can reap the benefits of 
increased security and performance. 
 
The proposed token provides a location-based authentication mechanism. It is not only 
used to control an area but also control a country and region to invoke a service. The 
PDNT can disallow a region that cannot invoke the Web Services, even though a user 
has permission. Therefore, this new security token could have a significant impact in 
combating industrial espionage by commercial organizations and National Security 
Agencies. 
 
6.3 Future Directions 
OASIS Web Services Security standards do not only enhance a SOAP message to 
provide message integrity and confidentiality but also define how to use the secure 
token to enable the implementation of a wide range of protocols, such as Kerberos, 
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X.509. The proposed token enhances the WS-Security by adding a new secure token to 
provide location-based authentication mechanisms. It also respects the WS-Security 
specification, which fulfills the requirements to use the SOAP header for carrying 
security information. The PDNT can be used for the authentication of a message sender 
location. The newly designed token can be used to reject invalid requests or responses, 
which come from unknown or fake domains before parsing and processing the other 
secure token profiles. 
 
The proposed secure token profile incorporates one of the most widely used Internet 
service information identities, which is the Domain Name Service (DNS). It can verify, 
control and monitor the location of the service consumer or message sender. An existing 
DNS record is used to describe or show participant domain information, which is 
Service Record (SRV), a DNS resource record for specifying the location of services. 
However, the target field defined in the SRV record has been a little changed since the 
original meaning to the self-defined. Therefore, it will confuse a user who follows the 
SRV specification, the RFC2782.  
 
In the future, a new type of DNS resource record should be considered to support the 
proposed token. This record can be used to properly support the PDNT without 
changing the usage of the SRV record. The Network Address Translation (NAT) is also 
considered if a participant uses a firewall between internal network and Internet. One-
to-many NAT is usually adopted for multiple private hosts mapped to a public IP 
address. If there are many departments within an organization invoking Web Services, 
which are outside the organization, for instance, on the Internet, only a single public IP 
can be used to validate all departments by the PDNT handler because of the NAT issue. 
In the future, we will provide mechanisms to tackle this issue. Moreover, the PDNT 
should be implemented in a real service consumer and service provider and become a de 
facto Web Services secure token profile. 
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Student Web Service is mainly composed of three java program files and one wsdl: 
1. StudnetService.java 
2. StudentDao.java 
3. Studnet.java 
4. StudnetService.wsdl 
 
StudnetService.java 
package uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method; 
import uk.ac.sussex.dao.StudentDao; 
import uk.ac.sussex.entity.Student; 
 
public class StudentService { 
 public Student getStudnet(long studentId){ 
  StudentDao studentDao=new StudentDao();   
  Student student=studentDao.getStudentById(1); 
  return student;   
 } 
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} 
 
StudnetDao.java 
package uk.ac.sussex.dao; 
import uk.ac.sussex.entity.Student; 
public class StudentDao { 
 public Student getStudentById(long studentId){ 
  Student student=new Student(); 
  student.setStudentId(studentId); 
  student.setFirstName("Peter"); 
  student.setLastName("Gade"); 
  student.setGender("M"); 
  student.setNationality("Genermy"); 
  student.setPhone("12345678"); 
  student.setEmail("perter.gade@sussex.ac.uk"); 
  return student; 
 } 
} 
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Studnet.java 
package uk.ac.sussex.entity; 
import java.util.Date; 
public class Student { 
 private long studentId; 
 private String firstName; 
 private String lastName; 
 private String gender; 
 private String nationality; 
 private Date dateOfBirth; 
 private String phone;  
 private String email; 
  
 public long getStudentId(){ 
  return studentId; 
 } 
 public void setStudentId(long studentId){ 
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  this.studentId=studentId; 
 }  
 public String getFirstName() { 
  return firstName; 
 } 
 public void setFirstName(String firstName) { 
  this.firstName = firstName; 
 }  
 public String getLastName() { 
  return lastName; 
 } 
 public void setLastName(String lastName) { 
  this.lastName = lastName; 
 } 
 public String getGender() { 
  return gender; 
 } 
 public void setGender(String gender) { 
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  this.gender = gender; 
 } 
 public String getNationality() { 
  return nationality; 
 } 
 public void setNationality(String nationality) { 
  this.nationality = nationality; 
 } 
 public Date getDateOfBirth() { 
  return dateOfBirth; 
 } 
 public void setDateOfBirth(Date dateOfBirth) { 
  this.dateOfBirth = dateOfBirth; 
 } 
 public String getPhone() { 
  return phone; 
 } 
 public void setPhone(String phone) { 
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  this.phone = phone; 
 } 
 public String getEmail() { 
  return email; 
 } 
 public void setEmail(String email) { 
  this.email = email; 
 } 
} 
 
 
 
StudnetService.wsdl 
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>  
- <wsdl:definitions xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:ns1="http://org.apache.axis2/xsd" 
xmlns:ns="http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk" xmlns:wsaw="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl" 
xmlns:http="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/http/" xmlns:ax21="http://entity.sussex.ac.uk/xsd" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:mime="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/mime/" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
xmlns:soap12="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap12/" targetNamespace="http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk"> 
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  <wsdl:documentation>Please Type your service description here</wsdl:documentation>  
- <wsdl:types> 
- <xs:schema attributeFormDefault="qualified" elementFormDefault="qualified" targetNamespace="http://entity.sussex.ac.uk/xsd"> 
- <xs:complexType name="Student"> 
- <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="dateOfBirth" nillable="true" type="xs:date" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="email" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="firstName" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="gender" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="lastName" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="nationality" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="phone" nillable="true" type="xs:string" />  
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="studentId" type="xs:long" />  
  </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:schema> 
- <xs:schema xmlns:ax22="http://entity.sussex.ac.uk/xsd" attributeFormDefault="qualified" elementFormDefault="qualified" 
targetNamespace="http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk"> 
  <xs:import namespace="http://entity.sussex.ac.uk/xsd" />  
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- <xs:element name="getStudnet"> 
- <xs:complexType> 
- <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="studentId" type="xs:long" />  
  </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
- <xs:element name="getStudnetResponse"> 
- <xs:complexType> 
- <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="return" nillable="true" type="ax21:Student" />  
  </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
  </xs:element> 
  </xs:schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
- <wsdl:message name="getStudnetRequest"> 
  <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:getStudnet" />  
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  </wsdl:message> 
- <wsdl:message name="getStudnetResponse"> 
  <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:getStudnetResponse" />  
  </wsdl:message> 
- <wsdl:portType name="StudentServicePortType"> 
- <wsdl:operation name="getStudnet"> 
  <wsdl:input message="ns:getStudnetRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:getStudnet" />  
  <wsdl:output message="ns:getStudnetResponse" wsaw:Action="urn:getStudnetResponse" />  
  </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:portType> 
- <wsdl:binding name="StudentServiceSoap11Binding" type="ns:StudentServicePortType"> 
  <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document" />  
- <wsdl:operation name="getStudnet"> 
  <soap:operation soapAction="urn:getStudnet" style="document" />  
- <wsdl:input> 
  <soap:body use="literal" />  
  </wsdl:input> 
- <wsdl:output> 
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  <soap:body use="literal" />  
  </wsdl:output> 
  </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
- <wsdl:binding name="StudentServiceSoap12Binding" type="ns:StudentServicePortType"> 
  <soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document" />  
- <wsdl:operation name="getStudnet"> 
  <soap12:operation soapAction="urn:getStudnet" style="document" />  
- <wsdl:input> 
  <soap12:body use="literal" />  
  </wsdl:input> 
- <wsdl:output> 
  <soap12:body use="literal" />  
  </wsdl:output> 
  </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
- <wsdl:binding name="StudentServiceHttpBinding" type="ns:StudentServicePortType"> 
  <http:binding verb="POST" />  
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- <wsdl:operation name="getStudnet"> 
  <http:operation location="getStudnet" />  
- <wsdl:input> 
  <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters" />  
  </wsdl:input> 
- <wsdl:output> 
  <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters" />  
  </wsdl:output> 
  </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
- <wsdl:service name="StudentService"> 
- <wsdl:port name="StudentServiceHttpSoap11Endpoint" binding="ns:StudentServiceSoap11Binding"> 
  <soap:address location="http://localhost:8881/SussexWebServices/services/StudentService.StudentServiceHttpSoap11Endpoint/" />  
  </wsdl:port> 
- <wsdl:port name="StudentServiceHttpSoap12Endpoint" binding="ns:StudentServiceSoap12Binding"> 
  <soap12:address location="http://localhost:8881/SussexWebServices/services/StudentService.StudentServiceHttpSoap12Endpoint/" />  
  </wsdl:port> 
- <wsdl:port name="StudentServiceHttpEndpoint" binding="ns:StudentServiceHttpBinding"> 
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  <http:address location="http://localhost:8881/SussexWebServices/services/StudentService.StudentServiceHttpEndpoint/" />  
  </wsdl:port> 
  </wsdl:service> 
  </wsdl:definitions> 
 
Student Web Service Client is mainly composed of three java program files: 
1. TestClient.java 
2. StudentServiceSub.java 
3. StudentServiceCallbackHandler.java 
 
 
 
TestClient.java 
package uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method; 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnet; 
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import uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnetResponse; 
import uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.Student; 
public class TestClient { 
 public static void main (String[] args) throws RemoteException { 
  StudentServiceStub stub =new StudentServiceStub(); 
  GetStudnet getStudent= new GetStudnet(); 
  getStudent.setStudentId(new Long(1)); 
  GetStudnetResponse response=stub.getStudnet(getStudent); 
  Student student=response.get_return(); 
  System.out.println(student.getFirstName()); 
 } 
} 
 
StudentServiceStub.java (Part of) 
  
public uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnetResponse getStudnet( 
 
uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnet getStudnet0) 
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throws java.rmi.RemoteException 
 
{ 
 org.apache.axis2.context.MessageContext _messageContext = null; 
 try { 
  org.apache.axis2.client.OperationClient _operationClient = _serviceClient 
    .createClient(_operations[0].getName()); 
  _operationClient.getOptions().setAction("urn:getStudnet"); 
  _operationClient.getOptions().setExceptionToBeThrownOnSOAPFault( 
    true); 
 
  addPropertyToOperationClient( 
    _operationClient, 
    org.apache.axis2.description.WSDL2Constants.ATTR_WHTTP_QUERY_PARAMETER_SEPARATOR, 
    "&"); 
 
  // create a message context 
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  _messageContext = new org.apache.axis2.context.MessageContext(); 
 
  // create SOAP envelope with that payload 
  org.apache.axiom.soap.SOAPEnvelope env = null; 
 
  env = toEnvelope(getFactory(_operationClient.getOptions() 
    .getSoapVersionURI()), getStudnet0, 
    optimizeContent(new javax.xml.namespace.QName( 
      "http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk", 
      "getStudnet")), new javax.xml.namespace.QName( 
      "http://method.webservices.sussex.ac.uk", 
      "getStudnet")); 
 
  // adding SOAP soap_headers 
  _serviceClient.addHeadersToEnvelope(env); 
  // set the message context with that soap envelope 
  _messageContext.setEnvelope(env); 
 
172 
 
APPENDIX 
  // add the message contxt to the operation client 
  _operationClient.addMessageContext(_messageContext); 
 
  // execute the operation client 
  _operationClient.execute(true); 
 
  org.apache.axis2.context.MessageContext _returnMessageContext = _operationClient 
    .getMessageContext(org.apache.axis2.wsdl.WSDLConstants.MESSAGE_LABEL_IN_VALUE); 
  org.apache.axiom.soap.SOAPEnvelope _returnEnv = _returnMessageContext 
    .getEnvelope(); 
 
  java.lang.Object object = fromOM( 
    _returnEnv.getBody().getFirstElement(), 
    uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnetResponse.class, 
    getEnvelopeNamespaces(_returnEnv)); 
 
  return (uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnetResponse) object; 
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 } catch (org.apache.axis2.AxisFault f) { 
 
  org.apache.axiom.om.OMElement faultElt = f.getDetail(); 
  if (faultElt != null) { 
   if (faultExceptionNameMap 
     .containsKey(new org.apache.axis2.client.FaultMapKey( 
       faultElt.getQName(), "getStudnet"))) { 
    // make the fault by reflection 
    try { 
     java.lang.String exceptionClassName = (java.lang.String) faultExceptionClassNameMap 
       .get(new org.apache.axis2.client.FaultMapKey( 
         faultElt.getQName(), "getStudnet")); 
     java.lang.Class exceptionClass = java.lang.Class 
       .forName(exceptionClassName); 
     java.lang.Exception ex = (java.lang.Exception) exceptionClass 
       .newInstance(); 
     // message class 
     java.lang.String messageClassName = (java.lang.String) faultMessageMap 
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       .get(new org.apache.axis2.client.FaultMapKey( 
         faultElt.getQName(), "getStudnet")); 
     java.lang.Class messageClass = java.lang.Class 
       .forName(messageClassName); 
     java.lang.Object messageObject = fromOM(faultElt, 
       messageClass, null); 
     java.lang.reflect.Method m = exceptionClass.getMethod( 
       "setFaultMessage", 
       new java.lang.Class[] { messageClass }); 
     m.invoke(ex, new java.lang.Object[] { messageObject }); 
 
     throw new java.rmi.RemoteException(ex.getMessage(), ex); 
    } catch (java.lang.ClassCastException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
    } catch (java.lang.ClassNotFoundException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
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     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
    } catch (java.lang.NoSuchMethodException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
    } catch (java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
    } catch (java.lang.IllegalAccessException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
    } catch (java.lang.InstantiationException e) { 
     // we cannot intantiate the class - throw the original 
     // Axis fault 
     throw f; 
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    } 
   } else { 
    throw f; 
   } 
  } else { 
   throw f; 
  } 
 } finally { 
  if (_messageContext.getTransportOut() != null) { 
   _messageContext.getTransportOut().getSender().cleanup( 
     _messageContext); 
  } 
 } 
StudentServiceCallbackHandler.java 
/** 
 * StudentServiceCallbackHandler.java 
 * 
 * This file was auto-generated from WSDL 
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 * by the Apache Axis2 version: 1.6.1  Built on : Aug 31, 2011 (12:22:40 CEST) 
 */ 
    package uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method; 
    /** 
     *  StudentServiceCallbackHandler Callback class, Users can extend this class and implement 
     *  their own receiveResult and receiveError methods. 
     */ 
    public abstract class StudentServiceCallbackHandler{ 
    protected Object clientData; 
 
    /** 
    * User can pass in any object that needs to be accessed once the NonBlocking 
    * Web service call is finished and appropriate method of this CallBack is called. 
    * @param clientData Object mechanism by which the user can pass in user data 
    * that will be avilable at the time this callback is called. 
    */ 
    public StudentServiceCallbackHandler(Object clientData){ 
        this.clientData = clientData; 
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    } 
 
    /** 
    * Please use this constructor if you don't want to set any clientData 
    */ 
    public StudentServiceCallbackHandler(){ 
        this.clientData = null; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Get the client data 
     */ 
     public Object getClientData() { 
        return clientData; 
     } 
           /** 
            * auto generated Axis2 call back method for getStudnet method 
            * override this method for handling normal response from getStudnet operation 
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            */ 
           public void receiveResultgetStudnet( 
                    uk.ac.sussex.webservices.method.StudentServiceStub.GetStudnetResponse result 
                        ) { 
           } 
          /** 
           * auto generated Axis2 Error handler 
           * override this method for handling error response from getStudnet operation 
           */ 
            public void receiveErrorgetStudnet(java.lang.Exception e) { 
            } 
      } 
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APPENDIX B 
  
- SOURCE CODE OF PDNT 
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PDNT is mainly composed of three java program files: 
4. ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler.java 
5. MessageUtil.java 
6. DNSClient.java 
 
ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler.java 
package soapMessage; 
import java.util.List; 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
import client.DNSClient; 
 
public class ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler { 
 private SOAPMessage soapMessage; 
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 private SOAPPart soapPart; 
 private SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope; 
 private SOAPHeader soapHeader; 
 private SOAPBody soapBody; 
 
 public ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler(SOAPMessage message){ 
  try{ 
   soapMessage=message; 
   this.soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
      this.soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
      this.soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
      this.soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
      if (soapHeader==null){ 
       soapHeader=MessageUtil.createSecureHeader(soapEnvelope);        
      } 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void addDomainNameToken(String domainName){ 
  try{ 
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   soapEnvelope.addNamespaceDeclaration("pdn", MessageUtil.URI_PDN); 
   SOAPElement security=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getChildElements(soapHeader.createQName("Security", "wsse")).next(); 
   SOAPElement participantDominName=security.addChildElement("ParticipantDominName", "pdn"); 
   SOAPElement dn=participantDominName.addChildElement("DomainName", "pdn"); 
   dn.addTextNode(domainName); 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public String getDomainName(){ 
  SOAPElement participantDominName=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("pdn:ParticipantDominName").item(0); 
  SOAPElement dn=(SOAPElement) participantDominName.getElementsByTagName("pdn:DomainName").item(0); 
  String domainName=dn.getTextContent(); 
  return domainName; 
 } 
 
 public String getLookupService(){ 
  SOAPElement participantDominName=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("pdn:ParticipantDominName").item(0); 
  SOAPElement dn=(SOAPElement) participantDominName.getElementsByTagName("pdn:DomainName").item(0); 
  String domainName=dn.getTextContent(); 
  return domainName; 
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 } 
 
 public boolean validate(){ 
  String lookupService=getLookupService(); 
  DNSClient.getAddressRecord(lookupService); 
  return true; 
 } 
   
 public boolean validate(String senderIP){ 
  String lookupService=getLookupService(); 
  List <String> ipList=DNSClient.getAddressRecord(lookupService); 
  for (int i=0;i<ipList.size();i++){ 
   if (ipList.get(i).equals(senderIP)) 
    return true; 
  } 
  return false; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPMessage getSoapMessage() { 
  return soapMessage; 
 } 
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 public void setSoapMessage(SOAPMessage soapMessage) { 
  this.soapMessage = soapMessage; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPPart getSoapPart() { 
  return soapPart; 
 } 
 
 public void setSoapPart(SOAPPart soapPart) { 
  this.soapPart = soapPart; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPEnvelope getSoapEnvelope() { 
  return soapEnvelope; 
 } 
 
 public void setSoapEnvelope(SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope) { 
  this.soapEnvelope = soapEnvelope; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPHeader getSoapHeader() { 
  return soapHeader; 
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 } 
 
 public void setSoapHeader(SOAPHeader soapHeader) { 
  this.soapHeader = soapHeader; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPBody getSoapBody() { 
  return soapBody; 
 } 
 
 public void setSoapBody(SOAPBody soapBody) { 
  this.soapBody = soapBody; 
 } 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) {   
  try{ 
   String senderIP="";   
   MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
   MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
         mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, MessageUtil.readFileToInputStream("soapMessage.xml")); 
   ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler tokenHandler=new ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler(soapMessage); 
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   tokenHandler.validate(senderIP);    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 
MessageUtil.java 
package soapMessage; 
import java.io.BufferedReader; 
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; 
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileInputStream; 
import java.io.FileReader; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.StringReader; 
import java.io.StringWriter; 
import java.security.KeyPair; 
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator; 
import java.security.SecureRandom; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
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import javax.crypto.KeyGenerator; 
import javax.crypto.SecretKey; 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder; 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.Node; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.transform.OutputKeys; 
import javax.xml.transform.Transformer; 
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerException; 
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory; 
import javax.xml.transform.dom.DOMSource; 
import javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamResult; 
import org.apache.xml.security.c14n.Canonicalizer; 
import org.w3c.dom.Document; 
import org.w3c.dom.Element; 
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList; 
import org.xml.sax.InputSource; 
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public abstract class MessageUtil { 
 public static final String URI_DS="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"; 
 public static final String URI_WSSE="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"; 
 public static final String URI_WSU="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"; 
 public static final String URI_XENC="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"; 
 public static final String URI_PDN="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/pdn#"; 
  
 public static void dumpDocument(Node root) throws TransformerException { 
     Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer(); 
     transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.METHOD, "xml");    
     transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes"); 
     transformer.transform(new DOMSource(root), new StreamResult(System.out)); 
     //transformer.transform(new DOMSource(root), sr); 
     //return outText.toString(); 
   } 
 
 public static void dumpDocument(org.w3c.dom.Node root) throws TransformerException { 
//     StringWriter outText = new StringWriter(); 
//     StreamResult sr = new StreamResult(outText); 
     Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer(); 
     transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.METHOD, "xml");    
     transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes"); 
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     transformer.transform(new DOMSource(root), new StreamResult(System.out)); 
     //transformer.transform(new DOMSource(root), sr); 
     //return outText.toString(); 
   } 
  
 public static void writeToFile(Node root,String fileName) { 
  try{ 
   Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer(); 
   File file=new File(fileName); 
   transformer.transform(new DOMSource(root), new StreamResult(file)); 
    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
  
 public static InputStream readFileToFlat (String fileName){ 
  try {     
   File xmlFile=new File(fileName); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(xmlFile)); 
   String line;  
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   StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
   boolean addSpace=false; 
   while((line=br.readLine())!= null){ 
    if (line.length()>0){ 
//     String s=line.trim(); 
     String s=line.trim().replaceAll("\\r\\n", ""); 
     s.replaceAll("\\n", ""); 
     s=s.replaceAll("\\t", ""); 
      
     if (addSpace){ 
      if (!s.substring(0,1).equals("<")){ 
       sb.append(" "); 
       addSpace=false; 
      } 
     } 
      
     sb.append(s); 
     if (!s.substring(s.length()-1).equals(">"))  { 
      addSpace=true;       
     } 
    } 
   }    
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   InputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(sb.toString().getBytes("UTF-8")); 
   System.out.println ("file length="+sb.toString().length()); 
//   System.out.println (sb.toString()); 
   return is;    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 }  
 
 public static InputStream readFileToInputStream (String fileName){ 
  try {     
   FileInputStream fis = null;    
   File xmlFile=new File(fileName); 
   fis = new FileInputStream(xmlFile); 
   return fis; 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 }  
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 public static String readFileToString (String fileName){ 
  try {     
   File xmlFile=new File(fileName); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(xmlFile)); 
   String line;  
   StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
   boolean addSpace=false; 
   while((line=br.readLine())!= null){ 
    if (line.length()>0){ 
     String s=line.trim().replaceAll("\\r\\n", ""); 
     s.replaceAll("\\n", ""); 
     s=s.replaceAll("\\t", ""); 
      
     if (addSpace){ 
      if (!s.substring(0,1).equals("<")){ 
       sb.append(" "); 
       addSpace=false; 
      } 
     } 
      
     sb.append(s); 
     if (!s.substring(s.length()-1).equals(">"))  { 
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      addSpace=true;       
     } 
    } 
   }       
   sb.append("\r\n\r\n"); 
   return sb.toString();    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 }  
 public static String serialize(Iterator elements){ 
  try { 
   Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer();  
   StringWriter stw = new StringWriter(); 
   transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.OMIT_XML_DECLARATION, "yes"); 
   transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.STANDALONE,"yes"); 
   transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.MEDIA_TYPE,"text"); 
   while (elements.hasNext()) { 
//    Element element = (Element) elements.next(); 
    Node element = (Node) elements.next(); 
    if (element!=null) 
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     transformer.transform(new DOMSource(element), new StreamResult(stw)); 
   } 
    
//   return canonicalize(stw.toString()); 
   String result=stw.toString().replace("xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XMLSchema-instance\" ", ""); 
   return result; 
  }catch (Exception e) { 
   System.out.println("error in serialize"); 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
   
 } 
  
 public static String serialize(Element element){ 
  try { 
   Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer();  
   StringWriter stw = new StringWriter(); 
   transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.OMIT_XML_DECLARATION, "yes"); 
   transformer.transform(new DOMSource(element), new StreamResult(stw));  
//   return canonicalize(stw.toString()); 
   return stw.toString(); 
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  }catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
   
 } 
 
 public static String serialize(NodeList content) throws Exception { //XMLEncryptionException { 
  org.apache.xml.security.Init.init();    
     Canonicalizer canon = Canonicalizer.getInstance(Canonicalizer.ALGO_ID_C14N_WITH_COMMENTS); 
      
  ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
        canon.setWriter(baos); 
        canon.notReset(); 
        for (int i = 0; i < content.getLength(); i++) {                 
            canon.canonicalizeSubtree(content.item(i));                 
        } 
        baos.close(); 
        return baos.toString("UTF-8"); 
    } 
  
 public static String canonicalize(String xml){ 
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  try{ 
   org.apache.xml.security.Init.init();    
      Canonicalizer canon = Canonicalizer.getInstance(Canonicalizer.ALGO_ID_C14N_WITH_COMMENTS); 
      byte canonXmlBytes[] = canon.canonicalize(xml.getBytes());  
      return new String(canonXmlBytes);        
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
  
 public static String readFile(String fileName){ 
  try {     
   File xmlFile=new File(fileName); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(xmlFile)); 
   String line;  
   StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
   boolean addSpace=false; 
   while((line=br.readLine())!= null){ 
    if (line.length()>0){ 
     String s=line.trim(); 
     s=s.replaceAll("\\t", ""); 
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    }    
   }    
   return sb.toString(); 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
   
 } 
  
 public static SOAPHeader createSecureHeader(SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope) throws Exception{ 
  soapEnvelope.addNamespaceDeclaration("wsse", MessageUtil.URI_WSSE); 
  SOAPHeader soapHeader=soapEnvelope.addHeader(); 
  soapHeader.addHeaderElement(soapEnvelope.createQName("Security","wsse")); 
  return soapHeader; 
 } 
 
 public static KeyPair generateKeyPair(){ 
  try{ 
     //KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA"); 
     KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA"); 
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     kpg.initialize(1024, new SecureRandom());      
     KeyPair keypair = kpg.generateKeyPair(); 
     return keypair; 
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 }  
  
 public static SecretKey GenerateSymmetricKey() throws Exception{ 
     String jceAlgorithmName = "AES"; 
     KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance(jceAlgorithmName); 
     keyGenerator.init(128); 
     return keyGenerator.generateKey(); 
 } 
 
 public static SecretKey GenerateKeyEncryptionKey() throws Exception { 
     String jceAlgorithmName = "DESede"; 
     KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance(jceAlgorithmName); 
     SecretKey keyEncryptKey = keyGenerator.generateKey();  
     return keyEncryptKey; 
    } 
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 public static Document stringToDocument(String plainText) { 
  try{ 
   DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance(); 
      DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder(); 
      InputSource is = new InputSource( new StringReader( plainText ) ); 
      Document d = builder.parse( is ); 
      return d; 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public static SOAPMessage getSOAPMessage(String fileName){ 
  try { 
   MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
   MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
         mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, MessageUtil.readFileToInputStream(fileName)); 
   return soapMessage; 
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  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public static byte[] inputStreamToByteArray(InputStream in) throws IOException{ 
  ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(1024); 
  byte[] buffer = new byte[1024]; 
  int len; 
  while((len = in.read(buffer)) >= 0){ 
   baos.write(buffer, 0, len); 
  } 
  in.close(); 
  baos.close(); 
  return baos.toByteArray(); 
 }  
} 
DNSClient.java 
package client; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.List; 
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import org.xbill.DNS.ARecord; 
import org.xbill.DNS.Lookup; 
import org.xbill.DNS.Record; 
import org.xbill.DNS.SRVRecord; 
import org.xbill.DNS.TXTRecord; 
import org.xbill.DNS.Type; 
 
 
public  class DNSClient { 
 public static List<String> getSrvRecord(String lookupService){ 
  try { 
    
   List<String> hostList=new ArrayList<String>(); 
   Record [] records = new Lookup(lookupService, Type.SRV).run(); 
   for (int i = 0; i < records.length; i++) { 
    SRVRecord srvRecord=(SRVRecord) records[i]; 
    hostList.add(srvRecord.getTarget().toString()); 
   }    
   return hostList;  
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
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  } 
 } 
 
 public static String getARecord(String hostName){ 
  try{ 
   Record [] records = new Lookup(hostName, Type.A).run(); 
   ARecord aRecord=(ARecord) records[0]; 
   return aRecord.getAddress().toString(); 
    
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
  
  
 public static List<String> getAddressRecord(String lookupService){ 
  List<String> ipList=new ArrayList<String>(); 
  List<String> hostList=getSrvRecord(lookupService);   
  for (int i=0;i<hostList.size();i++){ 
   ipList.add(getARecord(hostList.get(i))); 
  } 
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  return ipList; 
 } 
  
  
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  try{ 
   long startMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   System.out.println(DNSClient.getAddressRecord("_pdn._tcp.sussex.ac.uk")); 
   long endMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   Long processingTime=endMillis-startMillis; 
   System.out.println("Query Time:" + processingTime + "ms"); 
    
  }catch (Exception e ){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX C 
  
- SOURCE CODE OF  
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
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The performance evaluation of PDNT is mainly composed of eight java program files: 
1. HTTPServer.java 
2. RequestProcessor.java 
3. HTTPClient.java 
4. SOAPDescruption.java 
5. SOAPEncryption.java 
6. SOAPSignature.java 
7. UsernameToken.java 
8. ParticipantDomainTokenHandler.java (shown in appendix A) 
 
HTTPServer.java 
package server; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.net.ServerSocket; 
import java.net.Socket; 
 
 
public class HTTPServer { 
 private ServerSocket serverSocket; 
 private static final int HTTP_PORT = 8888; 
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 public void start(){ 
  start (HTTP_PORT); 
 } 
 
 public void start(int port){ 
  Socket socket; 
  try{ 
   serverSocket=new ServerSocket(port); 
   System.out.println("Server Started at port " + port); 
   while (true) { 
    socket=null; 
//    synchronized (serverSocket) { 
     socket=serverSocket.accept(); 
//    }            
    socket.setSoTimeout(0); 
    new RequestProcessor(socket).start();     
   } 
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
   
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
  HTTPServer httpServer=new HTTPServer(); 
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  httpServer.start(); 
 } 
 
} 
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RequestProcessor.java 
package server; 
import java.io.BufferedReader; 
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.InputStreamReader; 
import java.io.PrintStream; 
import java.net.Socket; 
 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
 
import org.apache.http.ProtocolVersion; 
import org.apache.http.RequestLine; 
import org.apache.http.message.BasicHttpEntityEnclosingRequest; 
import org.apache.http.message.BasicRequestLine; 
 
import soapMessage.ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler; 
import soapMessage.SOAPDecryption; 
import soapMessage.SOAPSignature; 
import soapMessage.UserNameToken; 
 
public class RequestProcessor extends Thread{ 
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 private Socket client; 
 private InputStream input; 
 private PrintStream output; 
 private Long processingTime; 
 private long startMillis; 
 private long endMillis; 
  
 public RequestProcessor(Socket socket){ 
  try{ 
   startMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   client=socket; 
   input =client.getInputStream();       
   output = new PrintStream(client.getOutputStream()); 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public void run(){ 
  try { 
//   System.out.println("Accepting HTTP Request"); 
   parse(input); 
    
   sendResponse(); 
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   output.close(); 
   input.close();    
    
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private void sendResponse(){ 
  String soapxml=buildSOAPResponse(); 
  output.println("HTTP/1.1 200 OK"); 
  output.println("Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8"); 
  output.println("Content-length: "+ soapxml.length()); 
  output.println(""); 
  output.println(soapxml); 
  output.flush();   
 } 
  
 private String buildSOAPResponse(){ 
  StringBuilder message= new StringBuilder(); 
  message.append("Processing Time:"+processingTime); 
  return message.toString(); 
 }  
  
 private RequestLine getRequestLine(String requestLine){ 
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  String[] line=requestLine.split(" "); 
   
  String method=line[0]; 
  String uri=line[1]; 
  String protocolLine=line[2]; 
   
  String protocol=protocolLine.substring(0,protocolLine.indexOf("/")); 
  String version=protocolLine.substring(protocolLine.indexOf("/")+1); 
   
  String[] versionDetail=version.split("\\.");   
  int major=Integer.parseInt(versionDetail[0]); 
  int minor=Integer.parseInt(versionDetail[1]); 
   
  ProtocolVersion protocolVersion=new ProtocolVersion(protocol,major,minor); 
  return new BasicRequestLine(method,uri,protocolVersion); 
   
 } 
 
 public void parse(InputStream input) { 
  try {    
    
   BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(input)); 
   char [] data=null; 
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   String line; 
   line=in.readLine();    
    
   BasicHttpEntityEnclosingRequest httpRequest=new BasicHttpEntityEnclosingRequest(getRequestLine(line));   
       
   int contentLength=0; 
 
   while (true) { 
    line=in.readLine();            
    String[] header=line.split(":");     
    System.out.println(line); 
    if (header.length>=2) { 
     httpRequest.addHeader(header[0].trim(), header[1].trim()); 
     if (header[0].equals("Content-Length")){ 
      contentLength=Integer.parseInt(header[1].trim()); 
      data=new char[contentLength];       
     } 
    } 
    if (line.equals("")){ 
     break; 
    } 
   } 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace();    
  } 
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 } 
  
 private void handleSoapMessage(String soapData){ 
  try { 
    
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=getSOAPMesssage(soapData); 
   handleSoapMessageUserNameToken(soapMessage); 
    
   endMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   processingTime=endMillis-startMillis; 
   System.out.println(processingTime); 
    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   System.out.println("error in handleSoapMessage"); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private SOAPMessage handleSoapMessageDecryption(SOAPMessage soapMessage){ 
  SOAPDecryption soapDecrption =new SOAPDecryption(soapMessage);    
  soapDecrption.decrypt();   
  soapDecrption.getSoapPart().getFirstChild(); 
  return soapDecrption.getSoapMessage(); 
 } 
  
 private void handleSoapMessageValidation(SOAPMessage soapMessage){ 
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  try{ 
   SOAPSignature soapSignature=new SOAPSignature();  
   soapSignature.validation(soapMessage.getSOAPHeader()); 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private void handleSoapMessagePDN(SOAPMessage soapMessage){ 
  try{ 
   ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler tokenHandler=new ParticipantDomainNameTokenHandler(soapMessage); 
   tokenHandler.validate();    
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private void handleSoapMessageUserNameToken(SOAPMessage soapMessage){ 
  try{ 
   UserNameToken userNameToken=new UserNameToken(soapMessage); 
   userNameToken.validatePasswordDigest(); 
    
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
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 } 
  
  
 private SOAPMessage getSOAPMesssage(String soapData){ 
  try{ 
   MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
   MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
         mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, new ByteArrayInputStream(soapData.toString().getBytes("UTF-8"))); 
    
   return soapMessage; 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   System.out.println("error in getSOAPMessage");    
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 
} 
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HTTPClient.java 
package client; 
import java.io.BufferedReader; 
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.InputStreamReader; 
 
import org.apache.http.Header; 
import org.apache.http.HttpEntity; 
import org.apache.http.HttpResponse; 
import org.apache.http.HttpVersion; 
import org.apache.http.client.HttpClient; 
import org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpGet; 
import org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpPost; 
import org.apache.http.entity.StringEntity; 
import org.apache.http.impl.client.DefaultHttpClient; 
import org.apache.http.params.BasicHttpParams; 
import org.apache.http.params.HttpParams; 
import org.apache.http.params.HttpProtocolParams; 
 
import soapMessage.MessageUtil; 
 
public class HTTPClient extends Thread { 
 private String records="100"; 
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 private String fileName="soapMessagePDNUserName"+records+".xml"; 
  
 HttpClient  httpclient=new DefaultHttpClient(); 
  
 public HTTPClient(){   
  httpclient.getParams().setParameter("http.socket.timeout", new Integer(0)); 
  httpclient.getParams().setParameter("http.connection.timeout", new Integer(0)); 
  httpclient.getParams().setParameter("http.connection-manager.timeout", new Integer(0));  
  HttpProtocolParams.setUserAgent(httpclient.getParams(), "soapClient/1.1 searchTemplate/1.0"); 
 } 
  
 public void run(){ 
  try{ 
   this.parsing(this.submit()); 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   System.out.println("Exception in run"); 
  } 
 } 
  
 private HttpParams getHttpParams(){ 
  HttpParams params = new BasicHttpParams(); 
  HttpProtocolParams.setVersion(params, HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1); 
  HttpProtocolParams.setContentCharset(params, "UTF-8"); 
  HttpProtocolParams.setUserAgent(params, "HttpComponents/1.1"); 
  HttpProtocolParams.setUseExpectContinue(params, true); 
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  return params; 
 } 
  
 public HttpResponse go(){ 
  try { 
      HttpGet httpget = new HttpGet("http://www.pj.gov.mo"); 
      httpget.getParams().setParameter("http.socket.timeout", new Integer(0)); 
    return httpclient.execute(httpget); 
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public HttpResponse submit() throws Exception{ 
  StringEntity se=null; 
  try { 
   HttpPost httppost = new HttpPost("http://192.168.111.74:8888");    
   httppost.getParams().setParameter("http.socket.timeout", new Integer(0)); 
   se = new StringEntity(buildSOAPRequest(),"UTF-8"); 
   se.setContentType("text/xml");    
   httppost.setHeader("Content-Type","application/soap+xml;charset=UTF-8"); 
   httppost.setEntity(se); 
   return httpclient.execute(httppost);    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
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   System.out.println("Exception in submit");    
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void parsing(HttpResponse response){ 
   try { 
    System.out.println("parsing"); 
     
   HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();      
    Header httpHeaders[]=response.getAllHeaders(); 
 
    for (int i=0;i<httpHeaders.length;i++){ 
     Header header=httpHeaders[i];      
     System.out.print(header.getName()+ ":");  
     System.out.println(header.getValue()); 
    } 
     
    if (entity != null) { 
     InputStream instream = entity.getContent(); 
     BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(instream)); 
     char[] str=new char[Integer.parseInt(response.getHeaders("Content-length")[0].getValue())]; 
     in.read(str);           
     System.out.println(new String(str)); 
    }   
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   }catch (Exception e){ 
    System.out.println("Exception in parsing"); 
   }     
  } 
  
 private String buildSOAPRequest(){ 
  return MessageUtil.readFileToString(fileName); 
 } 
  
  
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
   
  int noOfRequests=1; 
  for (int i=0;i<noOfRequests;i++)    
   { 
    new HTTPClient().start(); 
    try { 
     Thread.sleep(200); 
    } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
     e.printStackTrace(); 
    }  
   } 
 } 
 
} 
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SOAPDescription.java 
package soapMessage; 
 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
import org.w3c.dom.Document; 
import org.w3c.dom.Node; 
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList; 
 
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.utils.Base64; 
 
public class SOAPDecryption { 
 
 private SOAPMessage soapMessage; 
 private SOAPPart soapPart; 
 private SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope; 
 private SOAPHeader soapHeader; 
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 private SOAPBody soapBody; 
 private byte[] symmetricKey;  
  
 public SOAPDecryption(SOAPMessage message ){ 
  try{ 
    
   this.soapMessage=message; 
   this.soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
      this.soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
      this.soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
      this.soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
 
       
       
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   System.out.println("exception in init"); 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public void decrypt(){ 
  try{ 
   SOAPElement cipherValue=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("xenc:CipherValue").item(0);   
   String keyEncryptedKey=cipherValue.getTextContent();    
   symmetricKey=KeyManager.decryptSymmetricKey(Base64.decode(keyEncryptedKey)); 
224 
 
APPENDIX 
    
   cipherValue=(SOAPElement) soapBody.getElementsByTagName("xenc:CipherValue").item(0); 
   String cipherText=cipherValue.getTextContent();   
    
   String plainText=KeyManager.doSymantecDecryption(symmetricKey, KeyManager.Algorithm_AES, Base64.decode(cipherText)); 
 
   //Merge Node 
   Document doc=MessageUtil.stringToDocument(plainText); 
   Node newChild=doc.getChildNodes().item(0); 
   Node oldChild=soapBody.getChildNodes().item(0);    
   soapBody.removeChild(oldChild); 
   Node importNode=soapPart.importNode(newChild, true); 
   soapBody.appendChild(importNode); 
   Node securityNode=soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("wsse:Security").item(0); 
   Node encryptedKeyNode=soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("xenc:EncryptedKey").item(0); 
   securityNode.removeChild(encryptedKeyNode); 
    
   soapEnvelope.removeNamespaceDeclaration("xenc"); 
    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
   
 } 
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 public SOAPPart getSoapPart() { 
  return soapPart; 
 } 
 
 public void setSoapPart(SOAPPart soapPart) { 
  this.soapPart = soapPart; 
 } 
  
  
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  try {    
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=MessageUtil.getSOAPMessage("soapMessageEncrypted100.xml");    
   SOAPDecryption soapDecrption =new SOAPDecryption(soapMessage); 
    
   long startMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   soapDecrption.decrypt(); 
   long endMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
    
    
   MessageUtil.dumpDocument(soapDecrption.getSoapPart()); 
   Long processingTime=endMillis-startMillis; 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
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 public SOAPMessage getSoapMessage() { 
  return soapMessage; 
 } 
 
 public void setSoapMessage(SOAPMessage soapMessage) { 
  this.soapMessage = soapMessage; 
 } 
} 
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SOAPEncryption.java 
package soapMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.Node; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
import org.w3c.dom.Element; 
 
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.utils.Base64; 
 
public class SOAPEncryption { 
 private SOAPMessage soapMessage; 
 private SOAPPart soapPart; 
 private SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope; 
 private SOAPHeader soapHeader; 
 private SOAPBody soapBody; 
 private byte[] symmetricKey; 
 private String encryptedSymmetricKey; 
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 public SOAPEncryption(SOAPMessage soapMessage ){ 
  try{ 
    
    
   this.soapMessage=soapMessage; 
   this.soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
      this.soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
      this.soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
      this.soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
       
      if (soapHeader==null){ 
       soapHeader=MessageUtil.createSecureHeader(soapEnvelope);        
      } 
       
   symmetricKey=KeyManager.genSymmetricKey(KeyManager.Algorithm_AES); 
   encryptedSymmetricKey=Base64.encode(KeyManager.encryptSymmetricKey(symmetricKey));       
       
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public void encrypt(String referenceName){ 
  try { 
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   addEncryptHeader(referenceName); 
   String plainText=MessageUtil.serialize(soapBody.getChildElements());    
   String cipherText=Base64.encode(KeyManager.doSymantecEncryption(symmetricKey, KeyManager.Algorithm_AES, plainText)); 
    
   while (soapBody.getChildElements().hasNext()){ 
    soapBody.removeChild((Node) soapBody.getChildElements().next()); 
   } 
    
   SOAPElement EncryptedData=soapBody.addChildElement("EncryptedData", "xenc"); 
   SOAPElement encryptionMethod=EncryptedData.addChildElement("EncryptionMethod", "xenc"); 
   encryptionMethod.setAttribute("Algorithm", "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc");    
   SOAPElement CipherData=EncryptedData.addChildElement("CipherData", "xenc"); 
   SOAPElement CipherValue=CipherData.addChildElement("CipherValue","xenc"); 
   CipherValue.addTextNode(cipherText); 
    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace();    
  } 
   
 } 
  
 private void addEncryptHeader(String referenceName){ 
  try{ 
   soapEnvelope.addNamespaceDeclaration("xenc", MessageUtil.URI_XENC); 
   SOAPElement security=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getChildElements(soapHeader.createQName("Security", "wsse")).next(); 
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   SOAPElement encryptedKey=security.addChildElement("EncryptedKey", "xenc"); 
   SOAPElement encryptionMethod=encryptedKey.addChildElement("EncryptionMethod", "xenc"); 
   encryptionMethod.setAttribute("Algorithm", "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"); 
   SOAPElement keyInfo=encryptedKey.addChildElement("KeyInfo","ds","http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"); 
   SOAPElement securityTokenReference=keyInfo.addChildElement("SecurityTokenReference","wsse"); 
   SOAPElement x509IssuerSerial=securityTokenReference.addChildElement("X509IssuerSerial", "ds"); 
   SOAPElement X509IssuerName=x509IssuerSerial.addChildElement("X509IssuerName", "ds"); 
   X509IssuerName.addTextNode(KeyManager.getIssuerName()); 
   SOAPElement x509SerialNumber=x509IssuerSerial.addChildElement("X509SerialNumber", "ds"); 
   x509SerialNumber.addTextNode(KeyManager.getIssuerSerialNumber()); 
    
   SOAPElement cipherData=encryptedKey.addChildElement("CipherData", "xenc"); 
   SOAPElement cipherValue=cipherData.addChildElement("CipherValue", "xenc"); 
   cipherValue.addTextNode(encryptedSymmetricKey); 
    
   SOAPElement referenceList=encryptedKey.addChildElement("ReferenceList", "xenc"); 
   SOAPElement dataReference=referenceList.addChildElement("DataReference" , "xenc"); 
   dataReference.setAttribute("URI", referenceName); 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public SOAPMessage getSoapMessage() { 
  return soapMessage; 
231 
 
APPENDIX 
 } 
 
 public SOAPPart getSoapPart() { 
  return soapPart; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPEnvelope getSoapEnvelope() { 
  return soapEnvelope; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPHeader getSoapHeader() { 
  return soapHeader; 
 } 
 
 public SOAPBody getSoapBody() { 
  return soapBody; 
 } 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  try { 
   String records="500"; 
    
   long startMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
 
   MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
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   MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
         mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
   SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, MessageUtil.readFileToInputStream("soapMessage.xml")); 
  
 
   SOAPEncryption soapEncryption=new SOAPEncryption(soapMessage);  
      soapEncryption.encrypt("#MsgBody"); 
       
    
      long endMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
      MessageUtil.writeToFile(soapEncryption.getSoapPart(),"soapMessageEncrypted"+records+".xml"); 
      Long processingTime=endMillis-startMillis; 
      MessageUtil.dumpDocument(soapEncryption.getSoapPart()); 
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  }   
 } 
 
 public byte[] getSymmetricKey() { 
  return symmetricKey; 
 } 
 
 public void setSymmetricKey(byte[] symmetricKey) { 
  this.symmetricKey = symmetricKey; 
 } 
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 public String getEncryptedSymmetricKey() { 
  return encryptedSymmetricKey; 
 } 
 
 public void setEncryptedSymmetricKey(String encryptedSymmetricKey) { 
  this.encryptedSymmetricKey = encryptedSymmetricKey; 
 } 
 
} 
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SOAPSignature.java 
package soapMessage; 
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.security.KeyFactory; 
import java.security.KeyPair; 
import java.security.PrivateKey; 
import java.security.PublicKey; 
import java.security.spec.RSAPublicKeySpec; 
import java.util.Collections; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.CanonicalizationMethod; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.DigestMethod; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.Reference; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.SignatureMethod; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.SignedInfo; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.XMLSignature; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.XMLSignatureFactory; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.dom.DOMSignContext; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.dom.DOMValidateContext; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.keyinfo.KeyInfo; 
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import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.keyinfo.KeyInfoFactory; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.keyinfo.KeyValue; 
import javax.xml.crypto.dsig.spec.C14NMethodParameterSpec; 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.Node; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList; 
import org.w3c.dom.Text; 
 
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.utils.Base64; 
 
public class SOAPSignature { 
 
 public void sign(KeyPair keypair,String referenceName, SOAPHeader soapHeader){ 
  try { 
 
      XMLSignatureFactory sigFactory = XMLSignatureFactory.getInstance(); 
      Reference ref = sigFactory.newReference(referenceName, sigFactory.newDigestMethod(DigestMethod.SHA1, 
          null)); 
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      SignedInfo signedInfo = sigFactory.newSignedInfo(sigFactory.newCanonicalizationMethod( 
          CanonicalizationMethod.INCLUSIVE_WITH_COMMENTS, (C14NMethodParameterSpec) null), sigFactory 
          .newSignatureMethod(SignatureMethod.RSA_SHA1, null), Collections.singletonList(ref)); 
      KeyInfoFactory kif = sigFactory.getKeyInfoFactory(); 
      KeyValue kv = kif.newKeyValue(keypair.getPublic()); 
      KeyInfo keyInfo = kif.newKeyInfo(Collections.singletonList(kv));  
      XMLSignature xmlSignature = sigFactory.newXMLSignature(signedInfo, keyInfo); 
       
      PrivateKey privateKey = keypair.getPrivate(); 
      DOMSignContext sigContext = new DOMSignContext(privateKey, soapHeader.getFirstChild()); //include the signature element in 
<wsse:Security> 
      sigContext.putNamespacePrefix(XMLSignature.XMLNS, "ds"); 
      xmlSignature.sign(sigContext); 
   }catch (Exception e){ 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
 } 
 public boolean validation(SOAPHeader soapHeader){ 
     try{ 
      NodeList nodeList=soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("ds:Signature"); 
      DOMValidateContext valContext = new DOMValidateContext(getPublicKeyFromHeader(soapHeader), nodeList.item(0)); 
   XMLSignatureFactory sigFactory = XMLSignatureFactory.getInstance(); 
   XMLSignature xmlSignature = sigFactory.unmarshalXMLSignature(valContext); 
    
   boolean coreValidity=xmlSignature.validate(valContext);  
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   if (coreValidity == false) { 
       boolean sv = xmlSignature.getSignatureValue().validate(valContext); 
System.out.println(Base64.encode(xmlSignature.getSignatureValue().getValue())); 
        
       if (sv == false) { 
           // Check the validation status of each Reference. 
           Iterator i = xmlSignature.getSignedInfo().getReferences().iterator(); 
           for (int j=0; i.hasNext(); j++) { 
               boolean refValid = ((Reference) i.next()).validate(valContext); 
           } 
       } 
   } else { 
   } 
   return coreValidity; 
     }catch (Exception e){ 
      e.printStackTrace(); 
      return false; 
     } 
 } 
  
 public PublicKey getPublicKeyFromHeader(SOAPHeader soapHeader){ 
    try { 
   NodeList nodeList=soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("ds:Modulus"); 
   Node node=(Node) nodeList.item(0); 
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   Text text=(Text) node.getChildNodes().item(0); 
   BigInteger mod=Base64.decodeBigIntegerFromText(text); 
            
      nodeList=soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("ds:Exponent"); 
      node=(Node) nodeList.item(0); 
      text=(Text) node.getChildNodes().item(0); 
      BigInteger exp=Base64.decodeBigIntegerFromText(text); 
       
      KeyFactory rsaFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("RSA"); 
      RSAPublicKeySpec rsaKeyspec =new RSAPublicKeySpec(mod,exp);       
      PublicKey publicKey = rsaFactory.generatePublic(rsaKeyspec);  
      return publicKey; 
    }catch (Exception e){ 
     e.printStackTrace(); 
     return null; 
    } 
   } 
  
   
 public static void main(String[] args) {  
   
  try{ 
   long startMillis = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   SOAPSignature soapSignature=new SOAPSignature();  
   MessageFactory factory = MessageFactory.newInstance();          
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   MimeHeaders mimeHeaders = new MimeHeaders(); 
          mimeHeaders.addHeader("Content-Type","text/xml; charset=UTF-8"); 
SOAPMessage soapMessage=factory.createMessage(mimeHeaders, 
MessageUtil.readFileToInputStream("soapMessagePDNSigned100.xml"));   
   SOAPPart soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
      SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
      SOAPHeader soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader();  
      if (soapHeader==null){ 
       soapHeader=MessageUtil.createSecureHeader(soapEnvelope);        
      } 
       
       
      SOAPBody soapBody = soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
      System.out.println(soapSignature.validation(soapHeader)); 
 
  } catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 
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UsernameToken.java 
package soapMessage; 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.security.MessageDigest; 
import java.security.SecureRandom; 
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat; 
import java.util.Date; 
 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPHeader; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.utils.Base64; 
 
public class UserNameToken { 
 private SOAPMessage soapMessage; 
 private SOAPPart soapPart; 
 private SOAPEnvelope soapEnvelope; 
 private SOAPHeader soapHeader; 
 private SOAPBody soapBody; 
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 final static String xsdDateFormat="yyyy-MM-dd'T'HH:mm:ssZ"; 
 private BigInteger nonce; 
 private String created; 
 private byte[] hash; 
  
 public UserNameToken(){ 
   
 } 
  
 public UserNameToken(SOAPMessage message){ 
  try{ 
   soapMessage=message; 
   this.soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart();    
      this.soapEnvelope = soapPart.getEnvelope();             
      this.soapHeader = soapEnvelope.getHeader(); 
      this.soapBody=soapEnvelope.getBody(); 
       
      if (soapHeader==null){ 
       soapHeader=MessageUtil.createSecureHeader(soapEnvelope);        
      } 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
   
 } 
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 public boolean validatePasswordDigest(){ 
  SOAPElement userNameToken=(SOAPElement) soapHeader.getElementsByTagName("wsse:UsernameToken").item(0); 
  SOAPElement passwordElement=(SOAPElement) userNameToken.getElementsByTagName("wsse:Password").item(0); 
  String passwordDigest=passwordElement.getTextContent(); 
  SOAPElement nonceElement=(SOAPElement) userNameToken.getElementsByTagName("wsse:Nonce").item(0); 
  String nonceBase64=nonceElement.getTextContent(); 
  SOAPElement createdElement=(SOAPElement) userNameToken.getElementsByTagName("wsu:Created").item(0); 
  String created=createdElement.getTextContent(); 
  return validatePasswordDigest(nonceBase64, created, passwordDigest); 
 } 
  
 private BigInteger generateNonce(){ 
  try{ 
   SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG"); 
   String randomValue=new Integer(random.nextInt()).toString();   
   return new BigInteger(randomValue); 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace();  
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
 
 private String getDate(){ 
  return new SimpleDateFormat(xsdDateFormat).format(new Date());     
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 } 
  
 private Date dateParse(String date){ 
  try{ 
   return new SimpleDateFormat(xsdDateFormat).parse(date); 
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  } 
 } 
  
 private byte[] getSha1Hash(String text){ 
  try{ 
   MessageDigest sha = null; 
   sha = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1");    
   sha.update(text.getBytes()); 
   return sha.digest(); 
    
  }catch (Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return null; 
  }   
 } 
  
 public String createPasswordDigest(String password){ 
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  nonce=generateNonce(); 
  created=getDate(); 
  hash=getSha1Hash(nonce+created+password); 
  return Base64.encode(hash); 
 } 
 
 public String createPasswordDigest(BigInteger nonce,String created,String password){ 
  hash=getSha1Hash(nonce+created+password); 
  return Base64.encode(hash); 
 } 
  
  
 public BigInteger getNonce() { 
  return nonce; 
 } 
 
 public String getNonceBase64(){ 
  return Base64.encode(nonce); 
 } 
  
 public void setNonce(BigInteger nonce) { 
  this.nonce = nonce; 
 } 
 
 public void setNonce(byte[] nonce){ 
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  this.nonce=new BigInteger(nonce);   
 } 
   
 public String getCreated() { 
  return created; 
 } 
 
 public void setCreated(String created) { 
  this.created = created; 
 }  
 
 public boolean validatePasswordDigest(String nonceBase64,String created,String passwordDigest){ 
  try{ 
   BigInteger n=new BigInteger(Base64.decode(nonceBase64)); 
   String digest=createPasswordDigest(n,created,"Test"); 
   if (digest.equals(passwordDigest)) 
    return true; 
   else 
    return false; 
    
  }catch(Exception e){ 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
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 public static void main(String[] args)throws Exception{ 
  UserNameToken un=new UserNameToken(); 
  System.out.println(un.validatePasswordDigest("zgniDw==", "2012-02-10T16:45:27+0800", "NtaIDHV2y+beT9ED5IUUck9dvqE=")); 
   
 } 
} 
 
 
 
